The "24 Theses" of Thomas Aquinas have always bothered me.

These theses, promulgated by the Sacred Congregation of Studies in 1914 during the pontificate of Pius X have traditionally (of course, in a neo-traditional sense) been given as the central theses of the philosophical teaching of Aquinas, especially in the metaphysical realm.

I can of course not fault the intention of The Church: "We admonish professors to bear well in mind that they cannot set aside St. Thomas, especially in metaphysical questions, without grave disadvantage". --Pope St. Pius X, Pascendi Dominici Gregis

(Please excuse the non-linearity of the following. I am past my bedtime.)

What I don't yet understand (though I do not deny) is this statement:
"eas (dictis thesibus) plane continere sancti Doctoris principia et pronuntiata maiora"

Quite a statement. My question is, what is the value or importance of attempting to identify 'eas'? (Also how are assured are we to know that the above is right? And are we bound to believe them?)

A philosophical objection: Philosophy is of reason. Metaphysics is the most difficult and highest attainment of such acts of reason. Therefore it is unfitting most of all to assert metaphysical principles as statements and self-evident.

...I found this comment on a post on Thomistica.net: "Moreover, the tradition to express his thought by way of formulating principles and building on them like for instance Antonin Réginald (+ 1676) or more recently Norberto del Prado is an effective way to master Aquinas's thought and to receive an intellectual framework. Manuals like Gredt and others did precisely that."

My problem with this is that maxim-memorizing is that it neither follows the order of learning in coming-to-know a science, nor does it follow the order of being whereby those things known in science are intrinsically governed. Hence it seem to me memorizing metaphysical tenants would not be a "an effective way to master Aquinas's thought," but a sign of a lack of mastery-- especially if one were to think that by knowing the tenants one had mastered the thought of Thomas!! Therefore, it seems especially unfitting that the theses be promulgated amongst the "professors" which Pius X was above admonishing (who, by professing, claim at least some real mastery).

I've grown to really dislike the manual tradition because it seems to destroy the order which Thomas proceeds from himself (and therefore something quite central to the thought of Thomas). If it's a concession, it's conceding too much.

So, if I need to be a manualist in order to be a Thomist, I am not a Thomist.

Your comments and clarification are most welcome.

Though it is tardy, where Our Lady is concerned, it is better to honor her later, rather than never. In light of this, I attach a homily that John Paul II gave on the feast of the annunciation in the Great Jubilee in the year of Our Lord 2000 at the Basilica of the Annunciation in Nazareth. May God bless you all, and Our Lady keep you! Theotokos, Save Us!

“Behold the handmaid of the Lord. Be it done unto me according to your word” (Angelus Prayer).

Your Beatitude,
Brother Bishops,
Father Custos,
Dear Brothers and Sisters,

1. 25th March in the year 2000, the Solemnity of the Annunciation in the Year of the Great Jubilee: on this day the eyes of the whole Church turn to Nazareth. I have longed to come back to the town of Jesus, to feel once again, in contact with this place, the presence of the woman of whom Saint Augustine wrote: “He chose the mother he had created; he created the mother he had chosen” (Sermo 69, 3, 4). Here it is especially easy to understand why all generations call Mary blessed (cf. Lk 2:48).

I warmly greet Your Beatitude Patriarch Michel Sabbah, and thank you for your kind words of presentation. With Archbishop Boutros Mouallem and all of you – Bishops, priests, religious women and men, and members of the laity – I rejoice in the grace of this solemn celebration. I am happy to have this opportunity to greet the Franciscan Minister General, Father Giacomo Bini, who welcomed me on my arrival, and to express to the Custos, Father Giovanni Battistelli, and the Friars of the Custody the admiration of the whole Church for the devotion with which you carry out your unique vocation. With gratitude I pay tribute to your faithfulness to the charge given to you by Saint Francis himself and confirmed by the Popes down the centuries.

2. We are gathered to celebrate the great mystery accomplished here two thousand years ago. The Evangelist Luke situates the event clearly in time and place: “In the sixth month, the angel Gabriel was sent by God to a town in Galilee called Nazareth, to a virgin betrothed to a man named Joseph. . . The virgin’s name was Mary” (1:26-27). But in order to understand what took place in Nazareth two thousand years ago, we must return to the Reading from the Letter to the Hebrews. That text enables us, as it were, to listen to a conversation between the Father and the Son concerning God’s purpose from all eternity. “You who wanted no sacrifice or oblation prepared a body for me. You took no pleasure in holocausts or sacrifices for sin. Then I said. . . ?God, here I am! I am coming to obey your will’” (10:5-7). The Letter to the Hebrews is telling us that, in obedience to the Father’s will, the Eternal Word comes among us to offer the sacrifice which surpasses all the sacrifices offered under the former Covenant. His is the eternal and perfect sacrifice which redeems the world.

The divine plan is gradually revealed in the Old Testament, particularly in the words of the Prophet Isaiah which we have just heard: “The Lord himself will give you a sign. It is this: the virgin is with child and will soon give birth to a child whom she will call Emmanuel” (7:14). Emmanuel - God with us. In these words, the unique event that was to take place in Nazareth in the fullness of time is foretold, and it is this event that we are celebrating here with intense joy and happiness.

3. Our Jubilee Pilgrimage has been a journey in spirit, which began in the footsteps of Abraham, “our father in faith” (Roman Canon; cf. Rom 4:11-12). That journey has brought us today to Nazareth, where we meet Mary, the truest daughter of Abraham. It is Mary above all others who can teach us what it means to live the faith of “our father”. In many ways, Mary is clearly different from Abraham; but in deeper ways “the friend of God” (cf. Is 41:8) and the young woman of Nazareth are very alike.

Both receive a wonderful promise from God. Abraham was to be the father of a son, from whom there would come a great nation. Mary is to be the Mother of a Son who would be the Messiah, the Anointed One. “Listen!”, Gabriel says, “ You are to conceive and bear a son. . . The Lord God will give him the throne of his ancestor David. . . and his reign will have no end” (Lk 1:31-33).

For both Abraham and Mary, the divine promise comes as something completely unexpected. God disrupts the daily course of their lives, overturning its settled rhythms and conventional expectations. For both Abraham and Mary, the promise seems impossible. Abraham’s wife Sarah was barren, and Mary is not yet married: “How can this come about”, she asks, “since I am a virgin?” (Lk 1:34).

4. Like Abraham, Mary is asked to say yes to something that has never happened before. Sarah is the first in the line of barren wives in the Bible who conceive by God’s power, just as Elizabeth will be the last. Gabriel speaks of Elizabeth to reassure Mary: “Know this too: your kinswoman Elizabeth has, in her old age, herself conceived a son” (Lk 1:36).

Like Abraham, Mary must walk through darkness, in which she must simply trust the One who called her. Yet even her question, “How can this come about?”, suggests that Mary is ready to say yes, despite her fears and uncertainties. Mary asks not whether the promise is possible, but only how it will be fulfilled. It comes as no surprise, therefore, when finally she utters her fiat: “I am the handmaid of the Lord. Let what you have said be done to me” (Lk 1:38). With these words, Mary shows herself the true daughter of Abraham, and she becomes the Mother of Christ and Mother of all believers.

5. In order to penetrate further into the mystery, let us look back to the moment of Abraham’s journey when he received the promise. It was when he welcomed to his home three mysterious guests (cf. Gen 18:1-15), and offered them the adoration due to God: tres vidit et unum adoravit. That mysterious encounter foreshadows the Annunciation, when Mary is powerfully drawn into communion with the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Through the fiat that Mary uttered in Nazareth, the Incarnation became the wondrous fulfilment of Abraham’s encounter with God. So, following in the footsteps of Abraham, we have come to Nazareth to sing the praises of the woman “through whom the light rose over the earth” (Hymn Ave Regina Caelorum).

6. But we have also come to plead with her. What do we, pilgrims on our way into the Third Christian Millennium, ask of the Mother of God? Here in the town which Pope Paul VI, when he visited Nazareth, called “the school of the Gospel”, where “we learn to look at and to listen to, to ponder and to penetrate the deep and mysterious meaning of the very simple, very humble and very beautiful appearing of the Son of God” (Address in Nazareth, 5 January 1964), I pray, first, for a great renewal of faith in all the children of the Church. A deep renewal of faith: not just as a general attitude of life, but as a conscious and courageous profession of the Creed: “Et incarnatus est de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria Virgine, et homo factus est.”

In Nazareth, where Jesus “grew in wisdom and age and grace before God and men” (Lk 2:52), I ask the Holy Family to inspire all Christians to defend the family against so many present-day threats to its nature, its stability and its mission. To the Holy Family I entrust the efforts of Christians and of all people of good will to defend life and to promote respect for the dignity of every human being.

To Mary, the Theotókos, the great Mother of God, I consecrate the families of the Holy Land, the families of the world.

In Nazareth where Jesus began his public ministry, I ask Mary to help the Church everywhere to preach the “good news” to the poor, as he did (cf. Lk 4:18). In this “year of the Lord’s favour”, I ask her to teach us the way of humble and joyful obedience to the Gospel in the service of our brothers and sisters, without preferences and without prejudices.

“O Mother of the Word Incarnate, despise not my petitions, but in your mercy hear and answer me. Amen” (Memorare).

I found this quote in a combox on the Leiter philosophy blog; it seems right to me.

"I think pragmatism is very important to success at publication. Know which journals publish what kinds of articles. Master the style of a philosophy article. Understand which topics are current. Know what literature you'll be expected to discuss if you write on a given topic. Don't try to say everything in one place -- learn how to break your work into article-sized chunks. Don't wait for a paper to be perfect (it never will be) before submitting it to a journal."

Does anyone have any particular suggestion about where to find more information related to the italicized section of the quote with regard to our ancient and medieval studies? It seems like interminable labor finding relevant conferences and calls for papers sometimes. Has anyone found a particular blog or site which list topics of interest to us? Etc.? Much thanks. -HM

For anyone who might be interested, there is a primitive inquiry into the notion of right and its place in the Natural Law found here. Of course all thought and discourse would be appreciated. Pax.

Below is a summary that I quickly wrote up for a class I am taking on St. Thomas' De Veritate. This article can be found at the following web address: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdv01.html. As will be seen in my summary, St. Thomas concludes this article in way that is surprising to me. Since I do not understand it I thought I would post my summary and raise the question for your consideration, my venerable brethren. Any assistance you can offer would be greatly appreciated.

In the eighth article St. Thomas is seeking whether every truth is from the first truth. St. Thomas will argue that all truths are from the first truth. As is clear from the context of the article, what is meant by "from the first truth" means, from it as an effect is from a cause. First truth, according to the previous articles, refers to God. Therefore, the objections that arise concerning this article involve knowledge of sins, deficiencies and evils. The basic argument being the following: there are evil things in truth, both in things and in the adequation of things to an intellect. Therefore if God is going to be the cause of the truth of these things, then God is the cause of evil. This, however, is impossible. Therefore, every truth is not from the first truth.
St. Thomas begins his response by bringing forth conclusions from the previous articles. He brings up the point that just as the human intellect measures artifacts, so the divine intellect measures things, and these same things measure the human intellect. He then adds something that we have not seen. St. Thomas argues that all things exist through their forms, thus the forms of things have in their account esse. The form, however, is that by which we know things. Therefore, the truth of existing things includes the account of the being of the things. Further, this form, as known, also has the account of adequation to the human intellect.
It is important to note that in the above argument St. Thomas qualifies what he is saying by speaking only of existing things. The remainder of the article will concern itself with the existence of privations (i.e. evils, deficiencies and sins). However, since we only know privations through existing things St. Thomas will compare the privation of blindness with a stone.
All negations and privations which exist outside the soul do not have a form through which they exist, and therefore, no form through which they can be known to exist. The truth of a stone has within it the account of the being of the thing with the superadded account of being in the intellect, as is clear from what has been said. The truth about blindness, however, does not include in it the privation. That is to say, we do not have some privative form. Non-being does not have a form. Blindness does have some existence in the intellect, however, as known. That is to say, we truly know that someone is blind. The blindness in the person is not caused by God, but the truth that we know is caused by God.
At this point it seems that St. Thomas could conclude thus: It is therefore clear that every truth has some existence, insofar as every truth must in someway be in a soul. All existing things, however, come from God. God is therefore the cause of every truth. Therefore every truth is from the first truth. However, St. Thomas instead brings in the account of the good. He argues that it is a good of the human intellect to know things and that insofar as the things are good they come from God. Therefore, every truth is from God. It seems strange that St. Thomas would argue through the good, because the good is a narrower notion than that of being. Consequently, it seems that one could object and say that perhaps it is not good to know a certain truth. For instance, were a layman to know some individual's sins, or faults that he was not well acquainted with would not seem to benefit him at all. Rather, such things are often considered malicious gossip or slander. Therefore, to my mind, this is left as a puzzle that I have not worked out and is worth further inquiry.

This is a summary of my views of ens commune that I formed from my previous article and the resulting discussion. I suppose that some of this is a positive assertion against some of the claims that ho_mathetes made in the previous post. I would still like to respond directly to his position, but I thought it would be helpful to late out my position as a formal whole as well.

In the pursuit of metaphysics there are many challenges that present themselves to the would be metaphysician. In contemporary thought, such challenges often arise from thinkers who oppose the very idea of metaphysics. Such thinkers as Kant and his present day adherents come quickly to mind. However, aside from these attacks from “outside” of metaphysics, there are other challenges, even for one who approaches the study with a good will. I do not speak merely of the challenges that arise from the difficulty of the matter, but there is a real question about whether metaphysics is even possible as a philosophical pursuit. A sign of the force of this difficulty is that in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics (of fourteen) Aristotle still is seeking whether there is such a science that can treat being qua being.1
Of particular concern to Aristotle is how to treat being qua being as something one. This will be of vital importance to metaphysics as a science. If being qua being cannot be understood as something one then there will not be one science. Nor would it seem possible to treat of first principles in a unified way and thus defend them accordingly. Consequently, it is of great importance to Aristotle that we see how to consider being qua being as something one.
This is where our present inquiry enters. St. Thomas Aquinas refers to this unified treatment of being qua being, as ens commune, or common being. In his preface to his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics St. Thomas refers to ens commune, naming it the subject of the science and a genus. It is the task of this paper, therefore, to examine what ens commune is. At the conclusion of this paper we should see that ens commune is only considered a genus in an extended sense and is thus an ens ratione with a foundation in things, unified through the notion of substance.
We will follow Aristotle's example and begin with what is more known to us and then proceed to what is more known by nature.2 It is important, therefore, to give a preliminary consideration to this concept of ens commune. Literally translated it means common being. Ens does not, however, have any connotation of action. Rather is refers to a being, or better yet, an entity. It should therefore be always taken as a noun. Common, here, can be understood in two ways. As St. Thomas argues, a principle is said to be common either through predication, or as a common cause.3 It remains to be seen which sense of common should be taken in ens commune.
There are a number of presuppositions that this paper will impose upon its readers, first of which is a presupposition of Aristotle's work in philosophy of nature. I will therefore be pursuing a particular path into metaphysics, which I will not here defend. My reasons for choosing to enter metaphysics through philosophy of nature are two-fold. First, this has been the traditional mode of proceeding for centuries. Second, I only see how to manifest the concept of ens commune by beginning with the philosophy of nature. I acknowledge that there are varying opinions about the necessity of treating physics before metaphysics, but I will not treat of that matter here.
To begin, it is clear that the subject of the philosophy of nature is mobile ens4 and its principles. It is this sort of ens that we are first and foremost familiar with. This is because we are composite beings and we know through our senses. Mobile ens is material ens, and therefore we know it as sensible ens. What is more, at first ens is equivalent to material ens, since anything more is beyond our experience.
Our idea of ens undergoes a radical change in the course of the philosophy of nature. This occurs when we prove the existence of the immortal human soul5 and of the first mover.6 What is significant about both of these is that they are both immaterial. Ens is now said in an entirely new way, since our studies in the philosophy of nature have compelled us to admit such beings. We consequently must expand our understanding of what it is to be an ens. This is what the concept ens commune attempts to do.
It is easily granted that I can imagine that there are such things as immaterial entes. Moreover, I can imagine a kind of “ensness” that all entes participate in. However, just because I am able to imagine such things, it does not follow that they be true concepts. Now that this “new” kind of ens has been discovered, i.e. immaterial ens, it may be that a we will only ever be able to treat of such things as principles and never in themselves. Also, it is possible that our desire to have some account of ens which is beyond that of our common experience may likewise be beyond us. The formation of the concept of ens commune must be done very carefully if we are to uphold the rigors required of true philosophical inquiry.
In order to have an understanding of ens that is broader than material being, we must form a concept of ens that is not in matter and motion. The emphasis on the “not” follows St. Thomas' division of the sciences in his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate. There St. Thomas makes a distinction between abstraction and separatio.7 In abstraction we consider one thing without reference to what it is in. As Aristotle says of the geometer,

He strips off all sensible qualities, e.g. weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in three dimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantitative and continuous and does not consider them in any other respect.8

Separatio, on the other hand, is considering one thing specifically as not in another. Such an activity belongs to the second act of the intellect which composes and divides and it is here that we find ens commune which is a conception of ens which is not in matter and motion. It is important to note here, again, the importance of carefully and rigorously forming this concept. The second act of the intellect is where truth and falsity is first found. We do not have the assurance of the inerrant first act of the intellect. The possibility of error is therefore quite real.
It is going beyond the scope of this paper to extensively defend the truth of ens commune. Looking to Aristotle as an example, it seems that to have certainty in making such a judgment we need to reflect long and carefully over our experience. As was mentioned above, the formation of this concept and the feasibility of the science of metaphysics as a whole is in question for Aristotle into the eleventh book of the Metaphysics. Therefore, we will at this point proceed, assuming that this judgment is true. It remains, therefore, to see how what has been said of ens commune illumines the initial claims made by St. Thomas, namely that it is a genus and the subject of metaphysics. It seems clear that ens commune cannot be a genus in any strict sense of the term. Ens can in no way be a genus, since it is said equivocally of various categories. A fortiori, ens commune will not be said univocally. However, in St. Thomas' De Veritate he makes an argument for a broad sense of genus.9 He justifies his claim with the authority of Scripture, where God and humans are said to be in a genus.10 A fortiori, we are able to use genus loosely when speaking of ens commune.
To fully justify this particular use of genus, it seems necessary that there be some basis for calling ens commune one. It would be unfitting to place any chance grouping under a genus, even said in a broad sense. If there is no basis in the things, then anything can be a genus. Therefore, it seems clear that there must be a basis in things for calling something a genus. It would seem to follow then, that if there were some way in which something could be understood to be as one, even as it was said of many, that then there would be a basis for calling it a genus.
Aristotle, as has been said, concerns himself with the question of the unity of the subject of metaphysics in book eleven. Aristotle first manifests that, "everything that is may be referred to something single and common."11 However, at this point it seems that "is" is said in an equivocal manner. Aristotle goes on to argue that the contrarieties also may be referred to the first contrarieties of being. However, every pair of contrarieties is examined by one science. Then, he rules out the other sciences as in sufficient to treat of ens qua ens, all of them being concerned with ens under a particular account. It remains, therefore, to metaphysics to treat of ens qua ens. Having examined the nature of contrarieties, and seen how they are also referred back to something one and common, "since all that is is said to be in virtue of something single and common." It would seem therefore, that what is single and common is substance. For all accidents exist and are entes through substance. Therefore, in so far as something is an ens, so it must belong to substance, either as substance, or as an accident, or the contrarieties. Therefore, we have found a basis for considering ens commune as one.
This conclusion seems to grant further insight into how we should understand common in ens commune. It seems here that we should understand it as a kind of formal cause, for ens commune is the account given of what makes something to be an ens. This cause, however, should not be understood as external to the thing, but rather as an intrinsic cause. Here we may draw an analogy to the concept of animal. Animal may likewise be seen as an intrinsic formal cause, since it belongs to the account of what it is to be something, but cannot be found as separate from the account of such things either. This would seem to be the case for other genera as well.
From what has been said, there appears to be grounds for considering ens commune as an ens ratione. For the account of why it is common seems to belong more to our conception than to things themselves. However, there is a distinction among entes rationes. There are some which are without a foundation in things and some that do have a foundation in things. Non-being is an example of an ens ratione without a foundation in things. It is, as it were, the exemplar of non-existence. It is a negative concept which we conceive of in the mode of substance, but is not directly based on any experience. Time, on the other hand, is an ens ratione with a foundation in things. Time, according to Aristotle, is "the number of motion according to before and after." Consequently, it is a being of reason since it depends on there being some mind for it to exist. However, it is not without a direct foundation in things, since it is measuring something real viz., motion. Ens commune therefore seems to belong to those entes rationes with a foundation in things. For ens is most of all real, though the account of it being common belongs to our conception. Therefore, ens commune is an ens ratione with a foundation in things.
The mode of this paper has been largely dialectic in an attempt to manifest the course of thought that is required for the formation of the concept of ens commune. Many of the conclusions, therefore, do not necessarily conclude with complete certainty. It does seem clear from what has been said, that ens commune is an attempt by our mind to find a broad account of ens which is not restricted to matter. Moreover, it seems clear that if such a concept is formed that it can be based on a loose notion of genus. Finally, the account for its unity, though briefly and summarily given, seems to provide sufficient grounds for calling it one. What is left quite uncertain by this paper is how ens commune can be the subject of metaphysics. That ens commune is an ens ratione, likewise lacks to certainty that one would require before agreeing to such a claim. These two claims are quite involved with one another. If ens commune is an ens ratione, then it seems difficult to see how it is fitting matter for a science. Likewise, the grounds for calling it common and an intrinsic formal cause are left uncertain, since these were used to arrive at ens commune being an ens ratione.

Notes:
1 Metaphysics 1059a21
2 Physics
3 Super De Trinitate Q. 5 a. 4
4 The english word “being” being ambiguous in its usage, compels me to therefore use ens throughout this paper in order to signify an an entity.
5 De Anima 430a 23
6 Physics 267b 24-25
7 Super De Trinitate Q.5 a3
8 Metaphyiscs 1061a 30-36
9 De Veritate Q.1 a. 4 ad s.c. 8
10 17:28 The Vulgate reads thus: ipsius enim et genus sumus
11 Metaphysics 1061a10

This is in addendum to the previous discussion-- I am making this a new thread per FA's suggestion.


First I want to review some things from the previous discussion for the sake of the continuity of my thought. Then some new ideas.

The first thing I want to state once again is that ens commune 'est genus.' I think St. Thomas should be read formally here, i.e. putting ens commune in the order of Porphyrian genus and species. This is the first meaning of the word 'genus', after all. Perhaps the second more convincing sign that this reading is correct is in the next clause: ens commune is differentiated as the 'of which' of the substances which are, quite distinctly, a common and universal cause. This is to disagree with FA's previous statement that ens commune is "considered under the formality of universal cause." According to my reading here, the formality of ens commune is as a genus.

Vince. has objections to similar statements in the previous discussion, which I see as simply resolved by his further distinguishing that ens commune is a non-univocal genus. It is precisely because ens commune is the universal cause's 'of which' that we can say that ens commune is "related to one common nature," and therefore has in a sense "one common notion." Hence we avoid Hegelian idealistic tendencies.

STh I-I q. 3 art. 4 contains some further distinctions about ens commune I'd like to draw out. Ad. 1 states: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit additio potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione eius sit quod non fiat ei additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine ratione. Alio modo intelligitur aliquid cui non fit additio, quia non est de ratione eius quod sibi fiat additio, sicut animal commune est sine ratione, quia non est de ratione animalis communis ut habeat rationem; sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione. Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione, est esse divinum, secundo modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune."

Ens commune has nothing added to it because it isn't required, being what it is, to have any addition. Ens commune and animal commune are analogues because neither require that anything be added to it; nor do either precisely indicate a deficiency of such an addition. This is, once again, a very Porphyrian way of putting things-- Porphyry himself states that "genus is a certain principle of things under it, and seems also to comprehend all the multitude under itself." This statement seems to amount to the same as that implied in Aquinas' text above: a genus is a principle which differs from the many as standing above them without their addition, and yet does not exclude the multitude by comprehending them.

It should be obvious at this point that I am making a sustained argument that ens commune is "made up" or a "notional grouping" as was stated in the previous discussion. However, an important question remains: in what way can we say ens commune is a being?

Again, STh I-I q. 3 art. 4 has the answer (somewhat less directly): esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto.

Logical concepts exist as the real conjunction which is the act of predication. By predication commune of ens we have a notion of the being shared by all beings, without difference, and yet without opposition to difference. Of course, such a predication is logical and not metaphysical. That is to say, the terms respectively give foundation to the predication which per se has no direct foundation.

This, for me, seems right, and yet leads to a serious textural difficulty right where we started: "Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus..." Why would metaphysics consider ens commune if its essence is ultimatly logical? The answer seems to be that metaphysics is at most indirectly interested in ens commune as such, and rather is interested directly in investigating the sepreated substance which is in fact the universal cause of all the many different degrees of speciality of beings (be as it may that each may have its own set of proper causes, i.e. physics has physical causes, etc.).

So then, what is the relevance of considering ens commune in metaphysics? This is my conjecture. Utilizing the method of limits in the study of mathematics you can consider many things in a reduced and unified manner. Pascal does not merely look at each of the conics through a circle; he pursues one means to through which he can view them all. The circle contains all the conics, because all of the conics have a tendency to infinity, and the circle is that conic where such tendencies have met their term, and have met. Though the things know are know less perfectly when considered in this manner, the mode of knowing one operates from is superior. For Pascal, the circle is that to which the other conics are reduced to, in a way that all conics are seen by the one single form and concept of the circle. This is, of course, likened to the Divine mode of knowing which contains everything and yet is expressed in a single Concept.
In the consideration of any subjects as ens commune, the subjects would be considered commune without the exclusion or addition of what makes it specifically what it is. This makes ens commune unique in that by including in its ratio the notion precisely of 'commune,' it indicates neither deficiency or of addition--rather it comprehends it, containing all the differences somehow. Consequently, the consideration of ens commune is of importance to metaphysics not because ens commune is the subject of metaphysics, but rather the ratio of ens commune is more comparable to the mode of knowing of metaphysics' subject. If this is right, then ens commune is profoundly important for metaphysics.

Anyway, these are my conjectures. It's not all sorted out: I wonder what weird things I am implicating in my last paragraph. Suggestions and corrections welcome.

A very intriguing textual question has arisen recently concerning St. Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's De Anima. I invite comments and clarifications, etc. This is somewhat tied to the inchoate stream of thought that is currently my term paper.

First I will give the context: St. Thomas, in this opening chapter, is expositing Aristotle's prologue. He shows that first Aristotle wishes to render his reader benevolent towards learning this science of psychology by showing the worth of this knowledge. This he does in two ways: first by showing that the science is dignified, i.e. that its object is honorable, and second, because its knowledge is useful.

While this in itself is interesting, that a speculative science is useful, St. Thomas names three sciences for which psychology is 'utile.'

First, it is useful to first philosophy. More on this in a bit. Second, it is useful for ethics because it outlines the powers of soul for which there are various virtues, treated of in the ethical science. Third, it is useful for physics, because it explains the causes of motions of living things, which make up the bulk of mobile being.

However, concerning this first reason, there are two quandaries. The first is on the level of littera, the second that of sensus.

On the level of littera; I quote first from the Leonine edition of the text (Leon. v.41, t. 1; p. 5-6; lines 118-122):

"Quia si ad philosophiam primam attendamus, non possumus deuenire in cognitionem divinorum et altissimarum causarum nisi per ea que ex uirtute intellectus primo acquirimus. Si uero attendatur quantum ad moralem..."

Compare with the text from the Marietti edition, which is also used on CorpusThomisticum (n.7):

"Quia si ad philosophiam primam attendamus, non possumus devenire in cognitionem divinarum et altissimarum causarum, nisi per ea quae ex virtute intellectus possibilis acquirimus. Si enim natura intellectus possibilis esset nobis ignota, non possemus scire ordinem substantiarum separatarum, sicut dicit Commentator super undecimo metaphysicae. Si vero attendatur quantum ad moralem..."

As you can see, there is a sentence absent in the Leonine text. The "apparatus criticus" makes no mention of the absence of this sentence, doesn't admit to its existence in any fashion, and hence gives no reason for why it wasn't included in the Leonine edition, or even a repudiation of its existence in other editions.

Now, on the level of sensus.

The first text seems to be saying that psychology is useful to first philosophy because it provides a sort of prerequisite knowledge, namely the knowledge of divine things and highest causes attained at the level of the soul, the "by those" (per ea) which (quae) we acquire from the power of the intellect. This seems intelligible enough as a general statement, that is, by examining human intellect, we build the groundwork for understanding the analogy (meant strictly) between our intellectual substances and higher ones. Or even, if "highest causes" is taken to include causes by predication, a case seems possible that by attaining a knowledge of our intellectual power, we must appreciate the distinctions between the various grades of potency and act, namely in corporeal change first, then in sensitive change (De Anima II.5) and finally in intellectual "motion."

However, it seems that the Marietti "additional sentence" gives us this reason explicitly. Namely, by knowing the nature of our possible intellect, we come to know the order of separate substances.

However, this position in itself runs into problems. First, St. Thomas is citing Averroes, who held the separate existence of the possible and agent intellects. Since St. Thomas disagrees with this position, it lends support to the Leonine text's excision of the sentence. However, this removal is, as mentioned, unexplained.

However, perhaps St. Thomas is quoting Averroes with reverence. That is, he is noting that, due to the analogy present between our intellects and higher ones, we must first know our own intellective powers, and upon this base an analogous structure to understand the order of separate substances.

More on this as it develops...

This is not mine, but it's analysis is the most formally theological which I've seen, and I think deserves to be linked here. It's something like what I would like to write if I had the time.

Why the Pope Had to Do What He Did.

By Martin Mosebach

The Catholic Church is experiencing an unprecedented moment in her recent history. A sacerdotal act of the Pope – the removal of the excommunication of four bishops who had been consecrated contrary to the prohibition of his predecessor in the Petrine office – encounters an outraged lack of understanding not only of the non-Catholic public but also of many Catholics and even bishops, who have openly renounced their loyalty to the pope. Forty years after the Second Vatican Council, which attempted an “opening of the Church to the World”, the Catholic Church has been struck dumb - as if she does not recognize any more her own institutions.

What is a Catholic Bishop? Is he a senior administrative official of the Church? Is he a high-ranking politician, who can be subjected to party discipline? This is how non-Catholics (certainly contemporary ones) view the bishop, because they never have been told anything else. For Catholics, the bishop embodies the highest form of the priesthood, connected with the capacity to represent Jesus Christ himself in the giving of the Sacraments. He receives this capacity irrevocably upon his consecration and no pope or council can take it from him. That is the disturbing thing about the episcopal office: even the most unworthy and scandalous bishop always remains a bishop, capable until his last breath of adding new bishops to the line of apostolic succession.

What is excommunication? Exclusion from a political party? That’s how non-Catholics understand it - they like to call exclusion from the communist party “excommunication.” Catholics should know that a complete exclusion from their Church is absolutely impossible. For the Church, a baptized Christian cannot become an untouchable by any deed, however terrible it may be. If the Church, as the most extreme punishment, forbids a baptized Christian from confessing his sins, from receiving the Eucharistic Christ at Mass and from receiving the sacraments at death, she does so always in the hope of soon lifting the excommunication. Ultimately, no spiritual authority wants to accept the responsibility of letting a man die uncomforted. Strictly speaking, he who offends against the unity of the Church excommunicates himself. The cancellation of the excommunication cannot be denied him if he honestly desires to return to this unity.

The use of excommunication as a means of political pressure ( as it was often done in the Middle Ages) has been justly condemned. The Jewish philosopher Simone Weil called such excommunications a mortal sin of the Church. The fact that murderers and child molesters are not automatically excommunicated shows how little excommunication has to do with moral approval. The community that receives again an excommunicated person is a community of sinners.

These are likely to have been the principal considerations of Pope Benedict when he lifted the excommunication of the four bishops who had been consecrated in a manner sacramentally valid but contrary to canon law. For the pope, it must have been a tormenting thought that these bishops, in isolation, could have succumbed to the temptation to perpetuate the schism and consecrate additional bishops. The sacraments form the heart of the Church. The danger that they could be permanently dispensed while in breach of unity must have troubled the pope exceedingly.

Now, in the meantime, the whole world has had the opportunity of hearing on television one of the four bishops, the Briton Williamson, utter the most revolting theses regarding the persecution of the Jews at the time of Hitler. Behind the seemingly dispassionate poker face of the prelate there was revealed a paranoia bordering on madness. This was linked, as had been long known in the Fraternity, to a complete, insane, system composed of similar “secret knowledge.” It is understandable that a general horror prevailed, on seeing that such a man might exercise his office as an official Bishop, reconciled with the pope.

Why, however, did the general public not notice that bishop Williamson specifically cannot exercise his office, because the lifting of the excommunication did not affect his suspension from the office of bishop. Instead, they indulged in conjectures as to whether the Pope after all had a secret inclination to anti-Semitism. This, regarding a Pope, who, leaving aside his addresses in Auschwitz and in the synagogue in Cologne, has tried in his theology – one could say, like no other pope since Peter - to read and understand the Gospel as the work of the Jews. It even extended as far as the laughable report that the pope had set the conditions for the lifting of the suspension of the bishops only under the pressure of public opinion.

No one should deceive himself: this pope does nothing under the pressure of public opinion.

The question was posed whether Benedict XVI knew of Williamson’s speeches. To be sure, he can’t help but have noticed the spiritual atmosphere in the SSPX. Unreality and fanaticism resounded from the many attacks that the bishops of the Fraternity directed against Benedict. And it is very well possible that the knowledge of a growing pathological narrowing of the minds drove the pope to act.

Twenty years ago, as Cardinal and prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, he had already labored with all his strength for a reconciliation with the SSPX. At the time their founder, the legendary Archbishop Lefebvre, still lived. He had participated in the Council and had only become an opponent when the “movement of ‘68” made inroads in the Church and made a revolution out of the reform. Lefebvre refused to give up the traditional, ancient mass rite and Paul VI responded by suspending him.

Cardinal Ratzinger attempted to win over the old man and promised that the pope would name a bishop faithful to tradition for the community. Then Lefebvre’s distrust was aroused - he felt he was being strung along. He broke off the negotiations and consecrated four bishops with whom he was excommunicated immediately thereafter. Had Lefebvre acted rightly by following his hunch? Cardinal Ratzinger in any case must have been affected by the death of this man in the state of excommunication. For, unlike most bishops of this time, it was impossible for him to deny any justification to Lefebvre’s struggle. “Whomever these teachings do not please he does not deserve to be a man.” This hymn of liberalism from Mozart’s “Magic Flute” became the maxim of the Church that had become liberal. The SSPX was hermetically sealed off. It was not permitted to participate in the discussions of a post-conciliar Church so enamored of discussion. Its young priests celebrated in basements and garages. One could say that the Fraternity had circled the wagons but around these wagons yawned a void – nobody cared about that.

Every sociologist knows what quickly becomes of small oppositional groups cut off from interaction with reality. That this group was endangered would have been sufficient for a responsible priest to care for it. But more was at stake here: as misfortune would have it, exactly this group had made its mission the preservation of the greatest treasure of the Church.

Even today it is a difficult undertaking to speak of the importance of the liturgy for the Church. Twenty years ago it was almost hopeless finding a sympathetic ear. It was a foregone conclusion for many clerics that the traditional, over 1500-year old liturgy of the Church was decorative mumbo-jumbo for the nostalgic and for aesthetes. It had the same importance for “emancipated Christians” as the string quartets played on occasions of state have for politics. What had been true throughout the entire history of the Latin Church had been forgotten: that liturgy is the visible body of the Church; that Church and liturgy are identical. It is the mystic depiction of the whole plenitude of revealed truths. It is the locus of faith, where subjective conviction and feeling become objective contemplation and encounter. It is this liturgy which carried the Christian faith through the centuries. The success of the mission in the entire world was owed to its sacrality in liturgical language and chant.

The liturgy had soared above the deep divides of European history because it was equally removed from every epoch into which it entered. It is always unseasonable and therefore always an image of the other reality which awaits man. This great form of the liturgy had been softened up by Paul VI’s radical reform of the mass – an intervention unheard of in the entire history of the Church. It splintered into a thousand improvisations.

But why was Archbishop Lefebvre the only bishop in the entire world who uncompromisingly rejected this attack against the liturgy and thus against the Church? With this no to a process of decomposition so highly dangerous to the Church, Lefebvre entered ecclesiastical history. What gave him the strength was the milieu, only found in France, of a Catholic laity which had acquired its world view in the struggle against aggressive republican secularism. This was the tragedy of Lefebvre and his movement: they rescued the ancient liturgy but linked it to the struggle of political parties in recent French history. The only refuge that the traditional liturgy had found threatened to become its prison. Pope Benedict had already freed it from this prison with his Motu Proprio and had given it back with its universal claim to the entire Church.

Must he not, however, have felt a sense obligation to the SSPX; that, for all its faults, it had become an instrument for preserving the Holy of Holies of the Church in a time of crisis? Whether the SSPX succeeds in finding a place in the multiplicity of the present day Church remains to be seen. Its historic mission, in any case, has been concluded.

In the last few days it could be heard again and again that the Vatican is incapable of conveying its concerns to the public. It is certainly true that there would have been less excitement among those of good will if, for instance, one had emphasized at the lifting of the excommunications that Bishop Williamson remained suspended until further notice. But one cannot underestimate what black holes of ignorance have been created even in believing Catholics by more than thirty years of neglected religious instruction. These cannot be closed even by the cleverest public relations work. Regarding the pope, broad circles know only that he is for human rights and against condoms. It is happily declared that “the Church can’t return to before the Second Vatican Council.” Few, however, think about the contradictions and need for interpretation of the most important texts of this council.

Does anybody notice that the pope has acted exactly in accordance with the theology of the council in his magnanimous lifting of the excommunications? The restoration of the sacral visage of the church must remain for the majority of “worldly” observers foreign and incomprehensible. Probably only later generations will grasp that the restoration of liturgical identity was worth a great sacrifice. Building up is, after all, slower than tearing down.

Naturally, things could reach a point that the state and society lose the taste for tolerating within their borders a corporation, which visibly stands under a different law and defends values other than those of the secular majority. The coarseness of a chancellor in an election campaign gives us a foretaste. As was done under Bismarck, the accusation could be made against the Catholics that they are bad citizens of the state because their heart is ultramontane; it clings “over the mountains” to the pope and his authority.

Ultramontane – this word describes perfectly the Catholic mentality: with a small part of one’s consciousness to be not German, not contemporary, not cosmopolitan. Despite all distrust, the commonwealth does not have to fare ill with such members – the result of the constant tension between the Pope and the Emperor in the Middle Ages was nothing less than the European idea of freedom.



Copyright by Martin Mosebach. The original of this essay appeared in Der Spiegel magazine. Any errors are mine as translator. Special thanks to Ulrike Hagg for providing the article.

My question is simple: What is ens commune?
I believe that the/a key to understanding this idea lies in the text quoted from St. Thomas' Prooemium below. I will offer some initial thoughts and comments about the text below. I invite... no, rather I ask and urge you all to please add your thoughts to this discussion. This is for two reasons: First, I believe such a discussion is important and necessary for all those who would pursue wisdom. Secondly, and consequently, because I want to understand this and your help is needed and asked for.

Haec autem triplex consideratio, non diversis, sed uni scientiae attribui debet. Nam praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et primae causae essendi. Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicuius generis et genus ipsum: sicut naturalis considerat principia corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae. Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune. Hoc enim est subiectum in scientia, cuius causas et passiones quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae alicuius generis quaesiti. Nam cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est finis ad quem consideratio scientiae pertingit. Quamvis autem subiectum huius scientiae sit ens commune, dicitur tamen tota de his quae sunt separata a materia secundum esse et rationem. Quia secundum esse et rationem separari dicuntur, non solum illa quae nunquam in materia esse possunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam illa quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune. Hoc tamen non contingeret, si a materia secundum esse dependerent.

St. Thomas mentions ens commune together with, but distinct from, separated substances. Both are considered under the formality of universal cause. Ens commune as a genus. He later goes on to name ens commune as the proper subject of metaphysics. He goes on to make a further distinction between ens commune and separated substances saying that separated substances are never in matter, while ens commune is able to be without matter.

Here are my preliminary thoughts: It seems that ens commune cannot be any really existing thing. Nor is it a fiction, but a really existing principle. It seems to be something analogous to an algebraic "abstraction" in that it is able to be understood as ens in any genus.
Some further questions that arise: Is ens commune wholly excluded from the account of separated substances? It seems clear that ens commune can in no way be said of God, but what of angels etc. ?
Further, how is it that something so ephemeral can properly be considered as the subject of a science?

Aristotle gives the proper order of investigation in 415a 15-23: object, operation, power, soul. But in considering the intellect, he first considers the power (429a 10 – 430a 26), then its operation (430a 27 – 431a 4). Again, in considering the possible intellect, he first considers the power of the possible intellect (429a 10 – 429b 9), then its object (429b 10-23). Any thoughts?

This article is meant to be a reflection upon the principle, "the higher cannot stand without the lower." In particular, I will examine this principle in light of Aristotle's first chapter of the Metaphysics. This examination will, please God, manifest this principle as both a principle of our knowing and of the created order of being itself. This article is not a defense, because I am not aware of any significant objection to this principle. Consequently, I am not going to be answering any particular objections. It is merely a reflection on this principle: my contemplation written out for all to see, and join in as they are willing and able.

The first question that might confront us as we consider the principle, the higher cannot stand without the lower, is what each of the terms mean. "Higher," "lower," "stand," each of these seem rather vague. It seems that if we are going to allow for the widest application of this principle then we must allow that these terms can be used differently in different circumstances. Just as in the principle "the whole is greater than the part." For there can be many different kinds of wholes, and parts. So also these terms, "higher," "lower," and "stands" will have a certain meaning when applied to our knowing, quite another when applied to the order of being. I would assume the uses to be analogous if there is to be any truth to the principle.
Since being is the broadest account (all things being a certain kind of being) then it seems that the most general account one can give of these terms is that higher refers to a more excellent form of being and lower to the contrary of this. The measure of excellence will be relative to the kind of being that is being considered Stands will mean some sort of dependent existence.
Beginning with this rather vague account of our principle, let us see how it might play out in Aristotle's first chapter of his Metaphysics. "All men by nature desire to know." He starts us out by laying down a principle that will be operational throughout this first chapter. Note also that he begins with our end. The final cause is the cause of the agent causes' causing. So we see the purpose of the entire inquiry of the metaphysics and likewise the more immediate goal of this chapter, defining what Wisdom is, "But the purpose of our present discussion is to bring out this: all men beleive that what is called "wisdom" is concerned with the first causes and principles." (Metaphys. 981b27) Thus he ends the chapter with the definition of wisdom, "a science of certain causes and principles." (Metaphys. 982a2)
To obtain this goal he begins with sensations. Even here though, he looks to the end of the senses, looking to our goal before proceeding. Thus he speaks of the end of the senses as both for the sake of knowledge and for their own sake. He then shows that the end of knowledge is the higher end because sight is the most favored of all the senses, because this enables knowledge most certainly, and is itself the closest to knowledge.
It is then that Aristotle begins his inquiry in earnest. He begins, as our principle would suggest, with the lowest. Here the lowest is as the lowest common denominator in those things which could possibly be said to have some sort of knowledge. Consequently he excludes plants and inanimate things. He begins with sensitive beings and then distinguishes these into sensitive beings with memory and those with none. Those with memory he distinguishes into teachable and non-teachable, attributing this potency to the power of hearing. Since we are seeking knowledge, as was said, we are consequently going to be concerned with those animals that are teachable.
He begins again with something common: memories and appearances. Animals live by these alone while men live also by art and judgements. Many memories give rise to an experience, and art and science come to men through experience. Aristotle then moves a step further and distinguishes art and experience. Art being more excellent than experience because it knows causes, and is able to teach. In all of this Aristotle is moving step by step from the most fundamental idea of sensation which have in common with all animals.
He then distinguishes between arts saying that those that are for their own sake are more excellent than those that are necessary for survival, because the former give rise to knowledge. So we come to our end and Aristotle summarizes the journey from where we started considering men, "a man of experience seems to be wiser than a man who has any of the sensations, a man of art wiser than a man of experience, a master-artist[that is one who possesses the art more fully] than a manual worker, and theoretical sciences to be wisdom to a higher degree than productive sciences."
From this chapter, therefore, we are able to see how Aristotle uses the principle "the higher cannot stand without the lower." For, he begins with what is lowest, simple sensation, and proceeds to what is highest, knowledge of causes and principles. This consideration also manifests an order in material being. For we see how our ability to know is dependent on our ability to sense which is dependent on there being other things to sense.
This order of lower to higher, and the necessity of the lower to make a foundation for the higher has wide implications. It shows how the lower participate in the excellence of the higher, and how there is certain dignity that pertains to the lower in virtue of this. For a clear example of this consider the Aristotelian state, where all participate in contemplation to the degree he can.
In a less known context we can consider the angels. The glory of the higher angels is their ability to share their knowledge of God with those below, and so on down to man, the bridge between to different orders of being. It is worth pointing out here that this principle is used in a very different way when speaking of material being and immaterial beings as might be clear from the example. The reason for this is that there is a decreasing degree of multiplicity until we come to God who is utter unity and simplicity and the principle no longer holds, giving way to a higher principle: God.

The paradoxes that arise in the course of a philosopher’s thought and the contradictions that entangle him, whether they are noticed or not, ought to be the principle of an investigation into the system proposed by any thinker. Because such difficulties arise in the attempt to propose a science or knowledge to other men (while perhaps in the case of recluses, it is merely to propose it to yourself), these knots, it seems, can be understood through a consideration of human knowledge. Now this involves two aspects to begin with, for knowledge is knowledge of something, and that something is, purportedly, what is, and why it is so. That is, being as known provides two points of interest when it comes to difficulties arising from this arena: difficulties can arise from the side of the object known, or from the side of the knower. At bottom, however, this seems to be caught up in being and non-being, or act and potency. For being is potentially knowable, hence the act of knowledge is dependent upon this potency (albeit this arises from the side of the knower and is not a real relation in the thing known, i.e. the potentially intelligible is not some real aspect of the thing, otherwise the actual intellected is not the thing known). Thus, as act and potency govern the first division of the areas from which difficulties arise, so they shall govern the subsequent ones.


On the side of the thing known, according to the degree of actuality the thing possesses, the more it is knowable in itself, for knowledge is of what is in act. Thus, difficulties arise from this side due to an insufficient degree of act, e.g., knowledge of prime matter, or of future contingents as such. Because these things, insofar as they are, are so caught up with potency, they stand on (or beyond) the fringes of knowability.

On the side of the knower, according to the characteristic order of potency to act that the knower possesses, in such order will his difficulties arise. These seem to be of two sorts: first, the fact that there are certain potencies and material principles required to constitute a knower as such a being, and second, the fact that the knowing power has its own characteristic reception as such. Thus, on the first count, certain difficulties arise on the side of human beings, for knowledge must arise from sense experience, and our existence requires our living for a period of time, and retaining a mass of memory and experience, from which to draw scientific knowledge. On the second count, difficulties will arise in our mode of knowing according to the characteristic of our potency as knowers. Thus, we can know prime matter only by analogy, whereas God knows it as caused by himself.

Thus, in considering the various difficulties which may arise in the course of a thinker’s development or body of work, some may be attributed to the object at hand, others to the fact that the philosopher is a human being, with a whole concrete experience from which he lives and thinks, and others to the fact that our various capacities for knowledge are directed to apprehend being according to certain modes, insofar as being informs them as such. Locke’s various historical influences on his thought, and his confusion of Protestant Christianity and philosophy arise perhaps from the second class; his rejection of metaphysics perhaps to the first. His theory of person as opposed to his epistemology finds a divide in historical context, as do the other two noted paradoxes. But his failure to mend these rifts comes from the difficulties which arise in the first class, and third, taken together.

An Inquiry into the Question of Inertia

You will notice that there is much in this article that was taken from my previous post on the definition of motion. I decided to re-direct my ideas and focus on method, more than the actual question of motion and inertia.

St. Thomas Aquinas makes a bold claim concerning Aristotle’s definition of motion saying, “And therefore it is wholly impossible to otherwise define motion through what is prior and more known, but as the philosopher has here defined it.”i Such a claim, from such a mind, warrants a careful look as to the reasons behind a claim of this force. The significance of this inquiry is great. Aristotle's definition of motion is challenged by a fundamental principle of modern day physics, inertia. How to reconcile these ideas or change them is, therefore, an important question for those who do not wish to simply abandon Aristotle and St. Thomas.
We are left then with the quandary of what to do. Modern day thought on the whole encourages us to scorn ancient thought and embrace the current understanding of things. After all, modern science has taken us to the moon. Even so, there is a puzzle. When Aquinas made his bold claim, was he merely stuck in the world of own limited science? Did he make this claim based upon the poor and limited scientific data available at the time? It is interesting to note, that neither he nor Aristotle bring up the importance of accumulating more “data” at all in their explanations. Probably most striking to our modern sensibilities is that neither of them even mentions the idea of force or anything like it in their accounts.
The differences between the present day approach to the physical world and in particular to motion, and the ancient and medieval approach explains many of these difficulties. The modern day physicist proceeds according to what is commonly known as the scientific method. I here define it as a systematic method of inquiry proceeding according to hypothesis and experiment. Consequently, modern scientists establish various models to explain what they experience and then abandon them for another, better model when one should come along.
Aristotle and St. Thomas were engaged in a much different enterprise as can be clearly seen in their works. The classical approach was one that sought, first of all knowledge, or as St. Thomas would have said scientia. This cognate is obviously related to our modern day word for science, but its meaning is much different. Aristotle defines such knowledge in his Posterior Analytics,
“We think we know each [thing] without qualification, but not in the sophistical manner with respect to an attribute, when we think that we know the cause through which the thing exists as being the cause of that thing and that the thing cannot be other than what it is.”ii
As he will later show in his De Anima this knowledge comes from the abstraction of the forms of things by the agent intellect, so that the mind truly knows things.iii
As is clear, the two approaches to understanding the physical world are vastly different. While the differences between these two approaches are such that it seems impossible to say whether one is better than the other, it does seem that we may argue for one being prior to the other. This brings us to the purpose of this paper. While it would be a great task to once and for all settle the question about inertia and the classical definition of motion, at least we can here argue for where we ought to begin looking. My thesis is two-fold: Aristotle's definition of motion is prior to the account of inertia in the order of knowing in that it is self-evident. Consequently, any account of inertia must be able to keep this definition if it is to be taken as true.
To proceed I will first argue that the only valid way to proceed in any inquiry is as Aristotle states in the beginning of the Physics “The natural path is to go from things which are more known and certain towards us toward things which are more certain and more knowable by nature.”iv I will then address some preliminary concerns to the definition of motion. After this, I will examine Aristotle's definition of motion and how he argues that it is true showing that it is in fact self-evident, given Aristotle’s principles of nature. This being shown, I will conclude by claiming that this definition must be held if one is to investigate the physical world, in particular in examining the principle of inertia.

Beginning
In every inquiry in which there are principles or causes or elements, understanding and science occur from knowing these. For we think we know each thing when we know the first causes and first principles and have reached the elements. It is clear, then, that in natural science as well one must try to determine first what concerns the principles.v

So Aristotle opens the physics and directs us to examine the principles of natural philosophy. It is then that he enunciates the principle which will be our primary concern in this essay, “The natural path is to go from the things which are more known and certain to us toward things which are more certain and more knowable by nature.” There are some questions that the formulation of this principle brings up. In particular, the distinction between what is more known to us and what is more known by nature, for this is the principle by which Aristotle justifies this mode of proceeding. In this section I will argue that there is no other way to proceed with certainty and scientia except by this path that Aristotle lays forth. While such an inquiry belongs properly to epistemology, we will be able to touch on this matter briefly.
It is sufficient here to see that there are some things that we are able to see more immediately than others. For instance, I know that the whole is greater than the part, or that equals added to equals are equal. Such axioms are certain and clear to our minds. Further claims, such as the interior angles of a triangle equal two right angles, are true, but certainly cannot be grasped with the immediacy of the afore mentioned axioms. In fact, following Euclid's Elements there are various definitions, axioms and postulates, let alone propositions that I must comprehend before I can see that the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.vi
The movement in mathematics, however, is simpler than that of Aristotle’s Physics. Aristotle, since he is dealing with physical and therefore sensible realities, must move from his experience of things to the principles, and then from principles to demonstrations. The greater part of the Physics is dedicated to the discussion of principles. It is not until the sixth book (of eight) that Aristotle even begins to do demonstrations, properly so called. Therefore we see that the philosopher of nature must spend time examining his experience, moving from the more known to the less known.
He gives three analogies by which to understand this method. The first: “For the whole is more known according to sensation, and the universal is a certain whole. For the universal embraces many things within it as parts.”vii This analogy allows us to consider our experience in a way like the universal and particular. In our experience of things, say a tree, we realize that this is a kind of whole that is composed of other things which are themselves able to be known. We must be attentive to our experience to see what things might be contained therein.
This idea is further elaborated when Aristotle gives the second analogy, “In a way the same thing happens in the relation of a name to its account. For the name signifies indistinctly some whole, as circle, but the definition of this divides into the single parts.”viii Therefore, given that sensible whole, with its various parts, we see that the whole is grasped by the intellect as something indistinct. To better understand this whole we name and define the parts which are less obvious to us, but simpler and clear ideas in themselves. So in the case of the circle, we see that its principles are the point and the line, and these are more simply intelligible in themselves, but we first know the circle.
Aristotle then gives his final analogy, “And children at first call all men “fathers” and all women “mothers” but later they distinguish each of them.”ix Children take time to distinguish between adult males and adult males with offspring. So also we need time to distinguish those things that look the same to us, so that we must see their differences. As we are defining and seeing parts we will come to distinguish some things that were confused before.
Using these three examples Aristotle establishes that the confused whole that we first grasp, is in fact confused. It is what we know better, but it is not as intelligible on its own as the parts. We must grasp the parts and define and distinguish them in order to understand our experience. We must wade through the various sensations that we have received, and Aristotle gives us an ordered means by which to do so. Start with what we know, and then move forward. To abandon what we knew at first leaves us lost and adrift in the wild ocean of natural philosophy. We see therefore, that the “natural path” is the only path on which we can proceed with certainty. Therefore, it is the only path by which we can proceed scientifically.

Preliminary Considerations
It is well that we should first make a note regarding the most jarring part of my claim about motion that it is self-evident. Something can be self-evident in many ways. There are principles which the mind grasps immediately, and as obvious, such as “the whole is greater than the part.” There are also principles which St. Thomas calls “self-evident to the wise.”x What is characteristic of such principles is that they are not obvious to everyone. However, both kinds share in common that the mind immediately grasps them. What this means is that there is no middle term showing that they are the case, but rather, through sufficient reflection on experience one sees that it is true. This is to say, there is no proper demonstration of the definition of motion.xi (ref.)
It is nonetheless true that Aristotle's definition of motion, “the actuality of what exists in potency, as such,”xii provides challenges. Prima facie, this definition seems incomprehensible. This is because he is defining motion by what is prior to motion. While it seems reasonable enough that we must define motion in terms of something prior to motion, it challenges us, because there does not seem to be motion in the definition. This difficulty can be surmounted, only if we are able to understand how act and potency are prior to motion.
One final note about Aristotle's definition of motion before we proceed: he is not only defining locomotion, that is, motion from place to place. He certainly sees this as the paradigm of motion and will even say that it is at the base of all other kinds of motion, but he will consider growth and diminution, alteration, and locomotion as kinds of motion. Therefore he will speak of motion in very general terms, which is at once an excellence of his account, and a challenge to we who would understand him.
There are certain principles Aristotle assumes that his readers have at this point grasped and understood. I will not here argue to these principles, but take them as given. First of all we should know that there is such a thing as change and what a change is. If one denies that there is change then natural philosophy can have nothing more to say to him. Such an objection is for metaphysics. According to Aristotle, we must understand change to be, generally speaking, the loss or reception of a substantial or accidental form by some substance. Likewise, we must accept that there is such a thing as a nature. Again, the denial of this brings us to metaphysics. Aristotle defines nature as “a certain principle and cause of moving and of resting in that which it is, primarily, in virtue of itself, and not accidentally.”xiii
Aristotle comes to the principles of nature and change and calls these matter, form and privation. These again are taken as given. It is worthwhile here to point out though that these are indeed principles. There is no demonstration that these are true; they are manifested by reflections upon experience. Finally, Aristotle expects us to have some idea of potency and act. While these are likewise principles and therefore indemonstrable, we will pause briefly to see how Aristotle is able to come to the ideas of potency and act.
Aristotle first mentions the ideas of actuality and potentiality as a proper consideration of natural philosophy in Book II chapter 1. Here we are introduced first to potentiality when he says, “We would not yet claim, in the former case, that the bed has anything according to art if it is only a bed potentially and had not yet the species of a bed.”xiv He is here setting up an analogy between nature and art. The timber is potentially a bed just as matter is potentially flesh. This analogy is very similar to the one he uses to show that there is prime matter. There he argues that as the timber is to the bed, so is there some underlying principle that stands to formxv. He thus moves from matter to see that there is potency, a more general idea that something can be something, but is not. The idea of actuality immediately follows as a correlative. Therefore, when the timber is, the bed, it is no longer the bed potentially but actually.

Definition of Motion
When beginning his inquiry into the definition of motion Aristotle lays out those things that are concomitant to motion.xvi This should make us realize that a complete understanding of what motion is, will be impossible until we have considered the continuous, the infinite, place, void, and time. Having given us this context Aristotle makes a division between potency and act. “There is, then, something which is only in actuality and something in potency and actuality.”xvii This is the first of three divisions that he makes in his search for the definition of motion. As Glen Coughlin points out in his appendix on the definition of motion, it is important to note what is meant by potential.xviii He is dividing act from potency and for this division to be helpful, and then there must be things that stand in opposition to one another. For instance, it does not aid our inquiry to say that I have the potency to stand because I am standing. Therefore, we must understand potency together with privation of some act. However, we cannot confuse potency and privation.
Aristotle proceeds to explain the basis for relations as excess and defect, action and passion, the mover and the mobile. He leaves this aside at this time, but he will return to this consideration when discussing the relation between the mover and the moved. We shall also take this up below.
The second distinction is made when Aristotle states, “motion is not beyond things.”xix That is to say, that it is not beyond any of the categories. The final distinction points out that in every genus there is a being and privation of that being.
We see from the first division that motion must belong to what can be in potency and act. This is clear if we consider that motion is a kind of change, which is obvious from experience. What does not have potency (and this is potency understood with privation, as was said) is unable to change, for there is, as it were, nowhere for it to go. Therefore, motion must pertain to what can be in potency and act.
The second distinction, that motion belongs to the categories, must be understood in two ways. First, that motion cannot be some super genus since “one can grasp nothing common.”xx Second, we must understand that motion is not some eleventh category since there is “nothing beyond the things named.”xxi We may therefore conclude from this that motion is going to be understood in the context of a genus.
The third distinction concerning the being and privation in each genus indicates where to look for motion in a genus. That is, it is going to be somewhere between the being and privation, the white and the black or the perfect and imperfect, etc. It must be clear that when Aristotle says that “the species of motion and change are as many as are those of being,”xxii it does not mean that there is motion in every genus, as he will later deny, but he is claiming that as many categories as admit of motion, so many will the species of motion be. There will not be one kind of motion for multiple categories.
From the above we may conclude that motion belongs to those things that are in act and potency in some genus, according to the mode of that genus. We must take this together with our common experience of motion. We know motion as that which is between its two ends, “that from which” and “that towards which.” For we see the apple moving from green to red, or the child growing to his full height when a man, or the cup being here, and then being there. Such is out experience of motion.
What we know about motion at this point is its ends. For I know that the mobile is here or there, but when it is here or there I do not say that it is in motion. Therefore, since we know the ends of motion and we must always proceed from what is more known to the less known, then we must define motion in terms of its ends. For the sake of generality we will names these ends, “that from which” and “that towards which”
The end “from which” is what the mobile posses now, before it has gone somewhere. It is the end that is held in act. The end towards which is what is held in potency, the mobile is not there. We also see that there are any number of points in between these two at which the mobile could be said to be if its motion did not continue on. The mobile has no intrinsic order away or towards either end if it comes to rest at one of these points. If I get up and walk to the doorway and stop, I do not belong to either room more than the other. It is only in motion that I have an order towards or away from some point.xxiii
From these considerations we see that motion is a kind of potency, since it does not possess its end. We see also that there is a kind of actuality to motion. The points at which the motion could stop are closer to the end, so long as we take the order provided by the motion, than the point from which the motion began. Therefore, as long as it is moving it is becoming the end towards which.
Now, the end that towards which is what the mobile holds in potency, before and during the motion. Once the mobile holds the end towards which in act the motion is completed. However, we may still define this in terms of the end from which as the end from which. In order to do this in the language of act and potency, we say that mobile at the end “towards which” is the actuality of the potency. Or in a parallel formulation to Aristotle's definition, it is the actuality of what existed in potency.
So far, we are still speaking of the ends and not of what lies between them. We therefore want to understand the end “towards which” as it exists in potency, not as it existed. Therefore we must understand that potency insofar as it is still in potency. This is our definition: the actuality of what exists in potency, as it is in potency. As Aristotle phrases it, “the actuality of what exists in potency, as such, is motion.”
We see therefore, that Aristotle proceeds by starting with what is prior and more known, namely potency and act. We then consider what is “in between” these and this is what gives us motion. The argument works by the mode of manifestation. If something is in potency it is not moving, and if it is in act it is done moving, we therefore must look to what is between. There is however, no cause of this definition given. We do not see why motion is this way; we see only that it must be this way. This is what is proper to a principle, that there is no cause of it that the mind can grasp; we see only that it is.
Inertia
Sir Isaac Newton first introduced the world to the idea of inertia in his treatise Natural Philosophy’s Mathematical Principles. Right away we see that his conception of natural philosophy is different that Aristotle’s, given that he is searching for its mathematical principles. For Aristotle, mathematics and philosophy of nature were two very different things. We will discuss more of these differences below. In this section I will argue that Newton’s approach to natural philosophy is positivist in nature and that he proceeds as a mathematician.
Newton introduces us to the idea of inertia in the third definition. “Innate force of matter is the power of resisting, by which and body whatever, as much as is in it, perseveres in its state either of resting or of moving uniformly in a directed line.”xxiv By innate force of matter I am understanding inertia. This understanding seems to hold weight given the first sentence of the explanation of his definition, “This force is always proportional to its body, and does not differ in anything from the inactivity {inertia} of the mass except in the mode of conceiving it.”xxv At this point, there is not much to say regarding his method, only that he has proposed definitions of things that may or may not exist and that these definitions bring up questions them.
After his definitions Newton expounds the philosophical framework in which theses definitions are to be understood. In his Scholium Newton explains his understanding of “Time, space, place, and motion.”xxvi There is much that can be questioned in his accounts but to do so would divert us from our purpose. We will here only note what he does.
After his Scholium Newton introduces us to his “axioms or laws of motion.”xxvii The first law is that which interests us, as it is the law of inertia. “Every body perseveres in its state of resting or moving uniformly in a directed line, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by impressed forces.” immediately there seem to be difficulties. First of all questions arise such as “What does it mean for a body to be in a state of motion?” and “What is force?” These questions should then lead us to wonder what Newton could mean by calling these axioms. This law seems to be a far cry from “The whole is greater than its parts.”
We see that this proceeds very much like Euclid’s Elements. Euclid first lays down his definitions postulates and common notions and then proceeds. There is no discussion of these principles. This seems to be more acceptable since most of these seem fairly straightforward.However, when Newton begins a study of natural philosophy thus, it seems to beg many questions that are not here addressed. What Newton has effectively done is proposed a model by which to understand the phenomena. The certainty that we have in his explanation comes from seeing how effectively it explains the phenomena. This is what has become known as positivism.
In his highly influential work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn undertakes to describe the process of scientific revolutions and points out that they are essentially changes of what he calls “paradigms”xxviii That is, someone posits another model by which to understand the phenomena and the majority take hold of it. This is essentially what Newton has done. He has put forth a way of understanding the world. This includes the definitions and the Scholium which we mentioned earlier. This world view and the laws by which he describes it are far from axiomatic. This is not to say that they are false, merely that are not immediately grasped by the mind, and that a great amount of discussion should be gone through before accepting these ideas as true. We must work through our experience to see these as principles.
It seems right that Einstein has improved on Newton and his theories have taken precedence.xxix We will not, however, go on to discuss Einstein, because it is beyond our purpose. It is of concern here to put forth the way in which modern empirical science ought to proceed, not to describe how it has proceeded. What is more, I am not here going to criticize the principle of inertia, but only provide certain requirements which adherents to this principle must meet. This is the subject of the final section.
Conclusion
Newton's method fails to proceed according to the natural path as laid down by Aristotle. The language he uses seems to indicate that he is, but on a closer examination, we see that there are significant gaps. The difficulties with Newton's method are that he treats physical objects mathematically and that he does not proceed from what is more known to us, to what is more known by nature. What follows is that his method is not scientific in the classical sense.
The argument about treating physical objects mathematically has hitherto only been implied in this paper. A further discussion of this question would belong to a different study that would examine the various degrees of abstraction, and to what extent certainty can be had in these various degrees and whether there can be any overlap. Since this would take us beyond our primary purpose, we will leave this discussion aside and attend to the second difficulty raised, namely, Newton's invalid mode of proceeding.
Given that Newton is discussing natural philosophy he should proceed in the manner the Aristotle did, moving from the confused whole to principles, and from principles to demonstrations. As we saw above, Newton instead posits his principles, much like the mathematician. The difficulty here is that these principles are not axiomatic as we saw. There needs to be arguments to manifest that these are in fact principles.
There are two ways to go from here, one is to supply the missing dialectic of Newton’s Principia, and try to manifest his principles, or to say that Newton's project is wholly other than that of Aristotle's and that we ought not to hold him to the same standards. It is a different method. Given that Einstein does improve on Newton and effectively throw out Newton's world view, I will take the harder case, that Newton is undertaking a wholly different project.
This position is lent credence by examining the very title of the work, where it speaks of mathematical principles. Throughout his work Newton will express phenomena in a mathematical way. This seems to be vastly different than the way Aristotle speaks of motion and comes to his definition. If this is the case, as it seems that it is, then the question resolves back to the first difficulty raised regarding Newton's method, namely treating physical objects mathematically.
What can be said here is that this may in fact be a valid means of proceeding. The modern scientific hypothetical-deductive method has seemingly accomplished much and we should be loath to abandon it simply because it does not seem to conform so precisely to Aristotle's “natural path.” However, despite the great ability of this method to accomplish things, we must also be wary not to throw out the method of Aristotle. To use contemporary terminology, Aristotle is doing philosophy and Newton is doing science. Aristotle's method provides certainty, while Newton's does not seem to do so. If then we are to proceed effectively and with knowledge, then any account of inertia and inertial motion should be informed by what is held with certainty by following Aristotle. Aristotle's definition of motion is therefore prior in the order of knowing, as it is held with certainty and to further understand inertia and the world about us, we must hold on to what we know and proceed to into the unknown.

NOTES
i Thomas Aquinas In Pysicam bk. 3, lectio 2
ii Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 1.2.71b10-2
iii Aristotle, De Anima, 2.5.
iv Aristotle Physics 1.1.184a17-19
v Ibid., 184a9-16
vi Euclid, Elements bk.1
vii Aristotle, Physics 1.1.184a25-27
viii Ibid., 184b9-11
ix Ibid., 184b12-13
x Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, Q.1, a1
xi Thomas Aquinas, In Physicam, bk.III, lectio 2
xii Aristotle Physics 3.1.201a11-12
xiii Ibid., 2.1.192b21-23
xiv Ibid., 193a34-36
xv Ibid., 1.7.191a9-11
xvi Ibid., 3.1.200b16-26
xvii Ibid., 200b26-27
xviii Aristotle. Physics Or On Natural Hearing, ed. and trans. Glen Coughlin, William of Moerbeke Translation Series, (South Bend IN :St. Augustine’s Press, 2005), App. 6, 246.
xix Aristotle Physics 3.1.200b33
xx Ibid., 200b34-35
xxi Ibid., 201a3
xxii Ibid., 201a9
xxiii Aristotle. Physics Or On Natural Hearing, ed. and trans. Glen Coughlin, William of Moerbeke Translation Series, (South Bend IN :St. Augustine’s Press, 2005), App. 6, 248.
xxiv Isaac Newton Natural Philosophy’s Mathematical Principles, ed. Chris Decaen, trans Ronald Richard , (Thomas Aquinas College, 1996) 3.
xxv Ibid.
xxvi Ibid., 6.
xxvii Ibid., 11.
xxiii Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3rd ed., 10
xxix Antonio Moreno, “The Law of Inertia and the Principle Quidquid Movetur ab Alio Movetur,” Thomist 38 (1974) 313-316.

We join Catholic bloggers in this joint statement.

November 14, 2008

President-elect Barack Obama,

As American Catholics, we, the undersigned, would like to reiterate the congratulations given to you by Pope Benedict XVI. We will be praying for you as you undertake the office of President of the United States.

Wishing you much good will, we hope we will be able to work with you, your administration, and our fellow citizens to move beyond the gridlock which has often harmed our great nation in recent years. Too often, partisan politics has hampered our response to disaster and misfortune. As a result of this, many Americans have become resentful, blaming others for what happens instead of realizing our own responsibilities. We face serious problems as a people, and if we hope to overcome the crises we face in today’s world, we should make a serious effort to set aside the bitterness in our hearts, to listen to one another, and to work with one another

One of the praiseworthy elements of your campaign has been the call to end such partisanship. You have stated a desire to engage others in dialogue. With you, we believe that real achievement comes not through the defamation of one’s opponents, nor by amassing power and using it merely as a tool for one’s own individual will. We also believe dialogue is essential. We too wish to appeal to the better nature of the nation. We want to encourage people to work together for the common good. Such action can and will engender trust. It may change the hearts of many, and it might alter the path of our nation, shifting to a road leading to a better America. We hope this theme of your campaign is realized in the years ahead.

One of the critical issues which currently divides our nation is abortion. As you have said, no one is for abortion, and you would agree to limit late-term abortions as long as any bill which comes your way allows for exceptions to those limits, such as when the health of the mother is in jeopardy. You have also said you would like to work on those social issues which cause women to feel as if they have a need for an abortion, so as to reduce the actual number of abortions being performed in the United States.

Indeed, you said in your third presidential debate, “But there surely is some common ground when both those who believe in choice and those who are opposed to abortion can come together and say, ‘We should try to prevent unintended pregnancies by providing appropriate education to our youth, communicating that sexuality is sacred and that they should not be engaged in cavalier activity, and providing options for adoption, and helping single mothers if they want to choose to keep the baby.’”

As men and women who oppose abortion and embrace a pro-life ethic, we want to commend your willingness to engage us in dialogue, and we ask that you live up to your promise, and engage us on this issue.

There is much we can do together. There is much that we can do to help women who find themselves in difficult situations so they will not see abortion as their only option. There is much which we can do to help eliminate those unwanted pregnancies which lead to abortion.

One of your campaign promises is of grave concern to many pro-life citizens. On January 22, 2008, the 35th anniversary of Roe v. Wade, when speaking of the current right of women in America to have abortions, you said, “And I will continue to defend this right by passing the Freedom of Choice Act as president.”

The Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA) might well undermine your engagement of pro-life Americans on the question of abortion. It might hamper any effort on your part to work with us to limit late-term abortions. We believe FOCA does more than allow for choice. It may force the choice of a woman upon others, and make them morally complicit in such choice. One concern is that it would force doctors and hospitals which would otherwise choose not to perform abortions to do so, even if it went against their sacred beliefs. Such a law would undermine choice, and might begin the process by which abortion is enforced as a preferred option, instead of being one possible choice for a doctor to practice.

It is because of such concern we write. We urge you to engage us, and to dialogue with us, and to do so before you consider signing this legislation. Let us reason together and search out the implications of FOCA. Let us carefully review it and search for contradictions of those positions which we hold in common.
If FOCA can be postponed for the present, and serious dialogue begun with us, as well as with those who disagree with us, you will demonstrate that your administration will indeed be one that rises above partisanship, and will be one of change. This might well be the first step toward resolving an issue which tears at the fabric of our churches, our political process, our families, our very society, and that causes so much hardship and heartache in pregnant women.

Likewise, you have also recently stated you might over-ride some of President G.W. Bush’s executive orders. This is also a concern to us. We believe doing so without having a dialogue with the American people would undermine the political environment you would like to establish. Among those issues which concern us are those which would use taxpayer money to support actions we find to be morally questionable, such as embryonic stem cell research, or to fund international organizations that would counsel women to have an abortion (this would make abortion to be more than a mere choice, but an encouraged activity).

Consider, sir, your general promise to the American people and set aside particular promises to a part of your constituency. This would indicate that you plan to reject politics as usual. This would indeed be a change we need.

Sincerely,

Deal W. Hudson
Christopher Blosser
Marjorie Campbell
Mark J. Coughlan
Rev. James A. Nowack
Craig D. Baker
Susan DeBoisblanc
Megan Stout
Joshua D. Brumfield
Ashley M. Brumfield
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Matthew Talbot
Paul Mitchell
Todd Flowerday
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Adam P Verslype
Josiah Neeley
Michael J. Deem
Katerina M. Deem
Natalie Mixa
Henry Newman
Anthony M. Annett
Mickey Jackson
Veronica Greenwell
Thomas Greenwell PhD
Robert C. Koerpel
Nate Wildermuth

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