Some thoughts on quia v. propter quid. Also I hope to post soon the beginning of what Vin. and I will develop into a "dialog concerning the first thoughts of the mind." Finally, I will be posting portions of a paper on the principle "Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur."

Quia demonstration:

M: All non-twinklers are near.
m: All planets are non-twinklers.
C: All planets are near.

The [M]ajor is necessary (you can observe this in other cases, for instance), but it is not per se in any mode (Mode I: near is not in the definition of a non-twinkler, but rather some quality of perceived light, as steadiness; Mode II: nor is non-twinkler in the definition of near, but rather some relation of distance; Mode IV: nor is near an effect of non-twinkler, for a mode of perception cannot cause the distance between objects. So this means that the major would be per se in Mode IV is you convert it, for the distance between objects can cause a difference in their appearance...but at this stage the "per se" relation is not known, hence Aristotle says the per se is not known as per se).

The [m]inor is necessary (it is observed to happen always), and it happens to belong per se to planets, but you don’t know it as such yet.

Thus the conclusion is necessary, for the assumption is that non-twinkling is a necessary sign of nearness.

However, propter quid-ifying it:

M: All near things are non-twinklers.
m: All planets are nears.
C: All planets are non-twinklers.

The minor is necessary and per se in Mode I, for (as one realizes due to the quia argument [???]) this is what differentiates planets from stars (assuming geocentrism).

The Major is necessary and is now per se in Mode 4, because one realizes (through observation) that non-twinkling is a necessary effect of some source of light being near (i.e. Near enough, e.g. a lantern at night...).

Thus the conclusion is necessary and per se in... Mode 4 (?) because as near things they twinkle.

Hence we have an important "change of state of mind."

That is, “All non-twinkling things are near” is a statement that is necessary because this is the universal you’ve arrived at from experience. Through experience of seeing light-sources, (torches, flashlights, car-lights, lanterns) at night, one realizes that the more steady sources of light are always nearer (so this is a kata panta realization). However, what one doesn’t realize yet is that the necessity of this statement is due to the fact that nearness causes steadiness of light. The causative power of nearness is what makes non-twinkling per se to it, and thus necessary (this is the order of nature, the better known in itself), while we first see the accidental, the sensible aspect, i.e. lack of variation of the light source, and see this as necessary because it obtains always. Once we realize that the nearness is the causal factor, this is when we grasp the better know thing in itself, or see the per se as per se.

This leads to causal knowledge of the initial observation (“All planets are non-twinklers”) because we already have an accepted definition of planet (or perhaps it is better to say a proper accident, their definition is probably: genus=heavenly body, difference=travels in the sphere of ‘the different’ along the ecliptic). So this is where the major exhibits its causative power, because the “genus” of “near things” is much broader than “planet” and “non-twinkling” is just one possible attribute of a thing exerting its own sort of power due to nearness (gravity, magnetism, heat, pheromones, you name it). A planet being a near thing entails certain things which follow from near-light sources; so there’s a ‘descent’ and priority in the form that causes both the effect and our knowledge of it.

As Alexander of Aphrodisias says: "The syllogism does not have its being in the words but in what they signify."