An Inquiry into the Question of Inertia

You will notice that there is much in this article that was taken from my previous post on the definition of motion. I decided to re-direct my ideas and focus on method, more than the actual question of motion and inertia.

St. Thomas Aquinas makes a bold claim concerning Aristotle’s definition of motion saying, “And therefore it is wholly impossible to otherwise define motion through what is prior and more known, but as the philosopher has here defined it.”i Such a claim, from such a mind, warrants a careful look as to the reasons behind a claim of this force. The significance of this inquiry is great. Aristotle's definition of motion is challenged by a fundamental principle of modern day physics, inertia. How to reconcile these ideas or change them is, therefore, an important question for those who do not wish to simply abandon Aristotle and St. Thomas.
We are left then with the quandary of what to do. Modern day thought on the whole encourages us to scorn ancient thought and embrace the current understanding of things. After all, modern science has taken us to the moon. Even so, there is a puzzle. When Aquinas made his bold claim, was he merely stuck in the world of own limited science? Did he make this claim based upon the poor and limited scientific data available at the time? It is interesting to note, that neither he nor Aristotle bring up the importance of accumulating more “data” at all in their explanations. Probably most striking to our modern sensibilities is that neither of them even mentions the idea of force or anything like it in their accounts.
The differences between the present day approach to the physical world and in particular to motion, and the ancient and medieval approach explains many of these difficulties. The modern day physicist proceeds according to what is commonly known as the scientific method. I here define it as a systematic method of inquiry proceeding according to hypothesis and experiment. Consequently, modern scientists establish various models to explain what they experience and then abandon them for another, better model when one should come along.
Aristotle and St. Thomas were engaged in a much different enterprise as can be clearly seen in their works. The classical approach was one that sought, first of all knowledge, or as St. Thomas would have said scientia. This cognate is obviously related to our modern day word for science, but its meaning is much different. Aristotle defines such knowledge in his Posterior Analytics,
“We think we know each [thing] without qualification, but not in the sophistical manner with respect to an attribute, when we think that we know the cause through which the thing exists as being the cause of that thing and that the thing cannot be other than what it is.”ii
As he will later show in his De Anima this knowledge comes from the abstraction of the forms of things by the agent intellect, so that the mind truly knows things.iii
As is clear, the two approaches to understanding the physical world are vastly different. While the differences between these two approaches are such that it seems impossible to say whether one is better than the other, it does seem that we may argue for one being prior to the other. This brings us to the purpose of this paper. While it would be a great task to once and for all settle the question about inertia and the classical definition of motion, at least we can here argue for where we ought to begin looking. My thesis is two-fold: Aristotle's definition of motion is prior to the account of inertia in the order of knowing in that it is self-evident. Consequently, any account of inertia must be able to keep this definition if it is to be taken as true.
To proceed I will first argue that the only valid way to proceed in any inquiry is as Aristotle states in the beginning of the Physics “The natural path is to go from things which are more known and certain towards us toward things which are more certain and more knowable by nature.”iv I will then address some preliminary concerns to the definition of motion. After this, I will examine Aristotle's definition of motion and how he argues that it is true showing that it is in fact self-evident, given Aristotle’s principles of nature. This being shown, I will conclude by claiming that this definition must be held if one is to investigate the physical world, in particular in examining the principle of inertia.

Beginning
In every inquiry in which there are principles or causes or elements, understanding and science occur from knowing these. For we think we know each thing when we know the first causes and first principles and have reached the elements. It is clear, then, that in natural science as well one must try to determine first what concerns the principles.v

So Aristotle opens the physics and directs us to examine the principles of natural philosophy. It is then that he enunciates the principle which will be our primary concern in this essay, “The natural path is to go from the things which are more known and certain to us toward things which are more certain and more knowable by nature.” There are some questions that the formulation of this principle brings up. In particular, the distinction between what is more known to us and what is more known by nature, for this is the principle by which Aristotle justifies this mode of proceeding. In this section I will argue that there is no other way to proceed with certainty and scientia except by this path that Aristotle lays forth. While such an inquiry belongs properly to epistemology, we will be able to touch on this matter briefly.
It is sufficient here to see that there are some things that we are able to see more immediately than others. For instance, I know that the whole is greater than the part, or that equals added to equals are equal. Such axioms are certain and clear to our minds. Further claims, such as the interior angles of a triangle equal two right angles, are true, but certainly cannot be grasped with the immediacy of the afore mentioned axioms. In fact, following Euclid's Elements there are various definitions, axioms and postulates, let alone propositions that I must comprehend before I can see that the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.vi
The movement in mathematics, however, is simpler than that of Aristotle’s Physics. Aristotle, since he is dealing with physical and therefore sensible realities, must move from his experience of things to the principles, and then from principles to demonstrations. The greater part of the Physics is dedicated to the discussion of principles. It is not until the sixth book (of eight) that Aristotle even begins to do demonstrations, properly so called. Therefore we see that the philosopher of nature must spend time examining his experience, moving from the more known to the less known.
He gives three analogies by which to understand this method. The first: “For the whole is more known according to sensation, and the universal is a certain whole. For the universal embraces many things within it as parts.”vii This analogy allows us to consider our experience in a way like the universal and particular. In our experience of things, say a tree, we realize that this is a kind of whole that is composed of other things which are themselves able to be known. We must be attentive to our experience to see what things might be contained therein.
This idea is further elaborated when Aristotle gives the second analogy, “In a way the same thing happens in the relation of a name to its account. For the name signifies indistinctly some whole, as circle, but the definition of this divides into the single parts.”viii Therefore, given that sensible whole, with its various parts, we see that the whole is grasped by the intellect as something indistinct. To better understand this whole we name and define the parts which are less obvious to us, but simpler and clear ideas in themselves. So in the case of the circle, we see that its principles are the point and the line, and these are more simply intelligible in themselves, but we first know the circle.
Aristotle then gives his final analogy, “And children at first call all men “fathers” and all women “mothers” but later they distinguish each of them.”ix Children take time to distinguish between adult males and adult males with offspring. So also we need time to distinguish those things that look the same to us, so that we must see their differences. As we are defining and seeing parts we will come to distinguish some things that were confused before.
Using these three examples Aristotle establishes that the confused whole that we first grasp, is in fact confused. It is what we know better, but it is not as intelligible on its own as the parts. We must grasp the parts and define and distinguish them in order to understand our experience. We must wade through the various sensations that we have received, and Aristotle gives us an ordered means by which to do so. Start with what we know, and then move forward. To abandon what we knew at first leaves us lost and adrift in the wild ocean of natural philosophy. We see therefore, that the “natural path” is the only path on which we can proceed with certainty. Therefore, it is the only path by which we can proceed scientifically.

Preliminary Considerations
It is well that we should first make a note regarding the most jarring part of my claim about motion that it is self-evident. Something can be self-evident in many ways. There are principles which the mind grasps immediately, and as obvious, such as “the whole is greater than the part.” There are also principles which St. Thomas calls “self-evident to the wise.”x What is characteristic of such principles is that they are not obvious to everyone. However, both kinds share in common that the mind immediately grasps them. What this means is that there is no middle term showing that they are the case, but rather, through sufficient reflection on experience one sees that it is true. This is to say, there is no proper demonstration of the definition of motion.xi (ref.)
It is nonetheless true that Aristotle's definition of motion, “the actuality of what exists in potency, as such,”xii provides challenges. Prima facie, this definition seems incomprehensible. This is because he is defining motion by what is prior to motion. While it seems reasonable enough that we must define motion in terms of something prior to motion, it challenges us, because there does not seem to be motion in the definition. This difficulty can be surmounted, only if we are able to understand how act and potency are prior to motion.
One final note about Aristotle's definition of motion before we proceed: he is not only defining locomotion, that is, motion from place to place. He certainly sees this as the paradigm of motion and will even say that it is at the base of all other kinds of motion, but he will consider growth and diminution, alteration, and locomotion as kinds of motion. Therefore he will speak of motion in very general terms, which is at once an excellence of his account, and a challenge to we who would understand him.
There are certain principles Aristotle assumes that his readers have at this point grasped and understood. I will not here argue to these principles, but take them as given. First of all we should know that there is such a thing as change and what a change is. If one denies that there is change then natural philosophy can have nothing more to say to him. Such an objection is for metaphysics. According to Aristotle, we must understand change to be, generally speaking, the loss or reception of a substantial or accidental form by some substance. Likewise, we must accept that there is such a thing as a nature. Again, the denial of this brings us to metaphysics. Aristotle defines nature as “a certain principle and cause of moving and of resting in that which it is, primarily, in virtue of itself, and not accidentally.”xiii
Aristotle comes to the principles of nature and change and calls these matter, form and privation. These again are taken as given. It is worthwhile here to point out though that these are indeed principles. There is no demonstration that these are true; they are manifested by reflections upon experience. Finally, Aristotle expects us to have some idea of potency and act. While these are likewise principles and therefore indemonstrable, we will pause briefly to see how Aristotle is able to come to the ideas of potency and act.
Aristotle first mentions the ideas of actuality and potentiality as a proper consideration of natural philosophy in Book II chapter 1. Here we are introduced first to potentiality when he says, “We would not yet claim, in the former case, that the bed has anything according to art if it is only a bed potentially and had not yet the species of a bed.”xiv He is here setting up an analogy between nature and art. The timber is potentially a bed just as matter is potentially flesh. This analogy is very similar to the one he uses to show that there is prime matter. There he argues that as the timber is to the bed, so is there some underlying principle that stands to formxv. He thus moves from matter to see that there is potency, a more general idea that something can be something, but is not. The idea of actuality immediately follows as a correlative. Therefore, when the timber is, the bed, it is no longer the bed potentially but actually.

Definition of Motion
When beginning his inquiry into the definition of motion Aristotle lays out those things that are concomitant to motion.xvi This should make us realize that a complete understanding of what motion is, will be impossible until we have considered the continuous, the infinite, place, void, and time. Having given us this context Aristotle makes a division between potency and act. “There is, then, something which is only in actuality and something in potency and actuality.”xvii This is the first of three divisions that he makes in his search for the definition of motion. As Glen Coughlin points out in his appendix on the definition of motion, it is important to note what is meant by potential.xviii He is dividing act from potency and for this division to be helpful, and then there must be things that stand in opposition to one another. For instance, it does not aid our inquiry to say that I have the potency to stand because I am standing. Therefore, we must understand potency together with privation of some act. However, we cannot confuse potency and privation.
Aristotle proceeds to explain the basis for relations as excess and defect, action and passion, the mover and the mobile. He leaves this aside at this time, but he will return to this consideration when discussing the relation between the mover and the moved. We shall also take this up below.
The second distinction is made when Aristotle states, “motion is not beyond things.”xix That is to say, that it is not beyond any of the categories. The final distinction points out that in every genus there is a being and privation of that being.
We see from the first division that motion must belong to what can be in potency and act. This is clear if we consider that motion is a kind of change, which is obvious from experience. What does not have potency (and this is potency understood with privation, as was said) is unable to change, for there is, as it were, nowhere for it to go. Therefore, motion must pertain to what can be in potency and act.
The second distinction, that motion belongs to the categories, must be understood in two ways. First, that motion cannot be some super genus since “one can grasp nothing common.”xx Second, we must understand that motion is not some eleventh category since there is “nothing beyond the things named.”xxi We may therefore conclude from this that motion is going to be understood in the context of a genus.
The third distinction concerning the being and privation in each genus indicates where to look for motion in a genus. That is, it is going to be somewhere between the being and privation, the white and the black or the perfect and imperfect, etc. It must be clear that when Aristotle says that “the species of motion and change are as many as are those of being,”xxii it does not mean that there is motion in every genus, as he will later deny, but he is claiming that as many categories as admit of motion, so many will the species of motion be. There will not be one kind of motion for multiple categories.
From the above we may conclude that motion belongs to those things that are in act and potency in some genus, according to the mode of that genus. We must take this together with our common experience of motion. We know motion as that which is between its two ends, “that from which” and “that towards which.” For we see the apple moving from green to red, or the child growing to his full height when a man, or the cup being here, and then being there. Such is out experience of motion.
What we know about motion at this point is its ends. For I know that the mobile is here or there, but when it is here or there I do not say that it is in motion. Therefore, since we know the ends of motion and we must always proceed from what is more known to the less known, then we must define motion in terms of its ends. For the sake of generality we will names these ends, “that from which” and “that towards which”
The end “from which” is what the mobile posses now, before it has gone somewhere. It is the end that is held in act. The end towards which is what is held in potency, the mobile is not there. We also see that there are any number of points in between these two at which the mobile could be said to be if its motion did not continue on. The mobile has no intrinsic order away or towards either end if it comes to rest at one of these points. If I get up and walk to the doorway and stop, I do not belong to either room more than the other. It is only in motion that I have an order towards or away from some point.xxiii
From these considerations we see that motion is a kind of potency, since it does not possess its end. We see also that there is a kind of actuality to motion. The points at which the motion could stop are closer to the end, so long as we take the order provided by the motion, than the point from which the motion began. Therefore, as long as it is moving it is becoming the end towards which.
Now, the end that towards which is what the mobile holds in potency, before and during the motion. Once the mobile holds the end towards which in act the motion is completed. However, we may still define this in terms of the end from which as the end from which. In order to do this in the language of act and potency, we say that mobile at the end “towards which” is the actuality of the potency. Or in a parallel formulation to Aristotle's definition, it is the actuality of what existed in potency.
So far, we are still speaking of the ends and not of what lies between them. We therefore want to understand the end “towards which” as it exists in potency, not as it existed. Therefore we must understand that potency insofar as it is still in potency. This is our definition: the actuality of what exists in potency, as it is in potency. As Aristotle phrases it, “the actuality of what exists in potency, as such, is motion.”
We see therefore, that Aristotle proceeds by starting with what is prior and more known, namely potency and act. We then consider what is “in between” these and this is what gives us motion. The argument works by the mode of manifestation. If something is in potency it is not moving, and if it is in act it is done moving, we therefore must look to what is between. There is however, no cause of this definition given. We do not see why motion is this way; we see only that it must be this way. This is what is proper to a principle, that there is no cause of it that the mind can grasp; we see only that it is.
Inertia
Sir Isaac Newton first introduced the world to the idea of inertia in his treatise Natural Philosophy’s Mathematical Principles. Right away we see that his conception of natural philosophy is different that Aristotle’s, given that he is searching for its mathematical principles. For Aristotle, mathematics and philosophy of nature were two very different things. We will discuss more of these differences below. In this section I will argue that Newton’s approach to natural philosophy is positivist in nature and that he proceeds as a mathematician.
Newton introduces us to the idea of inertia in the third definition. “Innate force of matter is the power of resisting, by which and body whatever, as much as is in it, perseveres in its state either of resting or of moving uniformly in a directed line.”xxiv By innate force of matter I am understanding inertia. This understanding seems to hold weight given the first sentence of the explanation of his definition, “This force is always proportional to its body, and does not differ in anything from the inactivity {inertia} of the mass except in the mode of conceiving it.”xxv At this point, there is not much to say regarding his method, only that he has proposed definitions of things that may or may not exist and that these definitions bring up questions them.
After his definitions Newton expounds the philosophical framework in which theses definitions are to be understood. In his Scholium Newton explains his understanding of “Time, space, place, and motion.”xxvi There is much that can be questioned in his accounts but to do so would divert us from our purpose. We will here only note what he does.
After his Scholium Newton introduces us to his “axioms or laws of motion.”xxvii The first law is that which interests us, as it is the law of inertia. “Every body perseveres in its state of resting or moving uniformly in a directed line, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by impressed forces.” immediately there seem to be difficulties. First of all questions arise such as “What does it mean for a body to be in a state of motion?” and “What is force?” These questions should then lead us to wonder what Newton could mean by calling these axioms. This law seems to be a far cry from “The whole is greater than its parts.”
We see that this proceeds very much like Euclid’s Elements. Euclid first lays down his definitions postulates and common notions and then proceeds. There is no discussion of these principles. This seems to be more acceptable since most of these seem fairly straightforward.However, when Newton begins a study of natural philosophy thus, it seems to beg many questions that are not here addressed. What Newton has effectively done is proposed a model by which to understand the phenomena. The certainty that we have in his explanation comes from seeing how effectively it explains the phenomena. This is what has become known as positivism.
In his highly influential work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn undertakes to describe the process of scientific revolutions and points out that they are essentially changes of what he calls “paradigms”xxviii That is, someone posits another model by which to understand the phenomena and the majority take hold of it. This is essentially what Newton has done. He has put forth a way of understanding the world. This includes the definitions and the Scholium which we mentioned earlier. This world view and the laws by which he describes it are far from axiomatic. This is not to say that they are false, merely that are not immediately grasped by the mind, and that a great amount of discussion should be gone through before accepting these ideas as true. We must work through our experience to see these as principles.
It seems right that Einstein has improved on Newton and his theories have taken precedence.xxix We will not, however, go on to discuss Einstein, because it is beyond our purpose. It is of concern here to put forth the way in which modern empirical science ought to proceed, not to describe how it has proceeded. What is more, I am not here going to criticize the principle of inertia, but only provide certain requirements which adherents to this principle must meet. This is the subject of the final section.
Conclusion
Newton's method fails to proceed according to the natural path as laid down by Aristotle. The language he uses seems to indicate that he is, but on a closer examination, we see that there are significant gaps. The difficulties with Newton's method are that he treats physical objects mathematically and that he does not proceed from what is more known to us, to what is more known by nature. What follows is that his method is not scientific in the classical sense.
The argument about treating physical objects mathematically has hitherto only been implied in this paper. A further discussion of this question would belong to a different study that would examine the various degrees of abstraction, and to what extent certainty can be had in these various degrees and whether there can be any overlap. Since this would take us beyond our primary purpose, we will leave this discussion aside and attend to the second difficulty raised, namely, Newton's invalid mode of proceeding.
Given that Newton is discussing natural philosophy he should proceed in the manner the Aristotle did, moving from the confused whole to principles, and from principles to demonstrations. As we saw above, Newton instead posits his principles, much like the mathematician. The difficulty here is that these principles are not axiomatic as we saw. There needs to be arguments to manifest that these are in fact principles.
There are two ways to go from here, one is to supply the missing dialectic of Newton’s Principia, and try to manifest his principles, or to say that Newton's project is wholly other than that of Aristotle's and that we ought not to hold him to the same standards. It is a different method. Given that Einstein does improve on Newton and effectively throw out Newton's world view, I will take the harder case, that Newton is undertaking a wholly different project.
This position is lent credence by examining the very title of the work, where it speaks of mathematical principles. Throughout his work Newton will express phenomena in a mathematical way. This seems to be vastly different than the way Aristotle speaks of motion and comes to his definition. If this is the case, as it seems that it is, then the question resolves back to the first difficulty raised regarding Newton's method, namely treating physical objects mathematically.
What can be said here is that this may in fact be a valid means of proceeding. The modern scientific hypothetical-deductive method has seemingly accomplished much and we should be loath to abandon it simply because it does not seem to conform so precisely to Aristotle's “natural path.” However, despite the great ability of this method to accomplish things, we must also be wary not to throw out the method of Aristotle. To use contemporary terminology, Aristotle is doing philosophy and Newton is doing science. Aristotle's method provides certainty, while Newton's does not seem to do so. If then we are to proceed effectively and with knowledge, then any account of inertia and inertial motion should be informed by what is held with certainty by following Aristotle. Aristotle's definition of motion is therefore prior in the order of knowing, as it is held with certainty and to further understand inertia and the world about us, we must hold on to what we know and proceed to into the unknown.

NOTES
i Thomas Aquinas In Pysicam bk. 3, lectio 2
ii Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 1.2.71b10-2
iii Aristotle, De Anima, 2.5.
iv Aristotle Physics 1.1.184a17-19
v Ibid., 184a9-16
vi Euclid, Elements bk.1
vii Aristotle, Physics 1.1.184a25-27
viii Ibid., 184b9-11
ix Ibid., 184b12-13
x Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, Q.1, a1
xi Thomas Aquinas, In Physicam, bk.III, lectio 2
xii Aristotle Physics 3.1.201a11-12
xiii Ibid., 2.1.192b21-23
xiv Ibid., 193a34-36
xv Ibid., 1.7.191a9-11
xvi Ibid., 3.1.200b16-26
xvii Ibid., 200b26-27
xviii Aristotle. Physics Or On Natural Hearing, ed. and trans. Glen Coughlin, William of Moerbeke Translation Series, (South Bend IN :St. Augustine’s Press, 2005), App. 6, 246.
xix Aristotle Physics 3.1.200b33
xx Ibid., 200b34-35
xxi Ibid., 201a3
xxii Ibid., 201a9
xxiii Aristotle. Physics Or On Natural Hearing, ed. and trans. Glen Coughlin, William of Moerbeke Translation Series, (South Bend IN :St. Augustine’s Press, 2005), App. 6, 248.
xxiv Isaac Newton Natural Philosophy’s Mathematical Principles, ed. Chris Decaen, trans Ronald Richard , (Thomas Aquinas College, 1996) 3.
xxv Ibid.
xxvi Ibid., 6.
xxvii Ibid., 11.
xxiii Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3rd ed., 10
xxix Antonio Moreno, “The Law of Inertia and the Principle Quidquid Movetur ab Alio Movetur,” Thomist 38 (1974) 313-316.

We join Catholic bloggers in this joint statement.

November 14, 2008

President-elect Barack Obama,

As American Catholics, we, the undersigned, would like to reiterate the congratulations given to you by Pope Benedict XVI. We will be praying for you as you undertake the office of President of the United States.

Wishing you much good will, we hope we will be able to work with you, your administration, and our fellow citizens to move beyond the gridlock which has often harmed our great nation in recent years. Too often, partisan politics has hampered our response to disaster and misfortune. As a result of this, many Americans have become resentful, blaming others for what happens instead of realizing our own responsibilities. We face serious problems as a people, and if we hope to overcome the crises we face in today’s world, we should make a serious effort to set aside the bitterness in our hearts, to listen to one another, and to work with one another

One of the praiseworthy elements of your campaign has been the call to end such partisanship. You have stated a desire to engage others in dialogue. With you, we believe that real achievement comes not through the defamation of one’s opponents, nor by amassing power and using it merely as a tool for one’s own individual will. We also believe dialogue is essential. We too wish to appeal to the better nature of the nation. We want to encourage people to work together for the common good. Such action can and will engender trust. It may change the hearts of many, and it might alter the path of our nation, shifting to a road leading to a better America. We hope this theme of your campaign is realized in the years ahead.

One of the critical issues which currently divides our nation is abortion. As you have said, no one is for abortion, and you would agree to limit late-term abortions as long as any bill which comes your way allows for exceptions to those limits, such as when the health of the mother is in jeopardy. You have also said you would like to work on those social issues which cause women to feel as if they have a need for an abortion, so as to reduce the actual number of abortions being performed in the United States.

Indeed, you said in your third presidential debate, “But there surely is some common ground when both those who believe in choice and those who are opposed to abortion can come together and say, ‘We should try to prevent unintended pregnancies by providing appropriate education to our youth, communicating that sexuality is sacred and that they should not be engaged in cavalier activity, and providing options for adoption, and helping single mothers if they want to choose to keep the baby.’”

As men and women who oppose abortion and embrace a pro-life ethic, we want to commend your willingness to engage us in dialogue, and we ask that you live up to your promise, and engage us on this issue.

There is much we can do together. There is much that we can do to help women who find themselves in difficult situations so they will not see abortion as their only option. There is much which we can do to help eliminate those unwanted pregnancies which lead to abortion.

One of your campaign promises is of grave concern to many pro-life citizens. On January 22, 2008, the 35th anniversary of Roe v. Wade, when speaking of the current right of women in America to have abortions, you said, “And I will continue to defend this right by passing the Freedom of Choice Act as president.”

The Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA) might well undermine your engagement of pro-life Americans on the question of abortion. It might hamper any effort on your part to work with us to limit late-term abortions. We believe FOCA does more than allow for choice. It may force the choice of a woman upon others, and make them morally complicit in such choice. One concern is that it would force doctors and hospitals which would otherwise choose not to perform abortions to do so, even if it went against their sacred beliefs. Such a law would undermine choice, and might begin the process by which abortion is enforced as a preferred option, instead of being one possible choice for a doctor to practice.

It is because of such concern we write. We urge you to engage us, and to dialogue with us, and to do so before you consider signing this legislation. Let us reason together and search out the implications of FOCA. Let us carefully review it and search for contradictions of those positions which we hold in common.
If FOCA can be postponed for the present, and serious dialogue begun with us, as well as with those who disagree with us, you will demonstrate that your administration will indeed be one that rises above partisanship, and will be one of change. This might well be the first step toward resolving an issue which tears at the fabric of our churches, our political process, our families, our very society, and that causes so much hardship and heartache in pregnant women.

Likewise, you have also recently stated you might over-ride some of President G.W. Bush’s executive orders. This is also a concern to us. We believe doing so without having a dialogue with the American people would undermine the political environment you would like to establish. Among those issues which concern us are those which would use taxpayer money to support actions we find to be morally questionable, such as embryonic stem cell research, or to fund international organizations that would counsel women to have an abortion (this would make abortion to be more than a mere choice, but an encouraged activity).

Consider, sir, your general promise to the American people and set aside particular promises to a part of your constituency. This would indicate that you plan to reject politics as usual. This would indeed be a change we need.

Sincerely,

Deal W. Hudson
Christopher Blosser
Marjorie Campbell
Mark J. Coughlan
Rev. James A. Nowack
Craig D. Baker
Susan DeBoisblanc
Megan Stout
Joshua D. Brumfield
Ashley M. Brumfield
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Matthew Talbot
Paul Mitchell
Todd Flowerday
Henry C Karlson III
Darren Belajac
Adam P Verslype
Josiah Neeley
Michael J. Deem
Katerina M. Deem
Natalie Mixa
Henry Newman
Anthony M. Annett
Mickey Jackson
Veronica Greenwell
Thomas Greenwell PhD
Robert C. Koerpel
Nate Wildermuth

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CF: St. Thomas, De Veritate, Q. 11, (the 'De Magistro'), a. 1

1. St. Thomas points out that a man acquires science because of the certain seeds of knowledge that are in him. These are the first concepts and first principles. These seeds contain in their power all other actual and more particular knowledges. Whence from this potency, knowledge is led into act in a man.

2. However, St. Thomas compares this acquisition of knowledge to a doctor and health. In this comparison, the acquisition of knowledge, or learning, happens in two ways.

2.a. First, the way that health is regained naturally by the body, i.e. by it "healing itself." This St. Thomas compares the way of teaching oneself or the inventio of knowledge.

2.b. Second, the way that a doctor using the medical arts assists the body in healing itself. This is the way a man teaches another man, by reducing the potential knowledge in him to act by leading the learner along the way of inventio in the best route possible. This way is called disciplina.

3. Whence, it seems to me, given that "teaching" most properly said is in the second way (2.b), that the reduction of potential knowledge to actual knowledge in the learner is what all other analogous, metaphorical, and corrupt uses of the term "teach" are ordered towards this meaning.

3.b. Thus teaching has this respect to truth, that it leads a mind from potency to act with respect to the intellect's object of truth.

4. Two corollaries can be drawn regarding the "ethical realm" of teaching and learning. The first corollary uses this proper sense of teaching with respect to the ethics of disciplina; the second uses this proper sense with respect to inventio.

5. First corollary. Premise: to know propositional truth is the proper (natural) operation,proper good, and hence perfection, of the human intellect. Whence anything opposed to this is unnatural, bad, and an imperfection. A teacher, when using his authority in his office as teaching with respect to a student, in proposing something for them to learn, must pay attention to this standard. This is especially true when he, in his pedagogical method, invokes the authority of another, e.g., "As Aristotle says," or even the strongest example of quotation, claiming that someone is actually "teaching" and hence claiming a true reduction of potential knowledge to actual knowledge, and so a teacher might say "As 'so-and-so' teaches." In this way a teacher is to be compared to a doctor, who (as Mr. Berquist teaches often in Junior philosophy) makes the best murderer, because he knows the human body insofar as it is a composite and corruptible whole, and hence knows best how to decompose it and reduce it to perfect corruption. Just as a doctor would abuse his art and commit an evil by harming or killing his patient, so a teacher commits an evil (to varying degrees) if he harms the intellects of his learners by ignorance or falsity. "Teaching" must be measured against its proper sense, and if it fails this standard, the proposed disciplina is somewhere between folly and ignorance (the use of authority in place of true knowledge, or lack of knowledge and recourse to a sort of boasting) and dogmatism or pernicious lies. This is the gamut between sophistry and ideological tyranny, the organon of the dictator.

6. Second corollary. Same premise. Whence, in the way of inventio, a man must evaluate all sources of 'disciplina' professing to lead him on the way of learning or the way of discovery against this standard. This allows for an ordering of the uses of "teaching" when attributed to someone by way of authority, i.e., it indicates degrees among the proper use of "teach" while respecting the fact that (again, as Mr. Berquist is fond of pointing out) it is very hard to be all wrong. Whence, "As Descartes teaches," or "As Kant teaches," or "As Plato teaches," or "As Aristotle teaches," or "As St. Thomas teaches," or "As Jesus teaching in the Gospels," are all statements that require a certain order and judgment (taken in the sense of the second act of the intellect, with the mutatis mutandis for the Faith and grace). This evaluation takes the form of, in one's own via inventionis, of finding and following a master from whom to accept a via disciplinae.

"In the older systems both the kind of man the teachers wished to produce and their motives for producing him were prescribed by the Tao---a norm to which the teachers themselves were subject and from which they claimed no liberty to depart. They did not cut men to some pattern they had chosen. They handed on what they had received: they initiated the young neophyte into the mastery of humanity which over-arched him and them alike. It was but old birds teaching young birds to fly." (1)

Here is encapsulated the essence of teaching and learning according to true intellectual perfections.

What it is to be a master and what it is to be a learner, in the sense that men, in so doing, act according to their own natures, and conform to that very nature according to their proper activity as intellectual beings, is found in this exchange, this gift and reception according to an order that is itself given to our knowledge. In stark contrast, however, stands this passage:

"...the whole tradition of the disciplines presents us with a series of masters and pupils, not a succession of discoverers and disciples who make notable improvements to the discoveries." (2)

The proposal of the modern method, taken here as found in seminal form in the New Organon, clashes with a resounding and cacophonous racket against the conception of learning and intellectual perfection found in the earlier period, the "older system." Indeed, while Bacon claimed that the modern age was really the old age of the world, when men had arrived at full intellectual maturity and were ready to take on the challenges of adult scientific life, the situation of the ancients is portrayed as one of childhood and fruitless and infertile adolescence. The basic accusation here is that the old system will produce nothing but more birds who can fly in the same old fashion. Indeed, what happens if this chain of knowledge should be lost? If the entire intellectual endeavor is ordered around imitation and emulation of a master, without a drive to make better upon one's predecessors in the same spirit they possessed, that is in making new and more productive discoveries, is not the ancient way in the predicament of the followers of Socrates on the day of his death?

"[SOC:]...do you think everybody can give an account of the things we were mentioning just now? [SIMMIAS:] I wish they could, but I'm afraid it is much more likely that by this time tomorrow there will be no one left who can do so adequately." (3)

Does not a method which promotes attainment of an already measured-out perfection run the risk of destroying itself? If there is no man who can measure up to the achievements of the master, of what good is the science?

Now as perverse as such an objection might seem, this seems nevertheless to be the modern rant of science against the systems and wisdoms of old. These hoary heads have been mocked and beaten about the pate as crazy fools, and useless mystics. While the old craved perfection according to a measure set forth by nature, the new seeks a perfection that it claims will ever be bettered, a vast sum and history of particulars ruled by laws continually improved upon, and only measure by nature per accidens, in the sense that eventually the techne can eliminate this chain of phusis, which it truly is, a chain, and no measure.

From this it seems that the modern and post-modern effort has pointed out (perhaps unwittingly) the key difference. Is it not that the perfection of the new scientific method is extensive, whereas the perfection of the old wisdom is intensive? The new science bases itself upon the massive historical categorization of particulars according to laws, assisted with the powerful tools of imagination and mathematics, and is in itself a sort of snowball, which gathers speed and appears to be making great progress, but at the same time separates the various parts from the others and makes a fragmentary whole. This kind of expansive, or extensive, or more material perfection evidences itself in the mode of training: it is discoverer and disciple, who in turn surpasses the previous discoverer as merely another link in the chain.

On the other hand, the old science bases itself upon an approach to what is formal and intensive, which requires an intellectual discipline that makes it appear as mysticism, for the approach from what is magis nota quoad nos to what is better known by nature is fraught with many difficulties, and requires certain sacrifices, virtues, and material conditions (e.g. leisure). Furthermore, this penetration into the universal, the intellectual, and the realm of the fundamentally real, cannot produce "results" in the material sense because it is more noble and indeed prior to such an endeavor. This old science is the wondering after the causes, about which man can truly do nothing, and realizes he can do nothing, almost as a fuzzily conceived prerequisite to entering upon such speculation. As this method prescinds from the material and humanly changeable (insofar as its perfection is concerned), it cannot be transmitted easily, or simplified, or improved upon by later "discoverers" of shortcuts. Hence this kind of intensive and "occult" knowledge requires a mode of training that likens the student to the one who has already mirrored in his intellect the order of reality.

Now, granted, in both kinds of learning, the student will pass from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge. Furthermore, in both "kinds" of science improvements have been made by later thinkers upon their predecessors. Nevertheless, it seems consistent that the old science improves itself by becoming clearer, whereas the new science improves itself by expansion and becoming more powerful. Finally, I would submit that anytime the new science is improved by becoming clearer, it is actually participating in the old.

How then can we relate the two branches? Do they grow from the same tree? Is the elder a demented sot inebriated with his soured vintage, or is the younger a frightful bastard monster that should have been exposed?

Perhaps they can be brought into harmony:

"If by philosophy of nature is understood a science in a quite rigorous sense, that defined in Posterior Analytics I.1, and if by experimental sciences we mean those branches of the knowledge of natural things which remain in a condition of dialectical movement because they cannot sufficiently detach themselves from the singular and whose generalizations will thus always be tentative and provisory, it is understood that the two are quite distinct. Nevertheless, they bear on the same subject, their principles have a common origin, sensible matter; their term is the same, knowledge of natural things as much as possible in their proper principles. In this respect, the experimental sciences are only a continuation of the properly demonstrative science of nature. But this continuation requires the use of another method, not only in the search for principles, but for the choice and positing of the principles themselves [cites Topics I.16]" (4)

In this, then, seems to be the burden: to effect a reconciliation between the fragmented parts that constitute modern science, care must be taken to see what is prior and what is posterior, and then one can recognize that a true unity is to be found.



(1) C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, HarperCollins, New York, 2001; pp. 60-61
(2) Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Cambridge, 2000; p. 7, "Preface to the Great Renewal"
(3) Phaedo, 76c
(4) Charles DeKoninck, "Are the Experimental Science Distinct from the Philosophy of Nature?", from The Writings of Charles DeKoninck, transl. and comp. by Ralph McInerny, Notre Dame, 2008, p. 453

In the following essay I briefly explicate the definition of motion as given by Aristotle. This is an excerpt from a larger work that has been modified to stand on its own. This will be the first in a series of articles that is concerned with motion. In particular we will discuss inertia and its validity as a principle, especially in light of the definition of motion and the principle, "omnia quod movetur ab alio movetur"

Defining motion poses a daunting task for any thinker. This is for two reasons: First, motion is not very much of a being. As will be shown below, it has only a kind of potential, or imperfect being and this is the the reason that Aristotle notes that “it is difficult to grasp what motion is.”i . Second, it is very much a principle of our coming to understand nature, and as such, it is one of those things that is more known by nature, and less known to us. On account of these difficulties, definitions tend to fail in one of two ways. They end up being circular, such as Descartes' and Newton ii after him, or they end up neglecting the continuity of motion as notably done by Bertrand Russell.iii Aristotle's definition is the only definition that obviate these difficulties and comes to the truth. As St. Thomas says, “It is altogether impossible to define motion through what is prior and more known accept as the philosopher defines it here.”*
It is nonetheless true that Aristotle's definition of motion, “the actuality of what exists in potency, as such,”iv provides its own challenges. Prima facie, this definition seems incomprehensible. Indeed, Descartes remarked famously about this passage, “Who understands theses words?”v In addition to the difficulties that we are confronted with above, Aristotle's definition is hard because he is defining motion by what is prior to motion. While it seems reasonable enough that we must define motion in terms of something prior to motion, it challenges us, because there does not seem to be motion in the definition. This difficulty can be surmounted, only if we are able to understand how act and potency are prior to motion.
One final note about Aristotle's definition of motion before we proceed: he is not only defining locomotion, that is, motion from place to place. He certainly sees this as the paradigm of motion and will even say that it is at the base of all other kinds of motion, but he will consider growth and diminution, alteration, and locomotion as kinds of motion. Therefore he will speak of motion in very general terms, which is at once an excellence of his account, and a challenge to we who would understand him.
When beginning his inquiry into the definition of motion Aristotle lays out those things that “are concomitant to motion.”vi This should make us realize that a complete understanding of what motion is, will be impossible until we have considered the continuous, the infinite, place, void, and time.vii Having given us this context Aristotle makes a division between potency and act. “There is, then, something which is only in actuality and something in potency and actuality.”viii This is the first of three divisions that he makes in his search for the definition of motion. As Glen Coughlin points out in his appendix on the definition of motion, it is important to note what is meant by potential.ix He is dividing act from potency and for this division to be helpful, then there must be things that stand in opposition to one another. For instance, it does not aid our inquiry to say that I have the potency to stand because I am standing.x Therefore, we must understand potency together with privation.
Aristotle proceeds to explain the basis for relations as excess and defect, action and passion, the mover and the mobile.xi He leaves this aside at this time, but he will return to this consideration when discussing the relation between the mover and the moved. We shall also take this up below.
The second division is made when Aristotle states, “motion is not beyond things.”xii That is to say, that it is not beyond any of the categories. The final distinction points out that in every genus there is a being and privation of that being.xiii
We see from the first division that motion must belong to what can be in potency and act. This is clear if we consider that motion is a kind of change, which is obvious from experience. What does not have potency (and this is potency in the sense of privation, as was said) is unable to change, for there is, as it were, no where for it to go. Therefore, motion must pertain to what can be in potency and act.
The second distinction, that motion belongs to the categories must be understood in two ways. First, that motion cannot be some super genus since “one can grasp nothing common.”xiv Second, we must understand that motion is not some eleventh category since there is “nothing beyond the things named.”xv We may therefore conclude from this that motion is going to be understood in the context of a genus.
The third distinction concerning the being and privation in each genus, indicates where to look for motion in a genus. That is, it is going to be somewhere between the being and privation, the white and the black or the perfect and imperfect, etc. It must be clear that when Aristotle says that “the species of motion and change are as many as are those of being,” it does not mean that there is motion in every genus, as he will later deny, but he is claiming that as many categories as admit of motion, so many will the species of motion be. There will not be one kind of motion for multiple categories.
From the above we may conclude that motion belongs to those things that are in act and potency in some genus, according to the mode of that genus. We must take this together with our common experience of motion. We know motion as that which is between its two ends, “that from which” and “that towards which.” For we see the apple moving from green to red, or the child growing to his full height when a man, or the cup being here, and then being there. Such is out experience of motion.
It is worthwhile to point out that to a large extent our current question focuses on this claim precisely, that is, must motion have an end. For now, it is important to see what we experience simply of motion, such as in the examples given. Moreover, even inertial motion must be defined in terms of non-motion. Finally, inertial motion is certainly less known than the above examples and is consequently not profitable to examine at this point. We must proceed from what is more known to what is less known.xvi Therefore we will begin here and see if we need to clarify our definition later.
What we know about motion at this point is its ends. For I know that the mobile is here or there, but when it is here or there I do not say that it is in motion. Therefore, since we know the ends of motion and we must always proceed from what is more known to the less known, then we must define motion in terms of its ends. For the sake of generality we will names these ends, “that from which” and “that towards which”
The end “from which” is what the mobile posses now, before it has gone somewhere. It is the end that is held in act. The end towards which is what is held in potency, the mobile is not there. We also see that there are any number of points in between these two at which the mobile could be said to be if its motion did not continue on. The mobile has no intrinsic order away or towards either end if it comes to rest at one of these points. If I get up and walk to the doorway and stop, I do not belong to either room more than the other. It is only in motion that I have an order towards or away from some point.
From these considerations we see that motion is a kind of potency, since it does not posses its end. We see also that there is a kind of actuality to motion. The points at which the motion could stop, are closer to the end, so long as we take the order provided by the motion, than the point from which the motion began. Therefore, as long as it is moving it is becoming the end towards which.
Now, the end that towards which is what the mobile holds in potency, before and during the motion. Once the mobile holds the end towards which in act the motion is completed. However, we may still define this in terms of the end from which as the end from which. In order to do this in the language of act and potency, we say that mobile at the end “towards which” is the actuality of the potency. Or in a parallel formulation to Aristotle's definition, it is the actuality of what existed in potency.
So far, we are still speaking of the ends and not of what lies between them. We therefore want to understand the end “towards which” as it exists in potency, not as it existed . Therefore we must understand that potency insofar as it is still in potency. This is our definition: the actuality of what exists in potency, as it is in potency. As Aristotle phrases it, “the actuality of what exists in potency, as such, is motion.”xvii
We have therefore defined motion. The definition is good insofar as it is in terms of what is prior and what is more known. Indeed St. Thomas claims that it is wholly impossible to define motion in another way, by what is prior and more known, than as the philosopher defines it here.xvii This does not mean that all of our difficulties are resolved. However, we have perhaps narrowed down what the difficulties are. Aristotle's approach seems reasonable enough and he is certainly proceeding from common experience. Our question then must turn towards inertial motion. We must see how inertial motion influences our definition. The definition can change by expanding, and going beyond what have said, certainly. However, any sort of claim made by inertial motion which contradicts what has been said, should straight away be seen as an error, for this would be to contradict our experience. The other logical possibility is that inertial motion is not motion, but this would be strange. We speak about these things now, in a vague and indistinct way. For now, let what has been said suffice for our present consideration, and we shall take up these further difficulties later.


xviii omnino impossibile est aliter definire motum per priora et notiora, nisi sicut philosophus hic definit. (In Physicam, Lib. III, lectio 2)

I intend to cover this topic in my term paper for my class "Bacon and the Mastery of Nature." I would like to know what you all think...

It is granted by some that a speculative science takes part of its formality from the form of its object. Whence only if the object so known lends itself also to the use of practical reason can a speculative science inform a practical science. I take that an example of such an amenable speculative science would be the science of the human body. One not so disposed is metaphysics. However, if on the other hand the practical ends of reason begin to inform the way in which the formal object of a speculative science is taken up, it seems that one runs the risk of creating a mutant or crippled theoria. The physicist may discover not how nature is, but rather, for instance, how it is usable or alterable. Granted, if it is usable that must also be in some way how it is, but such is not necessarily all of its essence. The full picture may be, and arguable must be, missing.

Therefore the question is: granting that Francis Bacon wants to establish (in the New Organon) a science of nature that is ordered to the practical, in what way does it give an account for its object? What is its formal unity, if it has one?

Tentative thesis: The "new" physics Bacon proposes makes a very appropriate assumption in turning to "laws of nature" as its object, in order to address the various aspects (scientific objects) of nature in motion; for by understanding these processes (or apprehending their "behavior" by discerning the law they obey in action) men can more easily utilize these behavioral motions to achieve practical ends.

Another reason, at first glance, seems to be the fact that the object of such a new science would not be viewed insofar as it is speculatively true (i.e. knowable for its own sake and eternal or unchangeable), and this because of the introduced practical aspect to the science (for men would know for the sake of their ends, which a changeable, and need to involve changeable things). The eternal and unchangeable principles of mobile being, and their dependence upon a first cause, cannot be changed by men; however, the "law" according to which powers or habits of the soul, or of chemicals, "behave" seem to unlock certain inter-dependent relationships that can be played off one another to further benefit.

One of the difficulties is the fact that such laws, insofar as they are "not changeable," seem to have a speculative character to them. Can this be overcome by the fact that followers of the new physics apply these laws not to substance ("The Law of Being, That It Cannot Not Be") but to accidental qualities. It seems that it is for lesser qualities such as sweet tastes, or pleasures, or health of body, that these laws are sought.

I thank you all for your indulgence.

"Mastered by Nature, man overcomes by Art."
--Antiphon, (quoted by Aristotle in the beginning of his treatise on mechanical problems.)

Amongst Thomists, there is a discussion, almost a dichotomy, as to what falls first into the intellect. This is a valuable and important question. It seems the veracity of all scientific and philosophic inquiries are ultimately dependent on how it is that we know. Now, it should be made clear that this is in no way an essay. The appropriate research, therefore, that accompanies research and academic papers was not done. But I am convinced of this position. At the same time I also, humbly, request any comments, insights, or criticisms.

There are some in the Thomistic community who believe that Esse falls into the intellect first, rather than Ens. Now this is an attractive proposition, but one that i find patently false. The attraction stems from the truth that the intellect knows act, being, etc. But the study of Metaphysics prior to Physics convinces the student, who later becomes a 'master', that that 'being', which is the object of the intellect, is what Thomas calls Esse.

The immediate problem to my mind in saying that Esse falls first into the intellect can be summed up in the faulty position of Parmenides. It seems to me that he made the mistake of confusing Ens with Esse. Of course this led to the positing of many falsehoods, among them being the lack and impossibility of motion. Thus, it seems that these Thomists have, in effect created, not only a Metaphysics devoid of Physics, but one that not only contradicts true Physics, but also everyday experience.

Finally, there are other Thomists who don't take as radical a stance. You might call these quasi-existential Thomists. There position, however, is a somewhat modified version of the above. It seems that these believe that Ens falls first into the intellect, but that there is nothing wrong with studying Metaphysics prior to Physics. Of course, the logical question to put forth is 'What are you studying?' And their answer of course is 'Being (esse) as such, duh. Isn't that what Metaphysics is?' And I answer fair enough, but how do you know that something is other than what is in matter. And I get the following reply, because it is possible to separate existence from ens in the mind. True. The problem here, though, seems to be that without certainty that there is immaterial ens, you can't have a study of being as such. And if you do not have knowledge of being existing outside of matter, there is no proper object of science.

In conclusion, the result of both the above positions is one of faith rather than knowledge. Obviously the existential Thomists believe that motion exists because it is central to the Aristotelian and Thomistic thought. They also believe that there is a natural argument for the existence of God. But without the proper order of study and termination of the intellect, that is all these conclusions come to: BELIEF.

I am excited to have your thoughts on the matter. -Ciao

I am looking for some help as I am mulling over inertial motion. Taking Aristotle's definition of motion and Newton's account of inertial motion, there seems to be an inherent contradiction.

In analyzing the account of inertial motion, I am struck by Galileo's thought experiment of the sphere rolling down a plane on one side across the floor and up similarly inclined plane on the other. He posited that if this could be done without friction, the sphere would return to the same height on the opposite plane, and so back again, ad infinitum.
I am struck, however, by several questions when I consider this case. First of all, can there be motion without "friction?" I am inclined to think that it is a necessary condition of motion that it be through a medium which at once inhibits and allows for the possibility of motion. This idea is encouraged by the impossibility of a vacuum. Moreover, (and I know that is an area which you have studied Vincentius) is it right to make such an "abstraction" from motion that we see? Indeed, can the idea of inertial motion even be called abstraction? It seems to be a mathematical fiction, useful for calculation. It is hard for me to see that inertial motion is contained virtually in mobile objects the way mathematicals are contained in bodies. A sign of this is that I see nothing in the nature of matter that makes it impossible that there be a perfect sphere or cube. With inertia, on the other hand, there seem to be many impossibilities. One of which is an infinite effect from a finite agent.
Having laid these questions and considerations before you venerable brethren, I eagerly await your comments, questions and guidance.

Here is a proposed itinerary for an upcoming symposium on the nature of Aristotle's First Mover. Since these questions were prompted by recent claims that St. Thomas in his commentaries imposes his own philosophy/theology on the texts of Aristotle, this discussion will concern the text of Aristotle itself. Any comments will be appreciated!


Questions:
1) Does the First Mover move by final cause only?
2) Does the First Mover know the things He moves? Does He have a will and hence love the things He moves?
3) Is the First Mover the designer/originator of the universe?
4) Does the First Mover act through necessity or election?
5) Is the First Mover subsistent esse (as a distinct notion)? If so, does Aristotle see the consequences of this (God's infinity, perfection, goodness, unity, etc.)?

Relevant texts:
- Physics VII 1; VIII 5; VIII 10
- Metaphysics II 1-2; XII 6, 7, 9
- De Anima II 4

A Metaphysical Journey from Multiplicity of Understanding to the Unity of God's Essence, Back to Multiplicity in Creatures.

In this article I trace the movement from multiplicity to unity in our attempt to understand the immanent operations of God, and then show how the very account of that unity allows for and is the cause of multiplicity. Then, as regards the latter, I give an account not only of the existence of multiplicity, but of the order found within it both as concerns its relation to God and the mutual relation of creatures within this order.

Having discussed the principles of the science, and made arguments for God's existence and attributes, St. Thomas turns to the operations of God (PP QQ. 1-13, Q.14 intro.). In his introduction to the fourteenth question he divides operations into immanent operations and those that proceed externally. Since, therefore, we are proceeding as a theologian, it is proper to first consider the immanent operations, since we desire to understand all things in light of the proper subject of our science, namely God (PP Q. 1 a.7). St. Thomas considers these operations according to two major divisions, namely intellect and will. When considering these immanent operations we find a seemingly strange, and certainly difficult mixture of unity and multiplicity. The utter unity being on the part of God, and the multiplicity on that of creatures. Part of the reason for this difficulty is that we must begin with the multiplicity of our understanding to reach the unity of God, and then we later must see this very unity as the cause of the multiplicity.
This multiplicity reaches its fullness with the forty-fourth question when we examine the procession of creatures from God, and most of all in the first article of the forty-seventh question where St. Thomas explicitly addresses the question of whether multitude and distinction of things comes from God. However, long before we reach this article, as has already been suggested, we begin to see, as it were, the seeds of this multiplicity in our understanding of God's immanent operations. Indeed the confusion with which we perceive the multiplicity and unity in those questions regarding his operations can be clarified and resolved by considering the following: In understanding and naming God's operations, we must deny multiplicity and any defect of the words or ideas that we have in order to properly treat the divine unity; but it is this very unity that is the cause of multiplicity in creatures, insofar as their similitude to the divine essence is considered.
First, then, to be considered is a brief account of how we name God. Then each of the immanent divine operations will be considered, i.e. intellect, and will in their unity, as seen through the multiplicity of our understanding. Following this will be a consideration of the source of multiplicity in both of the immanent operations and then by God's power. There will follow a consideration of the multiplicity in general. This final consideration will be in three parts. First the cause of multiplicity in things as discussed by St. Thomas in question forty-seven, article one. Second, the order of multiplicity as related to God's knowledge and will. Finally, the relation of creatures within that order.
In the introduction to the second question St. Thomas says “...second, [we must consider] how [God] exists, or rather, how He does not exist.”1 This cannot be understood only in terms of what is termed “negative theology” that is, that we only negate things of God and never speak of Him directly. This is contradicted by St. Thomas when he argues that we can name God substantially and properly, and that such names are said of Him first before all creatures (PP Q.13 aa. 2, 3, 6). Rather, we must understand “how He does not exist” as showing that me must remove what is imperfect from our mode of speaking. St. Thomas says as much in the first article of the same question, saying that we must name Him “through the mode of excellence and remotion.” He goes on to explain this further:

“Thus [God] is able to be named by us from creatures, not as though a name can signify Himself, expressing the divine essence according as it is, just as this name, man expresses by its signification the essence of man according as it is; for it signifies the the definition, declaring his definition; for the ratio which this name signifies is the definition.”2

From the above, therefore, we have gained three important principles that will aid us in our understanding of how we speak of God. First, that we can indeed speak positively of him. Second, that this will be by way of excellence and remotion. Third, that these names in no way express the divine essence. Armed with these principles we can dare to go forward and discuss His operations.
In his first article of the fourteenth question St. Thomas shows that there is knowledge in God. This article clearly manifests the movement from multiplicity to unity of God's knowledge. St. Thomas first begins with creatures, and indeed with non intelligent creatures contrasting them with knowing creatures. He points out how the creatures that lack knowledge posses only their own forms, while those that posses knowledge are disposed to receive many forms. This manifests what the Philosopher says in De Anima III, namely, that “the soul is in a way all things.” From here we see that as forms become more immaterial, the approach nearer to infinity, thus giving us the ratio of knowing, immateriality. Immateriality is present most of all in God, since He is wholly simple, infinite, and one.
This unity of His intellect is manifested in another way in considering the object of His knowledge. Since the proper object of the intellect is Himself, since the object of all understanding is ens, and he is ens par excellence. Thus, we see the unity of His intellect in as much as He has one proper object, as distinct from ourselves who understand thing according to various intelligible species, and consider first one thing and then another.
Again, if we consider what it means for God to know himself we see his unity from multiplicity. St. Thomas first points out that in immanent operations the term of the operation is in the operator. (PP Q.14 a. 2) He goes on to point out that in understanding, the intelligible in act is the act of the understanding, and that the intellect is distinct from the intelligible species insofar as it is in potency to the thing. Thus, we have our multiplicity, which we will now deny to understand the operation in God. For, in God there is no potentiality, but He is pure act. Therefore in God the intellect and the thing understood are the same, so that as St. Thomas says,

“Neither does he lack the intelligible species, just as our intellect when it knows in potency, nor is the intelligible species other than the substance of the divine intellect as it is an accident in our intellect when it is understanding in act. But the intelligible species is the divine intellect itself.”3

When St. Thomas considers the will of God, we once again see the movement from multiplicity to unity. He first points out that will is consequent upon intellect (PP Q.19, a.1). He proceeds to set up a proportion: The perfection of a natural thing is through its form as the perfection of an intellectual thing is through its intelligible form. Therefore, just as a natural thing desires its form, so an intellectual thing desires an intelligible form. Thus, we see that there is will in God, and we now must move from this multiplicity to unity. For, since God is His own intellect and intelligible species, it is clear that He wills Himself and that His will is none other than Himself, since He is utterly simple and one.
Having established His unity in His operations, we may now see how multiplicity arises from this very unity of. We shall first consider the intellect. In the fifth article of the fourteenth question St. Thomas argues that God does know things other than himself. St. Thomas argues that since He knows Himself, perfectly and comprehensively (PP Q.14 aa2-3), He therefore understands all other beings through himself, since he is the cause of all other beings and posses their perfections in a super-immanent way (PP. Q.14, a 5). Here we have arrived at multiplicity. How exactly He has knowledge of creatures other than himself is shown more clearly when St. Thomas discusses the ideas.
St. Thomas defines the ideas as “the forms of things existing apart from the things themselves.”4These forms then are considered the exemplar causes of things created by God. Just as the artist has the artifact in his mind as the exemplar cause of the artifact. St. Thomas argues that the ideas are many in God because God knows that He knows. That is, since he knows His own essence perfectly and comprehensively, He knows it in every way that it can be known. Therefore, God can know His essence in so far as it is able to be participated. This is the account of the idea. For, the knowledge of a thing in as it is able to participate in the divine essence is an exemplar, and formal cause of that thing. Note, that this knowledge of how He is able to be participated arises precisely because He is His understanding. Therefore, we see the multiplicity arise from the unity of God's essence.
Multiplicity can also be seen as arising from the unity of God's will. To see this, St. Thomas introduces the principle, the good is diffusive of itself. This is appropriate, because as St. Thomas points out,

For natural things not only have a natural inclination with respect to proper goods, such as it acquires when it does not have them, or rests in that when had; but it diffuese that proper good into others, insofar as it is possible.5

Thus, insofar as the agent is perfect, it makes another like itself. This is seen clearly in the case of men. When this man is grown he is able to bring forth another like himself. A child, however, cannot. Therefore, it pertains to the nature of the will to communicate its good insofar as it is able, and this can be limited either on the part of the agent or on the part of the effect. Since, God is a perfect agent, we need not concern ourselves with such a defect, but since creatures are, by definition, limited, we must expect the likeness to be somewhat remote. Therefore, we can see that communicating a likeness belongs to the perfection of the agent, and this must therefore be attributed to God. Then, as St. Thomas says, “Thus, therefore, [God] wills both himself and others to be. But himself as end and others as towards an end, inasmuch as the divine goodness concedes even another to participate in itself.”6 Therefore, we see that it belongs to willing His own goodness that it be communicated to others in some way7; and therefore insofar as God is his own good, and that good is able to be participated, God will others.
To complete our examination of the source of multiplicity we must look to the power of God, of which St. Thomas says in the preface before question fourteen, “...concerning the power of God, which is considered as the principle of operations proceeding into as external effect.”8 The power of God is most proximate to the multiplicity of creatures, and is therefore more readily seen as the source of multiplicity in creatures.
It is important to note that we must consider power only as active power in God. In no way can we attribute potency to Him in anyway. Therefore, we must understand the power of God as the active principle of his external operations and to belong perfectly to His unity. As St. Thomas says,

Power is not placed in God as something differing from knowledge and will secundum rem but only secundum rationem, namely, inasmuch as power carries the ratio of principle of executing that which the will commands and that knowledge directs, which three things belong to the same in God. Or it is said that knowledege itself of the divine will according as it is and effective principle, has the account of power. Whence the consideration of knowledge and will precede the consideration of power in God, just as a cause precedes the operation and effect.9

Therefore, we come to say power of God, because we see that there are external effects. This power however, differs only in ratio from His knowledge and will. Therefore, the accounts of multiplicity that follow God's knowledge and will belong, by necessity, to the account of God's power. In fact, any external effect belongs more properly, secundum rationem to God's power. It is only by some extension of the accounts of knowledge and will that we speak of them as “touching” creatures. It is thus that we speak of the knowledge of approbation, and God's effective will.
We will now briefly consider multiplicity in a general way. Since God causes all things, the multiplicity of creatures must be traced back to God. We have seen this multiplicity arise from the very unity of His will and intellect. Fundamental to this multiplicity is the notion of participation. The question that has been lingering behind our consideration thus far, is why there is anything besides God. Up to this point, we have been answering (or at least attempting to answer) how there can be many things, but the why has thus far eluded us. The answer, to be frank, is a mystery. We can say with St. Thomas only this:

The distinction of things and the multitude [of things] is from the intention of the first agent, which is God. For he brings a thing into esse in order to communicate his goodness to creatures, and through them to be represented.10

St. Thomas will go on to say that since the divine essence can only be represented imprefectly by any given creature, He is more perfectly and fully represented by a multitude of creatures. Therefore, questions about why is some idea the exemplar of an actual being and another is only of a potential being, is impossible to answer. We must yield that it belongs to the divine will to choose, for to Him, above all, belongs the perfection of Freedom.
The above consideration naturally leads us to consider the relation of the multitude of creatures to one another. For it is not in some chaotic mass that the divine essence is represented, but rather in an ordered whole. We see this first when we consider that God intends the final end of all things since He is the principle agent cause of all things. It is clear that the universal order of things is the greatest good for creatures and is therefore included in the account of the final end of things. The final end of creatures is intended by God and is God. Now the order of things can be either material or formal. It is clear that material diversity belongs to things of the same form and therfore there is an essential equality. However, a formal difference requires inequality as St. Thomas points out, quoting Aristotle, “forms of things are as numbers in which the species are differed through the addition or subtraction of unity,”11 and between two unequal things there is some order.
This very order among creatures manifests their order to God. For the order of creatures forms a heirarchy, with the lower being ordered to the higher. Such an order is evidence of God's existence as is clear from the fourth way. (PP. Q2, a3) Moreover, we seethat this order arsise in creatures from the inability of any one creature to manifest the perfection of God. Therefore, by there being an order the essence of God is more clearly manifested. Finally, since creatures are limited and many, both as belonging to some genus and by being composed, they are ordered to God simply because of His a of the utterly one God. Springing forth from the abundance of His perfection we arising the multiplicity of creatures, this perfection which is precisely His unity. Finally, His unity provides for an order, not just of creatures to God, but of creatures to one another as they manifest in their maniness, the perfection of God.
perfection. In His unity His absolute perfection is manifested and well as his super-emminence of being. Per impossible, were we co-eternal with God, and not created by Him, we still would owe Him worship because He is His own esse. The nobility of such a one cannot be given too much honor.
Therefore, we have traced the path from mulitplicity to unity and back again. From the very mulitplicity of our understanding we are able to arrive at the idea of the utterly one God. Springing forth from the abundance of His perfection we arising the mulitplicity of creatures, this perfection which is precisely His unity. Finally, His unity provides for an order, not just of creatures to God, but of creatures to one another as they manifest in their maniness, the perfection of God.




1 ...secundo, quomodo sit, vel potius quomodo non sit.
2 Sic igitur potest nominari a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum, exprimat divinam essentiam secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo exprimat sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est, significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam; ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio.
3...neque careat specie intelligibili, sicut intellectus noster cum intelligit in potentia; neque species intelligibilis sit aliud a substantia intellectus divini, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro, cum est actu intelligens; sed ipsa species intelligibilis est ipse intellectus divinus.
4 Unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum rerum, praeter ipsas res existens. (PP, Q.15, a.1)
5 Res enim naturalis non solum habe naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut acquirat ipsum cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habe; sed etiam ut proprium bonum in alia diffundat, secundmum quod possibile est.
6 Sic igitur vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem, inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam participare.
7 This is in no way to be understood that the God is in anyway compelled to create. The emphasis here is on “some way.”That is to say, that we cannot, a priori, discern precisely how God diffuses his goodness.
8...de potentia Dei, quae conideratur ut principium operationis divinae in effectum exteriorum procedentis.
9 Potentia non ponitur in deo ut aliquid differens a scientia et voluntate secundum rem, sed solum secundum raionem; inquantumscilicet potentia importat rationem principee exequentis id quod voluntas imperet, et ad quod scientia dirigit; quae tria deo secundum idem conveniunt. Vel dicnedum quod ipsa scientia vel voluntas divina, secundum quod est principium effectivum, habere rationem potentiae. Unde considerationem potentiae, sicut causa praecedit operationem et effectum.
10 “...distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas repraesentandam.”
11 “formae rerum sunt sicut numeri in quibus species variantur per additionem vel subtrationem unitas.” (PP.Q.47, a2)

I have a question regarding a property of artifacts.

I was pondering this evening about one of the artifacts touched on in Physics II.1, vis. Antiphon's bed. While it is obviously true to say that it has its form qua artifact extrinsically, that is, from the artist, could it also further be said that if there was no one to use a bed, it would merely be shaped wood? In what way does the artificial form exist if the intention of the artist/users of the artifact is lost or absent? I am inclined to say the artificial form no longer exist, or only in a sort of potency, as 'shaped wood.' But I am not sure. How are we to name the 'bed' shape of the bed apart from the artist intention?

The Angelic realm is dauntingly beyond our power to comprehend. We cannot dare to plunge, or should I say, soar into the depths of the spiritual realm without sure guidance. Fortunately we have grace, and St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas, as in everything he does, treats of angels and angelic knowledge thoroughly and succinctly. However, since most of us lack the subtlety of St. Thomas, we tend to pass over some important truths that are perhaps not contained explicitly in the article. It is only with difficulty and lengthy study that we find all that this great teacher was intending when he wrote. Such is the case with the current topic. I am saying nothing that new, and by no means am I furthering the thought of St. Thomas' treatment of angels. I am merely emphasizing a truth that was already present, but that we may miss the first time reading it.
Angelic knowledge is possibly the most difficult and most essential part of the study of the angles. If one does not discuss the mode of knowing for subsisting intellects, there is not much left to discuss. However, the difficulty is trying to understand beings that in a way are like us, and in another way are completely beyond us. For instance, the topic of this article, how is it that these glorious beings consider the actions of men? Are they constantly present among us, watching? Or perhaps this is superstitious medieval fancy, and they know us only because they reason to our existence from their own. Both of these accounts are lacking, but hold some element of the truth. As will be shown, angels, know individual human acts through intelligible species handed down to them by God.
We shall proceed by following, for the most part, St. Thomas' own order. As my topic is far more narrow I will of course skip those articles that are not to my purpose, and go back if there is some item that we might have left behind in our haste. First we will consider the medium of angelic knowledge. Then, skipping angelic knowledge of immaterial things, we will proceed directly to the knowledge of material things. There will then be a brief discussion of human actions in general and then the argument for the thesis. Lest we fall prey to the very thing this article is designed to remedy, we will then take a brief moment to dwell on the consequences of the preceding arguments.
A medium of knowledge is the species through which an intellect knows some thing. Now in man, as is seen in Book III of Aristotle's De Anima, knowledge is had through a universal species that is abstracted from a phantasm in the imagination, present there from an object sensed. This cannot be so in angels. Angels are held to be pure intellects, i.e. separated forms that are their own natures (Summa Theologiae, pp. Q. 50 a1,2,4). Consequently, the medium for angelic knowledge must be more carefully examined.
That the angel might be distinguished clearly from God, it should be made clear that he does not know all things through his own substance. For the angel possesses a particular substance, and this substance does not contain the perfection of being in itself. As the Angelic Doctor says himself,

However, the essence of the angel does not comprehend in itself all things, since the existence of a essence is determined to some genus and species. But this is proper to the divine essence, that is infinite in itself simply and comprehends the perfections of all things. Therefore, only God knows all things through his essence.1

Therefore, it is clear that the angels must know by some other medium, and that their intellects must be perfected by some species in order to know. (Summa Theologiae, pp. Q.55, a1)
Already, from what has been said, we can see that it is not through some abstracted species that an angel knows. As St. Thomas says, “The species through which an angel understands is not taken from things but is connatural to them.”(ST, pp Q55, a2) St. Thomas argues that human souls, since they are united to matter, are perfected through matter, otherwise their union with matter would be in vain. However, angels are not in matter in any way. Therefore, in order for angels to be perfected by some intelligible species, it must come from an intelligible “efflux,” that comes from God directly (ST, pp Q55, a2). This is not surprising insofar as God is the cause of being and perfection of all things (ST, pp Q3, 7). Therefore, God as he is causing things in existence, is at the same time informing the angels with the intelligible species of the existing things.
Now, St. Thomas says that the species of things are connatural to the angels. It is not that the species come from the very nature of the angel, it is that the nature of the angel requires species to obtain its perfection. Note that St. Thomas makes his argument through perfection, but he is not speaking of the supernatural perfection of eternal beatitude, but simply the perfections which belong to a thing. For example, if God were to create a lion and put no other animals on earth, this would be highly unfitting. To eat meat belongs to the nature of the lion. Therefore, it is connatural to the lion that there be some animal to eat, otherwise the nature is in vain and cannot obtain its natural perfection. So also, the angel must have some intelligible species granted to them by God directly, otherwise they can in no way obtain their natural perfection and there nature is in vain.
It remains then to see how angels are able to know singulars. Necessarily then, we must take under consideration things in matter. St. Thomas argues from the order of things in nature. The superior beings are more perfect than the inferior and contain the perfections of the inferior eminently, wholly and simply. This is as much to say, anything a man can do, an angel can do better. There is a gradation in the order of things. God is the source of all things and all perfections. The angels are nearest to God in the order of being. St. Thomas then says,

Thus, therefore, all material things are in angels, preexisting simply. Indeed and more immaterially than in things themselves; but more multiplied and more imperfect than they exist in God.1

St. Thomas then concludes, in the same place, that since God knows material things, then the angels know them by some intelligible species given by God.
It is important to emphasize that, while God is the cause of being of things, and thus it is clear that creatures exist in Him above all things, the angels are not a cause of our being. Their knowledge of us is given to them directly by God, not as though they are necessary agents of His causality,2 but because in order for these creatures to know it must come from God, not from creatures simply. See how clearly St. Thomas puts it in his reply to the first back in Question 55, article 2,

In the mind of an angel there are similitudes of creatures, not indeed, as taken from the creature, but from God, who is the cause of creatures and in which the first similitudes of things exist. Whence Augustine says in [The Literal Interpretation of Genesis] that just as the ratio by which a creature is fashioned, first is in the Word of God before it is fashioned in the creature, so the same ratio is made first in the intellectual creatures [i.e. the Angels] and then is itself fashioned in the creature.

We can now consider how angels know singulars. St. Thomas begins his discussion of this question by addressing two common errors. The first of which is the outright denial of knowledge of singulars in angels. This is against the Catholic faith, which holds that angels minster to individual humans; these we call guardian angels. Others have stated that angels know singulars through universal causes. St. Thomas shows that this does not end the difficulty, because to know through universal causes is not the same as to know the thing in the here and now. He gives the example of the astronomer knowing through causes that an eclipse is going to happen, but does not know it in its singularity unless he senses it.(Summa Theologiae, pp Q57, a 2)
St. Thomas again appeals to the superiority of angels to show that they must know singulars if we do, since there is a certain perfection in knowing singulars in the here and now. He therefore argues that God causes all things, not just universally, but in their very individuality. For he is the cause of each individual substance. Therefore, even the very individual must exist in God preeminently. Socrates, exists in God first and foremost. Thus the angels know Socrates in his very singularity through a species given by God. (Summa Theologiae, pp Q57, a 2)
Human actions are caused by God's agency through the will. Human actions begin in deliberation. This deliberation is about the means to the final end which belongs to man by nature. The deliberation necessarily results in choice.3 That choice terminates in action. It is important to realize, in order to avoid the foolish Pelagian error, that God must be the cause of any and all actions because there is in fact some being there. Moreover, that the first movements of deliberation are caused by God's direct action upon the human will There is no human action without God's causing it immediately, just as there is no being of any sort without God's causing it directly.
We are left, therefore, with the question of how angels can know these particular actions of men. Remember above what St. Thomas concludes about angelic knowledge of singulars, that it is precisely the thing its singularity, the here and now, that the angel knows. This follows for all kinds of being caused by God. As was discussed above, God is the immediate cause of being of every action. Therefore, the angel knows individual actions of men as made known to them by God himself, through some intelligible species.
There is an inclination is to say that angels must in some way make the individual actions of man present to himself in some immaterial way, even though it cannot be asserted how it is done. This view supported by considering the way demons are able to judge human thoughts by outward appearances. For as Augustine says demons “sometimes are able with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions, not only through speech, but also as conceived in thought when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body” (De Divinatione Daemonum). It seems therefore that the angels (and demons) are able to somehow consider man's actions directly. Moreover, to say that the knowledge is from some intelligible species of the individual it seems that one necessarily falls into some form of determinism. Angels would be able to conclude to individual actions from the intelligible forms of individuals. However, as St. Thomas argues, angels are unable to know that secret thoughts of men. For the will is moved by God alone and directly (Summa Theologiae, pp Q. 57, a 4). Therefore angels cannot perceive the principle of human action, so likewise, they cannot conclude to human actions from intelligible forms of individuals. Therefore, it seems that angels must in some way understand the individual human action from the man's action directly and since there is no form to abstract, the angel is not knowing it through abstraction, and thus this does not contradict what was said before.
The source of this difficulty seems to arise from the mode of human knowing. We know particulars directly from the particulars as sensed. This seems to us the most direct and simple way to know things. However, like most things man does, this is backwards. God knows things perfectly since He knows things in the order of being and through the cause of being, i.e. Himself. Angels, even naturally speaking are much more like to God than we are, and also know according to the mode of being. As was shown above, they cannot abstract. There is no agent or passive intellect, nor imagination in which to hold a phantasm.
The solution lies in this: God is the cause of being for every being, even accidental being. Therefore, He is even the cause of the being of actions. Therefore, as He is causing the action to be, sense there is some new ens, qualified though it may be, he reveals this to the angel through an intelligible species. Not that the angel sees this particular action as necessarily resulting from what is to be Socrates, but rather, since there is this particular man Socrates, he must necessarily act in some particular way here and now. The ens Socrates, is the occasion for the ens running, or cutting in Socrates. The angel cannot see into the deliberation of Socrates, but he is able know the action of Socrates as caused by God directly.
This is a mind blowing and staggering conclusion. We can imagine that an angel must be flooded with virtually infinite number of intelligible species as every single creature in the world, and every accidental being belonging to it (list the categories of a given moment) at every moment. However, this not simply the case. St. Thomas shows that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the unity of an operation requires the unity of the object. Angels cannot know all things at once, because they are not infinite. Therefore they are only able to have one object for the operation of their vis intellectiva. To fill this out we can look at St. Thomas' consideration of whether the higher angels understand by fewer species. He argues that since God understands all things through himself in an absolute unity, inferior creatures know through many. Thus, those that are closer to Him know must by so much the fewer species understand all intelligible things. Therefore, his intelligible species are more universal (Summa Theologiae pp Q55, a3). Angels, therefore are not then attentive to all particulars accept in so far as the fall under the account of the universal species that they are considering.
Let us consider some speculative corollaries of this to help put the magnificence of this mode of knowing into perspective. Some have suggested that the highest angels are able to understand all creatures through the single species, created being. This does not seem unlikely especially considering what Dionysius says about the first hierarchy of angels in Chapter 7 of The Celestial Hierarchy.

They [Seraphim, Cherubim and Thrones] are perfect then not because of an enlightened understanding which enables them to analyze the many sacred things, but rather because of a primary and supreme deification, a transcendent and angelic understanding of God's work. They have been directed hierarchically not through other holy beings but directly from God Himself and they have achieved this thanks to the capacity which compared to others is the mark of their superior order. Hence they are found next to perfect and unfailing purity and are led, as permitted, into contemplation regarding the immaterial and intellectual splendor.

Dionysius is here speaking of the beatified angels, but what is most telling is that he attributes their proximity to God to “the capacity which compared to others is the mark of their superior order.” It is not hard to imagine, then, that the higher angels can take up the entire universe in a single glance;that they are so powerful that the universe itself is able to be a locus of their power. Through the one species, created being, they understand the natures of every created being now in existence. Thus, the spiritual realm is vastly beyond our own meagre material existence.
In light of the above it would behoove us to take a brief look at angelic intelligible species. Intelligible species is not said univocally of man and angels, but analogously. First, consider that every intelligible species we possess as with it the account of abstracted, and therefore universal. Angels labour under no such deficiency. They do not require that something be made universal in order for it to be understood. They understand it precisely in its particularity. The greatest angels are able to grasp Socrates-ness through the species created being.
We therefore see that angels are subsisting intellects. From their nature they must receive intelligible species connatural to them from God directly. These species are of all created being, even accidental being. Therefore it is through these species handed down by God that they understand human actions in the here and now.

1 Ipsa autem essentia angeli non comprehendit in se omnia, cum sit essentia determinata ad genus et ad speiciem. Hoc autem proprium est essentiae divinae, quae infinita est, ut in se simpliciter omnia comprehendat perfecte. Et ideo solus Deus cognoscit omnia per suam essentiam (Summa Theologiae pp Q. 55a 1). Though an interesting question, we will leave aside what is meant by an angel being determined to a genus and species in this article.

2 Sic igitur omnia materialia in ipsis angelis praeexistunt, simplicius quidem et immaterialius quam in ipsis rebus; multiplicius autem et imperfectus quam in deo. (Summa Theologiae, pp. Q57, a 1)

3 This is not to say that God cannot use angels in as a mediation for His direct causality, but it is not necessary. Furthermore, it seems that in certain ways that God cannot use the angels to cause at all, such as in the case of esse. We will avoid this digression.

4 Assuming that the deliberation comes to an end. One might be able to imagine a case where someone is in the grocery store indefinitely, but we try to dwell on the least part.