Check out a draft section at my other page.

I don't have time to give a full description of how the talk went, but in short I was very happy with it. Below is the paper, a response from Dr. Robert Miner of Baylor, and my (outline) reply to him-- a reply which deals mostly which his proposed alternative solution to mine as proposed in the paper. One thing which Robert empathized after the Q&A was that his comments were more "pedagogical" in the sense that he was more concerned with helping me see that some aspects of the paper need changing if I were interested in reaching a broader audience. This suggestion is fair, as I am working primary in a Thomistic framework for the paper.

Short PECE 5000 paper ACPA
Rober Miner Commentary

My Miner Response

This is the revised draft of the preface to my thesis. I might not include it at all, but it was helpful pre-writing. Please let me know what you think, including whether or not I should include this, or something like this. Thank you!


The following thesis is admittedly much influenced by the thought of Aristotle. While Aristotle's influence can be seen in many ways in this thesis rather overtly, nevertheless there is an underlying principle which is at work that cannot (and should not, to my mind) be addressed during the course of the thesis properly speaking. Most generally this principle is that there is an order to the various philosophical disciplines. While there is much to be said about this order, most specifically the order with which I am concerned is the Philosophy of Nature precedes Metaphysics, or first philosophy, in the order of learning.
As contemporary commentator Glen Coughlin claims, “If there is to be any understanding of metaphysics as Aristotle conceived it, or even of Aristotle's conception of metaphysics, it will have to be preceded by a careful study of natural philosophy...” This is for the simple truth that immaterial being does not evidently exist and according to Aristotle “If there were no substances other than those formed by nature, physics (natural philosophy) would be the first science.” Further, it is through the study of mobile being that we arrive at our understanding of immaterial being, as in Aristotle's De Anima, that presupposes much of the Physics. Also at the end of the Physics Aristotle concludes to the first mover and states “Therefore it is apparent that it is indivisible and partless and a thing having no magnitude.” Our knowledge of immaterial being is largely knowledge by negation. The Physics, therefore, concludes to immaterial being, and can say no more about it since its object if mobile being. It is from here that one is must begin first philosophy, or metaphysics.
From these considerations it is clear that in the order of learning, Natural Philosophy must precede Metaphysics. This is simply how to move from the more known to the less known. This is a formative principle behind this thesis.
Throughout this thesis I will be focused on treating the methodology of Natural Philosophy as a natural philosopher, not a metaphysician. The principles I intend to resolve to in order to make my argument will belong to the disciplines of Logic and Natural Philosophy. This approach has both weaknesses and advantages, yet it is important to maintain.
The possible weaknesses that can be encountered by such an approach is that there may be metaphysical objections or problems to some arguments, that will not be sufficiently dealt with. This does not mean that the arguments should lack their proper certainty, or not conclude properly, but rather that there may be what Aristotle terms, ἀπορία, that cannot be resolved, which nevertheless does not disprove what was said.
The great advantage of this approach is that it will assure a narrow and focused discussion that will not be weighed down by digression or confusing side arguments that do not immediately pertani to the task at hand. This will mean that this thesis will likely end with more questions than it began with, but as long as the questions with which I end are different from the ones I began with, I shall consider my work successful.

This is paper that I wrote for a couple of classes last semester. So far it has been warmly appreciated by the ones who have reviewed it and I am thinking about submitting a modified version for my writing sample to doctoral programs. I realize that it is rather long, but if you get the opportunity to read it I would appreciate your criticisms and comments.



Introduction


Thomas Nagel's influential article, What is it like to be a bat? poses a standard by which all other discussions about the mind-body problem must now be measured. His straightforward and honest critique of reductionism as it is now pursued, especially in the mind-body problem, opens up pathways for dialogue on this matter which formerly might not have been admitted. An important aspect of his article is what he calls a “speculative proposal.” It is here he that suggests another way to bridge the gap between subjective and objective. This solution relies on developing a new phenomenology that would allow us to describe mental events with new concepts.[1]

The enunciation of this difficulty, namely the gap between subjective and objective, is a relatively recent occurrence in the world of philosophy. Nevertheless, the problem though differently formulated in ages past, has been present from the beginning of philosophical inquiry. Classical thought framed this question by asking something like the following: “How do we know things?” or perhaps more pointedly, “How do we know natures?”[2] Prominent among such philosophers is Aristotle, who established a nuanced epistemology which at once allowed for knowing things, and yet respected the limits of our knowledge. St. Thomas, taking Aristotle's lead, establishes an even clearer description of how we know the natures of things and this largely in his historic work De Veritate.

Now the classical formulations betray a very different sort of hermeneutic than what we are confronted with in Nagel's question. The philosophies of Aristotle and St. Thomas have traveled over great distances and times, and are perhaps seen as strangers to the contemporary discussion. It is necessary for us, therefore, to at once respect the differences of the authors and not assume that all are on common ground, and yet to bring these minds together in a productive way that will shed light upon the question at hand. Therefore, this paper will not be a refutation of any one position, but rather we will bring in classical thoughts for the explanatory power of some of their positions, and then bring together the observations of Nagel, and St. Thomas and Aristotle to suggest further conclusions.

Already, from what has been said, it seems that the question of how to bridge the gap between the subjective and objective might be aided by a contribution from our classical visitors, namely, the idea of natures. It is with a view to the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of natures and how we can know them that makes it seem to my mind, that Nagel's hope for a new phenomenology of new concepts will ultimately be frustrated. Nevertheless, using principles that Nagel has put forth in this article together with Thomistic and Aristotelian insights, it is possible to see that this gap, in a way has already been bridged, and in another way, can never be bridged.

In order to address this question I will first discuss Nagel's critique of reductionism and his “speculative proposal” for what a different mode of reductionism might look like. I will attempt to argue that Nagel's hoped for reform must either reduce to the kind of reductionism he critiqued or that it can never be attained. To fully argue this last point I will suggest that what Nagel really wants is what Aristotle and St. Thomas call nature. Consequently, any sort of reductionistic mode of proceeding has, as it were, an infinite distance to traverse. I will then manifest the impediments to knowing natures according to a Thomistic epistemology and how the gap between the objective and subjective is thus crossed and yet not crossed. Having shown the “negative” side of the argument, I will then make a positive argument about what would be necessary according to a Thomistic conception of mind to know natures as Nagel seems to want to. I will suggest that St. Thomas would argue that the kind of knowledge that Nagel is searching for is akin to angelic knowledge. Finally, I will propose a possible exception to the limitations on humanity's inability to bridge the gap between subjective and objective with regard to human persons.





Nagel, Reductionism, and Natures

Nagel's article focuses on consciousness as the phenomena which, as he says, “makes the mind-body problem really intractable.”[3] He points to mental phenomena as the particular aspect of the mind-body problem which is very poorly understood. This leads to what I consider to be the thesis of his paper: “And careful examination will show that no currently available concept of reduction is applicable to [mental phenomena].” [4]

The next paragraph of Nagel's article is very important as it resolves to a common principle. While the tone of the paragraph takes on an hypothetical sense, nevertheless I think that Nagel is appealing to fundamental experience that we cannot soon deny. We will look at this paragraph more carefully below. For now, it is important to point out that Nagel here claims that “conscious experience is a widespread phenomena,” and that “fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is to be that organism.”[5]

Nagel goes on to describes this as “the subjective character of experience.”[6] Nagel begins to point out that current reductive analyses are not up to the task of accounting for this experience as they are “logically compatible with its absence.” He goes on to say “It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character.”[7]

Nagel then makes it very clear that his critique of reductionism is by no means driven by a desire to move away from physicalism, but rather to point out what rigors such a reduction must obtain to account for this, seemingly, undeniable experience. In order to illustrate more fully what he means Nagel turns to bats. He has very good reason for choosing bats to manifest his point. They are sufficiently close to us on the phylogenetic tree and yet their mode of experiencing is very obviously different than our own.[8] A sign of this is that bats depend on echolocation. It is therefore, as Nagel points out, not sufficient for me to imagine what it would be like for me to behave as a bat, he “wants to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat.” [9]

I will let Nagel's own words describe more fully what it is he is looking for:

“We cannot form more than a schematic conception of what it is like [to be a bat]. For example, we may ascribe general types of experience on the basis of the animal’s structure and behavior. Thus we describe bat sonar as a form of three dimensional forward perception; we believe that bats feel some versions of pain, fear, hunger, and lust, and that they have other, more familiar types of perception besides sonar. But we believe that these experiences also have in each case a specific subjective character, which it is beyond our ability to conceive.” [10]



Nagel then briefly touches upon the relation of facts to conceptual schemes. He rightly acknowledges that this is a large topic and he by no means intends to address it fully. He merely points out that, “Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.”[11] Nor does he hold that this is just a matter of the “alleged privacy of experience to its possessor.” He says that the point of view is a type. It is possible, according to Nagel, to describe the quality of experience of another person.[12] However, he admits that this objective ascription of experience is only possible for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription.[13]

The discussion in the article then turns to the dichotomy of a reductionist attempt to grasp subjective experience. Reduction's usual mode is to move away from the subjective to the objective. Precisely what is sought here, however, is the subjective experience. Thus, such a move towards the more objective seems ill suited to the task. Nagel goes so far as to say, “If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be done.”[14] A little further on Nagel seems to capture the essence of the problem when he says, “Does it make sense, in other words, to ask what my experiences are really like, as opposed to how they appear to me?”[15]

He closes his article with his speculative proposal that was mentioned above, that it may be possible to close the gap between the subjective and the objective. He claims that this can be done if one were to develop an objective phenomenology that is not dependant on empathy or imagination. “Though presumably it would not capture everything, its goal would be to describe, at least in part, the subjective character of experiences in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having those experiences.”[16]

With all due respect to a very adept thinker, it does seem that Nagel is attempting to hold together that which he just destroyed. His striking critique of reductionism seems to far out weigh the slim hope proposed by this hypothetical new phenomenology. Nagel wants to hold on to physicalism even though he has seemingly silenced it forever. He is right to say that it is a “mistake to conclude that physicalism must be false.” Nothing he has said as dealt it a death blow. He has merely effectively dismissed it as source for ever really explaining what it is to be something. It cannot obtain this. It has nothing to say on the matter. So also, this new phenomenology, on which Nagel pins his rather slim hopes, will either reduce to that which he just critiqued, or is simply impossible.

When Nagel speaks of trying to “develop concepts that could be used to explain to a person blind from birth what it was like to see,”[17] it is as if he is hoping that this new phenomenology will give humanity a new kind of consciousness, the likes of which we cannot grasp in our present condition.

The problem with this view, is that this new consciousness must develop from our current consciousness. What is more, it can only ever be artificial, and at root will have to resolve to the consciousness that is given as a fact of human existence. To put it another way, an attempt to describe the first person experiences of another must always resolve to our necessarily third person descriptions of objective claims. Therefore, it reduces back to the kind of reduction he just dismissed as insufficient for the task. We must be resigned to this undeniable given of our consciousness.

It is here that I wish to turn to our two guests from the 4th century B.C. and 13th century A.D. While I am afraid that I will here neglect Nagel as long as he is holding on to his physicalism, it is not my purpose to disprove such a theory here. I do intend to argue, however, that what Nagel is really seeking is the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of nature; and while this will not answer all his wants, it will give a cause for the insufficiency of reductionism and offer an explanation for certain limits on well we can know others.

I will here quote in full a paragraph that we briefly referenced in the above summary.

Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it. (Some extremists have been prepared to deny it even of mammals other than man.) No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism. There may be further implications about the form of the experience; there may even (though I doubt it) be implications about the behavior of the organism. But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is to be an organism -something it is like for the organism.[18]


In this paragraph Nagel reveals that he wants the “what it is to be” of an organism and to really grasp that with his mind.

Compare this with a claim by Aristotle, “Nature is a certain principle and cause of moving and resting in that in which it is, primarily, in virtue of itself, and not accidentally.”[19] Prima facie, these claims have very little in common. While respecting the obvious differences, let us look more carefully at Aristotle's claim. First of all, this arises in the context of his Physics and here he is studying mobile being. [20]Consequently, his definitions are going to pertain to this end. Notice, however, that he holds that it is in the thing primarily, in virtue of the thing itself, not accidentally. In other words, the nature pertains essentially to the account of what a thing is.

A little further on Aristotle begins to explain analogous uses of the term nature. In particular he identifies nature with the form or species of things. “Whence, in another way, nature would be the form and species of things which have in themselves a principle of motion, [which species is] not separable except according to account. What is from these is not nature, but by nature, e.g. man. And this [form] is more nature than the material.”[21] The form, however, is the actuality or, the what is to be of the thing and this he identifies with nature. We see, therefore, that Aristotle's account of nature is much closer to what Nagel wants than it may have first appeared.

We should note that this use of nature is far different from our common idea of Nature, as in Mother Nature. For Aristotle (and St. Thomas, as we will see below), nature is not some existing force encompassing all non-human creation. Rather it is an intrinsic principle of the thing; the what is to be of something. Consequently, rather than speaking of Nature, we will speak of natures, or a nature.

Here we will turn to St. Thomas in order to see a concise account of the final developments of the use of the word nature.

“[Essence] is also called by another name, nature, by taking nature according to the first way of those four ways which Boethius assigns in De Duabus Naturae, namely, according as everything that is able to be grasped of each thing by the intellect is able to be called nature. For a thing is not intelligible except through its definition and essence.[22]


Thomas says further, “Nevertheless the same name nature taken in this way signifies the essence of the thing according as it has an order towards some proper operation of the thing; since no thing is without its own proper operation.”[23] Therefore we see that the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of nature is the what it is to be a thing that Nagel wants to possess so thoroughly. However, while acknowledging that we can know these natures in one way, both Aristotle and St. Thomas are quick to point out, at the same time, our inability to understand such natures perfectly. In particular, St. Thomas in his De Veritate, indicates several impediments to knowing the natures of things.

The rest of this paper, therefore, divides into two main parts. The first will be to point out the limits of knowing the natures of others. The second will point out the possible exception to understanding the subjective experiences of others in the case of the human person.

Impediments to Knowing Natures

In order to understand the impediments to knowing natures, it is necessary to give a brief (very brief) outline of a Thomistic epistemology. For St. Thomas, the object of our thought is things. First of all we sense some thing. From this sense impression we form a phantasm which is the likeness of the thing. Finally we abstract the essence of the thing from the phantasm, and thus we know the thing itself. It is important to note here that the essence is an immaterial principle, first of the thing, and then as known by the intellect. Knowing, for the St. Thomas, is the immaterial possession of another as other.

A corollary principle that is derived from this is that to the degree something is immaterial is to the extent it is knowable.

With this brief outline we can then begin to consider the impediments there are to knowing the natures of things. There are seven impediments to knowing natures, and some of these have variations under them. First of all there is the thing itself. A dog, for example, is a composite being, composed of matter and form. To the extent, therefore, that the dog is material, it is not knowable. Therefore, we cannot posses the what it is to be this dog since we cannot possess it wholly as other.

The nature of the thing must be expressed through its sensible accidents.[24] These sensible accidents, therefore, must attempt to express the nature of the thing, even though they may not be able to express the nature fully. Often, no single accident is sufficient to express the nature of the thing. Consequently it requires a number of accidents taken together in order to express the nature.

These accidents are sometimes not adequate to express the nature of the thing. This can either be what is intended by the nature, or by some defect in the nature. In the first case it is clear that some things by nature attempt to deceive as to what their nature is.[25] Take, for example, the insect the walking stick. It is an insect, however, in order to deceive predators, etc., its nature is not adequately expressed by its accidents so that it looks like a twig. As to the second case there are some occasions where the thing is deformed so dramatically that the nature of the thing is only discerned with great difficulty. Such a thing might happen in the case of sever dismemberment.

These are the three impediments to knowing a nature that can arise on the part of the thing itself. There are also, however, impediments in the medium. All sensing must be done through a medium.[26] This medium might not be well suited to transmit the sensible accidents of the thing. For example, trying to see what color a thing is under a black-light, or attempting to hear during a wind storm. In both these instances, the medium is ill suited to transmit the sensible accident of the thing.

This brings us to the sense organs of the thing itself. There are occasions when the sense organ itself is not capable of receiving the sensible accidents of the thing in a way sufficient to grasp the nature of the thing. This deficiency can be in three ways: first, according to nature, second, according to defect and third, according to habituation. An example of the first way is found when the eye by nature can only see so far, or within such a light spectrum. Consequently, for a man, the sensible accidents of a thing that is a mile away might be received in a poor way due to the power of the sense organ, whereas an eagle might be able to perceive it quite clearly. The second way arises when the sense organ is damaged either wholly or partially. The third way is found when we sense something that we are not accustomed to seeing or that we are not accustomed to seeing in a certain way. Here, the habituation of the sense organ might make it unable to adequately receive the sensible accidents of the thing.

Once the sensible accidents have been received it then belongs to the common sense to unite these accidents. The common sense however, can fail either according to defect or according to habituation. Defects in the common sense most often are seen to arise with some sort of brain damage. Habituation of the common sense, similar to habituation of the senses, can cause someone to not observe something because they are not expecting it.

Then a phantasm is formed of the thing. This phantasm is a likeness of the thing but can become abstracted from particular determinations of the thing, such as determinate dimensions. Therefore, while it is certainly a likeness of the thing, and the essence of the thing itself is present in the phantasm, nevertheless, it is present under and through this indeterminate likeness.

The agent intellect abstracts the essence, or nature of the thing, from the phantasm. While the agent intellect does this unerringly, it does not necessarily do it completely. This imperfection can arise on the part of the object, as has been seen, or on the part of the agent intellect itself. When the imperfection is on the part of the object, the agent intellect can only abstract what is clearly present. Thus, if the sensible accidents of a thing are poorly expressed through an improper medium and at a great distance, the intellect might only be able to abstract something like “a being.” It seems possible also, that some agent intellect might be stronger than another, and therefore more apt to abstract the nature of the thing.[27]

Finally the will can effect our knowledge of nature. According to the scholastic dictum, all error lies in the will. That is to say, one might want to know a thing so much that he neglects to be attentive to what he actually knows of the thing and presume to make more determinate statements than is in accord with what is in his intellect. This is not a movement by the intellect, but a movement of the will. This can cause us to cease reflecting on experience because we imagine that we know something that we do not. This in turn will make it so that we do not strive to reflect on our experience more carefully and understand the natures of things better.

At the end, this process seems to be quite perilous to ever knowing a nature. While this must be granted, nevertheless, it will behoove us to see what kind of knowledge we have at the end of this process. This knowledge is not quite so intimate a knowledge as Nagel seems to be wanting. We are still separated from the thing itself. However, we are able to recognize an instance of this nature versus that nature, in most instances. For example, I am not usually puzzled as to whether the thing in front of me is a dog or a cat. I feel quite certain that they each have a different nature. I am prevented, however, from giving a proper definition of each. To be frank, any definition is going to be a description of accidents which to pertain to the nature more directly.

Moreover, there may be cases where I can be confused about the nature of the thing before me.[28] This is clear from the litany of impediments given above. These hard cases should not be the measure. For example, I may be confused about whether a venus fly trap is a plant or an animal, but that does not mean that I do not know what an animal or a plant is, or that I cannot recognize them in most other cases. Again, looking above to all the possible impediments, we should not be surprised to run into difficult cases. Exceptions are not the foundations of knowledge.

This is not at all the same as a reductionist view. The reductionist wants to reduce the 'what it is to be' to such a description and he is justly criticized by Nagel. The Aristotelian-Thomistic position agrees with the reductionist to this point: we might never be able to give a better definition of the thing than to describe its more essential accidents. This is as far as the two positions will go together. The Aristotelian-Thomistic position might be content with such description as what we can say as to the definition of a thing, but it will insist that this is not the, ‘what it is to be’ a thing. We are naming things that flow from the essence of the thing, even if we do not grasp it perfectly. We can recognize natures, give accounts for them, but we cannot fully grasp them.

Therefore, we see that there are seven impediments to knowing the natures of things, some of these necessary; others, possible, and still others, likely. There are three on the part of the thing itself: it is a composite, the nature of the thing is expressed through sensible accidents of the thing, and these can sometimes deceive, either through defect, or intent. On the part of the medium through which the sensible accidents must be sensed it may be unable to adequately carry the sensible accidents to the sense organs. The subject who is desiring to know likewise can cause impediments to knowing the nature of the thing. First on the part of his senses, and second because he must abstract the essence of the thing. Finally, because his will can blind him to his own experience.

Therefore, we see that there is a certain way in which the gap between the subjective and objective is crossed, in that we have the nature as understood is the same as the nature of the thing, essentially. However, since we must know the nature through our senses, the way we grasp the nature of the thing will always be impeded. Nagel's desire to “know what it is like for a bat to be a bat,” appears to be impossible for us to satisfy. To see what it would entail to possess such a knowledge, we must look to intellects that are something more than human.

Angelic Knowledge

The subject matter of this section might be quite distressing for a physicalist, such as Nagel was when he wrote the article we are here considering. Be that as it may, St. Thomas would hold that the kind of knowledge that Nagel is seeking about natures belongs to the angels. Nagel wants to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat; he wants an objective first person view, a perspective inside the very consciousness of a bat. As we saw, a Thomistic epistemology does not give a favorable impression as to the likelihood of ever obtaining such knowledge. Therefore in order to better appreciate the limitations and achievements of human knowing we will set it in contrast to an angelic mode of knowing, as conceived by St. Thomas. What is important about this consideration is not to discuss angels. In fact, one need not even necessarily believe that there are such beings in order to see the three main points of this section: first, that an Arisotelian-Thomistic view of knowing leaves room for different modes of knowing. Second, human knowing is by no means an exemplar. Third, the kind of 'first person' knowledge of the mental events of another is a mode of knowing proper to angels. Thus, even if angels are here considered only hypothetically, nevertheless we can see what it would take to know things as Nagel seems to want to.

Angelic knowledge is possibly the most difficult and most essential part of the study of the angels. The difficulty is trying to understand beings that in a way are like us, and in another way are completely beyond us. In order to get as close as possible to Nagel's first person experiences we want to address how it is that these glorious beings can consider the actions of men. Are they constantly present among us, watching? Or perhaps this is superstitious medieval fancy, and they know us only because they reason to our existence from their own. Both of these accounts are lacking, but hold some element of the truth. As will be shown, angels, according to a Thomistic account know individual human acts through intelligible species handed down to them by God.

We shall proceed by following, for the most part, St. Thomas' own order of treatment of angels as found in his Summa Theologiae. St. Thomas does not have an article which directly pertains to angelic knowledge of human actions. Therefore, as my topic is far narrower than his treatment I will of course skip those articles that are not to my purpose. First we will consider the medium of angelic knowledge. Then, skipping angelic knowledge of immaterial things, we will proceed directly to the knowledge of material things. There will then be a brief discussion of human actions in general and then the argument for the thesis. We will then take a brief moment to dwell on the consequences of the preceding arguments.

A medium of knowledge is the species through which an intellect knows some thing. Now in man, as is seen in Book III of Aristotle's De Anima, knowledge is had through a universal species that is abstracted from a phantasm in the imagination, present there from an object sensed. This cannot be so in angels. Angels are held to be pure intellects, i.e. separated forms that are their own natures.[29] Consequently, the medium for angelic knowledge must be more carefully examined.
That the angel might be distinguished clearly from God, it should be made clear that he does not know all things through his own substance; for the angel possesses a particular substance, and this substance does not contain the perfection of being in itself. As the Angelic Doctor says himself,

However, the essence of the angel does not comprehend in itself all things, since the existence of a essence is determined to some genus and species. But this is proper to the divine essence, that is infinite in itself simply and comprehends the perfections of all things. Therefore, only God knows all things through his essence.[30]

Therefore, it is clear that the angels must know by some other medium, and that their intellects must be perfected by some species in order to know.[31]

Already, from what has been said, we can see that it is not through some abstracted species that an angel knows. As St. Thomas says, “The species through which an angel understands is not taken from things but is con-natural to them.”[32] St. Thomas argues that human souls, since they are united to matter, are perfected through matter, otherwise their union with matter would be in vain. However, angels are not in matter in any way. Therefore, in order for angels to be perfected by some intelligible species, it must come from an intelligible “efflux,” that comes from God directly.[33] This is not surprising insofar as God is the cause of being and perfection of all things.[34] Therefore, God as he is causing things in existence is at the same time informing the angels with the intelligible species of the existing things.

Now, St. Thomas says that the species of things are con-natural to the angels. It is not that the species come from the very nature of the angel, it is that the nature of the angel requires species to obtain its perfection. Note that St. Thomas makes his argument through perfection, but he is not speaking of the supernatural perfection of eternal beatitude, but simply the perfections which belong to a thing. For example, if God were to create a lion and put no other animals on earth, this would be highly unfitting. To eat meat belongs to the nature of the lion. Therefore, it is con-natural to the lion that there be some animal to eat, otherwise the nature is in vain and cannot obtain its natural perfection. So also, the angel must have some intelligible species granted to them by God directly, otherwise they can in no way obtain their natural perfection and their nature is in vain.

It remains then to see how angels are able to know singulars. Necessarily then, we must take under consideration things in matter. St. Thomas argues from the order of things in nature. The superior beings are more perfect than the inferior and contain the perfections of the inferior eminently, wholly and simply. This is as much to say, anything a man can do, an angel can do better. There is a gradation in the order of things. God is the source of all things and all perfections. The angels are nearest to God in the order of being. St. Thomas then says,

Thus, therefore, all material things are in angels, preexisting simply. Indeed and more immaterially than in things themselves; but more multiplied and more imperfect than they exist in God.[35]

St. Thomas then concludes, in the same place, that since God knows material things, then the angels know them by some intelligible species given by God.

It is important to emphasize that, while God is the cause of being of things, and thus it is clear that creatures exist in Him above all things, the angels are not a cause of our being. Their knowledge of us is given to them directly by God, not as though they are necessary agents of His causality,[36] but because in order for these creatures to know it must come from God, not from creatures simply. See how clearly St. Thomas puts it in his reply to the first back in Question 55, Article 2

In the mind of an angel there are similitudes of creatures, not indeed, as taken from the creature, but from God, who is the cause of creatures and in which the first similitudes of things exist. Whence Augustine says in [The Literal Interpretation of Genesis] that just as the ratio by which a creature is fashioned, first is in the Word of God before it is fashioned in the creature, so the same ratio is made first in the intellectual creatures [i.e. the Angels] and then is itself fashioned in the creature.

We can now consider how angels know singulars. St. Thomas begins his discussion of this question by addressing two common errors. The first of which is the outright denial of knowledge of singulars in angels. This is against the Catholic faith, which holds that angels minister to individual humans; these we call guardian angels. Others have stated that angels know singulars through universal causes. St. Thomas shows that this does not end the difficulty, because to know through universal causes is not the same as to know the thing in the here and now. He gives the example of the astronomer knowing through causes that an eclipse is going to happen, but does not know it in its singularity unless he senses it.[37]

St. Thomas again appeals to the superiority of angels to show that they must know singulars if we do, since there is a certain perfection in knowing singulars in the here and now. He therefore argues that God causes all things, not just universally, but in their very individuality; is the cause of each individual substance. Therefore, even the very individual must exist in God preeminently. Socrates, exists in God first and foremost. Thus the angels know Socrates in his very singularity through a species given by God.[38]

Human actions are caused by God's agency through the will. Human actions begin in deliberation. This deliberation is about the means to the final end which belongs to man by nature. The deliberation necessarily results in choice.[39] That choice terminates in action. It is important to realize, in order to avoid the Pelagian error, that God must be the cause of any and all actions because there is in fact some being there. Moreover, that the first movements of deliberation are caused by God's direct action upon the human will There is no human action without God's causing it immediately, just as there is no being of any sort without God's causing it directly.

We are left, therefore, with the question of how angels can know these particular actions of men. Remember above what St. Thomas concludes about angelic knowledge of singulars, that it is precisely the thing its singularity, the here and now, that the angel knows. This follows for all kinds of being caused by God. As was discussed above, God is the immediate cause of being of every action. Therefore, the angel knows individual actions of men as made known to them by God himself, through some intelligible species.
There is an inclination is to say that angels must in some way make the individual actions of man present to himself in some immaterial way, even though it cannot be asserted how it is done. This view supported by considering the way demons are able to judge human thoughts by outward appearances. For as Augustine says demons “sometimes are able with the greatest facility learn man's dispositions, not only through speech, but also as conceived in thought when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body”[40]. It seems therefore that the angels (and demons) are able to somehow consider man's actions directly. Moreover, to say that the knowledge is from some intelligible species of the individual it seems that one necessarily falls into some form of determinism. Angels would be able to conclude to individual actions from the intelligible forms of individuals. However, as St. Thomas argues, angels are unable to know that secret thoughts of men. For the will is moved by God alone and directly.[41] Therefore angels cannot perceive the principle of human action, so likewise, they cannot conclude to human actions from intelligible forms of individuals. Therefore, it seems that angels must in some way understand the individual human action from the man's action directly and since there is no form to abstract, the angel is not knowing it through abstraction, and thus this does not contradict what was said before.

The source of this difficulty seems to arise from the mode of human knowing. We know particulars directly from the particulars as sensed. This seems to us the most direct and simple way to know things. However, like most things man does, this is backwards. God knows things perfectly since He knows things in the order of being and through the cause of being, i.e. Himself. Angels, even naturally speaking are much more like to God than we are, and also know according to the mode of being. As was shown above, they cannot abstract. There is no agent or passive intellect, nor imagination in which to hold a phantasm.

The solution lies in this: God is the cause of being for every being, even accidental being. Therefore, He is even the cause of the being of actions. Therefore, as He is causing the action to be, sense there is some new ens, qualified though it may be, he reveals this to the angel through an intelligible species. Not that the angel sees this particular action as necessarily resulting from what is to be Socrates, but rather, since there is this particular man Socrates, he must necessarily act in some particular way here and now. The ens Socrates, is the occasion for the ens running, or cutting in Socrates. The angel cannot see into the deliberation of Socrates, but he is able know the action of Socrates as caused by God directly.

This is a mind blowing and staggering conclusion. We can imagine that an angel must be flooded with virtually infinite number of intelligible species as every single creature in the world, and every accidental being belonging to it (list the categories of a given moment) at every moment. However, this not simply the case. St. Thomas shows that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the unity of an operation requires the unity of the object. Angels cannot know all things at once, because they are not infinite. Therefore they are only able to have one object for the operation of their vis intellectiva. To fill this out we can look at St. Thomas' consideration of whether the higher angels understand by fewer species. He argues that since God understands all things through himself in an absolute unity, inferior creatures know through many. Thus, those that are closer to Him know must by so much the fewer species understand all intelligible things. Therefore, his intelligible species are more universal.[42] Angels, therefore are not then attentive to all particulars accept in so far as the fall under the account of the universal species that they are considering.

Let us consider some speculative corollaries of this to help put the magnificence of this mode of knowing into perspective. Some have suggested that the highest angels are able to understand all creatures through the single species, created being. This does not seem unlikely especially considering what Dionysius says about the first hierarchy of angels in Chapter 7 of The Celestial Hierarchy.

They [Seraphim, Cherubim and Thrones] are perfect then not because of an enlightened understanding which enables them to analyze the many sacred things, but rather because of a primary and supreme deification, a transcendent and angelic understanding of God's work. They have been directed hierarchically not through other holy beings but directly from God Himself and they have achieved this thanks to the capacity which compared to others is the mark of their superior order. Hence they are found next to perfect and unfailing purity and are led, as permitted, into contemplation regarding the immaterial and intellectual splendor.

Dionysius is here speaking of the beatified angels, but what is most telling is that he attributes their proximity to God to “the capacity which compared to others is the mark of their superior order.” It is not hard to imagine, then, that the higher angels can take up the entire universe in a single glance; that they are so powerful that the universe itself is able to be a locus of their power. Through the one species, created being, they understand the natures of every created being now in existence. Thus, the spiritual realm is vastly beyond our own meagre material existence.

In light of the above it would behoove us to take a brief look at angelic intelligible species. Intelligible species is not said univocally of man and angels, but analogously. First, consider that every intelligible species we possess carries with it the account of abstracted, and therefore universal. Angels labour under no such deficiency. They do not require that something be made universal in order for it to be understood. They understand it precisely in its particularity. The greatest angels are able to grasp Socrates-ness through the species created being.

We therefore see according to St. Thomas' thought that angels are subsisting intellects. From their nature they must receive intelligible species con-natural to them from God directly and these species are of all created being, even accidental being. Therefore it is through these species handed down by God that they understand human actions in the here and now. In this way, they can have knowledge through the cause of even particular actions. Among particular human actions we can include many of the phenomena proper to consciousness. Angels, therefore, are able to have objective knowledge of even first person experiences.

This conclusion seems to correspond with what Nagel wants in his knowledge of things. Nagel is emphatic that he is not just “adverting here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type.”[43] So also the knowledge that angels have of individual human acts cannot violate the “inner sanctum” of human consciousness as St. Thomas points out when he says that angels cannot know the secret thoughts of men. This would seem to keep them from knowing what it is like for Socrates to be a man. However, they are still privy to what it is like for a man to be a man.

A Speculative Proposal

In this section I am going to follow Nagel's lead and offer my own speculative proposal. My own speculative proposal will at first look very much like Nagel's: there may be a way that man is able to more fully bridge the gap between the subjective and objective. I will go further with Nagel and say that its success seems to depend upon the development of a phenomenology. At this point, however our paths diverge. Nagel wants a phenomenology that would still lie in physical considerations. The phenomenology that I would look to is that which may subsist in the relationships between two human persons.

While an Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology seems to exclude the kind of knowledge that Nagel wants as a possibility for human intellects, nevertheless, it does leave open a possibility that Nagel himself seems to suggest, namely, that knowledge of another's first person experience may be more realizable the more similar it is to ourselves. As was quoted above Nagel holds, “the objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to hold this point of view.” Nagel the goes on to state the principle negatively, “The more different from oneself the other experiencer is, the less success one can expect with [being able to hold the point of view of the other].[44]

It seems to me that an Arisotelian-Thomistic view would allow for such a position, but determine it more. This view holds that every human person has the same nature. That is to say, each instance of a human is likewise a distinct instantiation of human nature, but each instantiation is essentially the same. There is, however, a great deal of difference between each instantiation. This difference is not in the nature, but lies somewhere else.

According to St. Thomas, the principle of individuation is matter. While this is the principle of our individuation, it by no means needs to be considered as the perfection of our individation. We are not merely distinct individuals, we are unique. Now the perfection of the uniqueness of each instance of a human nature, belongs to the personhood of that nature. It is here that we find what St. Thomas holds to be the incommunicable part of our existence.

It seems, therefore, quite possible to imagine that the inter relationship of persons can provide for a more intimate knowledge of the experiences of the other. There is not the impediment of knowing a different nature. It seems possible, therefore, that there may be a chance to bridge the gap between subject and object in a more profound way.

I would be surprised if this entailed finding new concepts and ways of describing color as Nagel seems to want. Rather, the kind of development, as I see it, would develop a kind of empathy between persons. Perhaps philosophy and science will still only be able to describe this kind of knowledge. I can imagine that this kind of empathy will be found to be pre-philosophical. Perhaps this kind of knowing has actually been going on from the beginning, and I am merely reinventing the wheel. For, it was in the beginning that “Adam knew Eve, his wife.”[45]

Conclusion

We began this paper with a summary of Thomas Nagel's article, What is it like to be a bat? In the summary of this article we pointed out his critique of physicalist reductionism, but I attempted to emphasize that what Nagel was really trying to get to was the 'what it is to be' of a bat. It was in his quest for this where he found reductionist theories wanting.

From this we turned to Aristotle and St. Thomas, both of whom held a concept of nature. As we saw, this is not an idea of nature like Mother Nature, or some mysterious presence/force. Rather, it began as “a certain principle and cause of moving and resting in that in which it is, primarily, in virtue of itself, and not accidentally,” and finally developed into “the essence of the thing according as it has an order towards some proper operation of the thing.”

We then had to consider in what mode we understood these natures and consequently examined the seven major impediments to knowing natures. There are three on the part of the thing itself: it is a composite, the nature of the thing is expressed through sensible accidents of the thing, and these can sometimes deceive, either through defect, or intent. On the part of the medium through which the sensible accidents must be sensed it can possibly me unable to adequately carry the sensible accidents to the sense organs. The subject who desires to know likewise can cause impediments to knowing the nature of the thing. First, on the part of his senses; second, because he must abstract the essence of the thing; finally, because his will can blind him to his own experience.

This led us to look at angelic knowledge. For, while the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of human knowing seems to point to something less than what Nagel was seeking, we saw that waht is required for such knowledge is proper to angelic intellects. These immaterial beings are subsisting intellects, and from their nature they must receive intelligible species con-natural to them from God directly. These species are of all created being, even accidental being. Therefore it is through these species handed down by God that they understand human actions in the here and now. In this way, they can have knowledge through the cause of even particular actions. Such knowledge would therefore extend even to certain mental events.

Finally, I made my own speculative proposal, pointing out that since between two human persons there is not a difference in nature, it may be possible to have greater knowledge of another's first person experience, though this knowledge may take on something different than what belongs to philosophical or scientific pursuits.

Therefore, the question of bridging the gap between the subjective and objective is not so neat a problem as we might hope. According to classical thought, Thomas Nagel will have to be content with something less than what he has hoped for in his inquiry into the 'what it is to be of things.' Perhaps also, the sheer ability of the Aristotelian-Thomistic account to explain why we cannot get to the 'what it is to be' of things may be cause enough to consider more carefully their thought.



24



[1] Nagel, Thomas. What is it like to be a Bat? From The Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 4 (October 1974);435-50. I am using the article from a personal source; therefore the page numbers referenced will not correspond to the afore referenced publication.

[2] Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, III, 5.

[3] Nagel, What is it like to be a Bat?, p. 1.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., p. 2.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., p. 3.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., p. 4.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., p. 6.

[15] Ibid., p. 8.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 1.

[19] Aristotle. Physics or Natural Hearing: William of Moerbeke Translation Series. Translated and edited by Glen Coughlin. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2005.

[20] Ibid., I, 2.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Aquinas, Thomas. De Ente et Essentia, Cap. I.: [Essentia] etiam alio nomine natura dicitur accipiendo naturam secundum primum modum illorum quattor, quos Boethius in libro De Duabus Naturae assignat, secundum scilicet quod natura dicitur omne illud quod intellectu quoquo mod capi potest. Non enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam.

[23] Ibid., Tamen nomen naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei, secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria operatione destituatur.

[24] Aquinas, Thomas. De Veritate, Q. 1, a. 10, c.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Aquinas, De Veritate, Q. 1, a. 12 c.

[28] Cf. Ibid.

[29] Aquinas, Summa Thologiae, pp. Q.. 50, aa. 1,2,4,.

[30] Ibid., pp Q. 55, a. 1. c. Ipsa autem essential angeli non comprehendit in se omnia, cum sit essential determinate ad genus et ad speciem. Hoc autem proprium est essentiae divinae, qua infinita est, ut in se simpliciter omnia comprehendat perfecte. Et ideo solus Deus cognoscit onia per suam essentiam. Though an interesting question, we will leave aside what is meant by an angel being determined to a genus and species in this paper.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid. a. 2.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid. pp. Q. 57, a. 1: Sic igitur omnia materialia in ipsis angelis praeexistun, simplicius quidem et immaterialius quam in ipsis rebus; multiplicius autem et imperfectus quam in Deo.

[36] This is not to say that God cannot use angels as a mediation for His direct causality, but it is not necessary. Furthermore, it seems that in certain ways God cannot use the angels to cause at all, such as in the case of esse We will avoid this digression.

[37] Ibid. a. 2.

[38] Ibid.

[39] This assuming that the deliberation comes to an end. One might be able to imagine a case where someone is in the grocery store indefinitely, but there is not need to dwell on what is on the least part.

[40] De Divinatione Daemonum as referenced by St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, pp. Q. 57, a 4.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid., Q. 55, a. 3.

[43] Nagel, What is it like to be a Bat? P. 2.

[44] Ibid. p. 3.

[45] Genesis 4:1.

Below is part 2 of my thesis on double effect reasoning. In the fist part I just provide a basic review of the components of the moral act (of which ya'll are familiar): means, end, circumstance, object, intention, etc. This is a closer look at St. Thomas' understanding of "end," which is more complex than his understanding of some of the other parts of human action. Thanks for reading!

Andrew M. Lang MA Phil Thesis Part 2

Here is the link to the American Catholic Philosophical Association's 2009 conference, with the theme "Reasoning in Context." It looks like some good papers will be given. My paper, “Clarifying two Central Issues in Double Effect Reasoning Debates," which you have seen a version of on this blog, will be given Saturday evening. Thanks for all the input and support fellow blogoi!

Here's the abstract: "The principles whereby the reason operates in ethically complicated situations has been subject to long-standing debates in Catholic Philosophy. A classic text which exemplifies this is Aquinas' consideration of self-defensive killing. In this paper I clarify two central issues in double-effect reasoning debates surrounding this text. Both issues are connected to the seemingly simple but actually complex task of accounting for the 'chosen means' of self-defense. The first issue is whether the 'chosen means' are also able to be considered a 'proximate end,' to which the intention is directed. The second is determining whether the assailant's death is related to the 'chosen means' per se and therefore to the rest of the moral action. Resolving these issues provide grounds for answering the broader question implicit in the situation of self-defensive killing: what is to be done when human actions would inevitably entail that some evil is instrumentally tied to realizing some good?"

Below is a first draft of the preface to my thesis. I would appreciate your thoughts and input on it. At this point I feel like it is rather clumsy, and lacks the proper rhetorical flair. Please let me know if anything about it sounds to overbearing, unnecessary, etc.

In the many conversations that I have had concerning this paper I have encountered certain questions and difficulties that this paper presents, and yet are not addressed within the scope of the paper. The questions of which I speak, pertain to the foundations on which this paper, and my own ideas proceed. This foundation can be described (if you will pardon the cliché) as my “world-view,” or as it has elsewhere more aptly been described, my intellectual custom.
By referring to this intellectual custom I do not mean to suggest that I have some wholly unique perspective, nor do I propose to say that different intellectual customs are wholly alienated from one another such that communication is impossible between them (hence I am writing this preface). Rather, I believe that while my perspective, in one sense, is necessarily unique since I am unique. It is likewise necessarily part of a broader community in which I have been formed, raised, and influenced, since it is impossible for us to exist, separated from any outside influence. This broader community is that wherein the intellectual custom I share in exists. (What Aristotle says about arguments)
Judging, therefore, from the sorts of questions I have encountered regarding this paper, I assume that many of those with whom I have conversed come from a somewhat different intellectual custom. Perhaps this means that I am part of some sort of minority, or that I have merely encountered a peculiar sample. Whatever the case may be, I will endeavour to use this preface as an occasion to sketch, as it were, a backdrop for the following paper. This will not be so much argumentative as descriptive, and all this is done with a view to obviating the objections that would not be so much against the thesis as against the approach that is being taken to this thesis.
I want to acknowledge further, that some intellectual custom may be superior to another and that there are somethings that belong to this intellectual custom about which arguments can be made, and about which I can be in error. I wish merely to establish clearly the pertain aspects of the foundation from whence I am proceeding so that questions and objections might be distinguished accordingly.
Chief among my principles is the conviction that Philosophy is about things and attempts to speak of things in so far as they are universal and unchanging. It follows, therefore, that I am more interested in ideas than in those that held the ideas. In this way, the title of this thesis may be somewhat misleading. I am not actually concerned with the thoughts that went through Aristotle or Newton's minds except accidentally. I trust the interpretations of the texts will not be too far from what they think, but nevertheless I must confess that it is possible they would object to the way I portray their thoughts. Nevertheless, this is not a court where persons are being tried, it is a philosophical treatise where ideas are considered, and these ideas are held to be better or worse to the extent they correspond to the way things are. A further consequence that will be noted is how I blithely and liberally use the commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas to understand Aristotle. I do this because St. Thomas seems to make the best sense of the texts of Aristotle. By makes “the best sense” I mean that he reads them in such a way as they make sense of things and make sense to me. Using the names of Aristotle and Newton, therefore, should be taken as more of a short-hand way of referring to their works.
This chief principle, as I have designated it, presupposes another: that things are intelligible. By many this claim is challenged. If it is not questioned that things can be known at all, there is great debate about to what extent things can be known. As important and interesting as these questions are, they have to be put aside. Unless I am to begin every work with an epistemological treatise, I must take it as given that I am able to know things. (Though how and to what extent merits discussion.)
Another frequent concern that has been brought to my attention is that in comparing Aristotle and Newton I am holding one as better than the other, as if I were pitting them against one another in some intellectual boxing match and that I grant victory to the one I favor. I will here give a glimpse of the following thesis: I will use terms such as “prior” and “more proper.” These are not intended to mean “better,” simply speaking. They will mean better in a certain respect. Prior means that it is better for this one to proceed the other. More proper means that it better suited to this end than the other, and this will be largely due to the other having a different end altogether. In essence, therefore, by saying prior and more proper, I am saying let the first is before that which follows, and that each is better suited to its proper rather than the end of the other.
Having laid down these prefatory remarks, I hope that I have sufficiently established the thought behind my thesis. That philosophy is about things, and that things are intelligible form the cornerstone of my philosophical approach. My clarifications about what it means to be prior and proper are to make clear the rhetorical approach that this thesis intends.

Below is the paper I recently gave at this conference at the University of Denver. I suggest reading this other linked paper when you get to the part on Averroes. Please excuse the half-baked-ness of my paper...

“The Locus of Intellectual Beatitude in Aquinas” By Andrew Lang

Here is my term paper, "Dialectical Considerations of Ens Commune for the Beginner of Metaphysics," written for the SRC Metaphysics course FA & I just finished. This paper was an attempt for me to sort of speculatively assess and place where my current understanding falls with regard to metaphysics. I am posting it as a PDF so I hopefully don't make a big mess. Just click on the link if the flash doesn't load. Of course, your input is welcome!

Ens Commune Final SRC Paper for Vega by Andrew Lang

Here is a paper that I turned in for my Special Readings Course on Existential Thomism. During the course of this class I realized that the basic concepts of metaphysics that were at stake were hard enough without trying to answer the positions of men like Gilson and Wippel. Consequently, while I do bring up their thought, it is only in a very cursory way.
Also, when reading the following, please remember that it is written by a student and not a master. These are my thoughts on the matter as far as I can see. The only part of this paper that I have real certainty about is the argument about the distinction between esse and essentia. You will note that this argument is a modification of the argument I gave before, and I view this as my retraction of the position that I before asserted. In particular, I grant that it is not necessary to see the existence of one necessary being, but it is necessary only to see what it would entail to be such a being.
I look forward to your thoughts and comments!

In the pursuit of metaphysics there are many challenges that present themselves to the would-be metaphysician. In contemporary thought, such challenges often arise from thinkers who oppose the very idea of metaphysics. Such thinkers as Kant and his present day adherents come quickly to mind. However, aside from these attacks from “outside” of metaphysics, there are other challenges, even for one who approaches the study with a good will. I do not speak merely of the challenges that arise from the difficulty of the matter, but there is a real question about whether metaphysics is even possible as a philosophical pursuit. A sign of the force of this difficulty is that in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics (of fourteen) Aristotle still is seeking whether there is such a science that can treat being qua being.[1]

Of particular concern to Aristotle is how to treat being qua being as something one. This will be of vital importance to metaphysics as a science. If being qua being cannot be understood as something one then there will not be one science. Nor would it seem possible to treat of first principles in a unified way and thus defend them accordingly. Consequently, it is of great importance to Aristotle that we see how to consider being qua being as something one.

This is where our present inquiry enters. St. Thomas Aquinas refers to this unified treatment of being qua being, as ens commune, or common being. In his preface to his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics St. Thomas refers to ens commune, naming it the subject of the science and a genus. It is the first task of this paper, therefore, to examine what ens commune is.

Not unrelated to this is the idea of esse commune. Here is an idea that pertains to the existence that all things possess. We say that all things exist; therefore it is a question to see how we are able to understand existence, which is presented to us in so many ways, in a unified manner.

This paper is not concerned with attempting to reconstruct the thought of the man Thomas Aquinas, or the man Aristotle. Rather, it is an attempt to understand the subject of metaphysics. I will, however, turn to Aristotle and St. Thomas as guides in my attempt to understand these matters. In particular, I will turn to St. Thomas, because the phrase, ens commune, is his. This however, creates a further difficulty. There is by no means a unified position of Thomists on the matter. While I cannot in any feasible way include the thoughts of all significant Thomists, nor even of many of them, I will speak to some of the challenges to my thought presented by two influential Thomists, Etienne Gilson and John Wippel.

Therefore, this goal of this paper is to see that ens commune is a genus in an extended sense and is thus an ens ratione with a foundation in things, unified through the notion of substance. The very foundation of ens commune however, is esse. Therefore, we must also see how esse can be said in common, in order to see how ens can be said in common.

First to be addressed is ens commune. It pertains to this inquiry to first examine our preliminary conceptions of ens and then to see how this idea is extended to many diverse things. From this point, we must see how such an idea can in anyway be a genus. Since, however, it belongs to a genus to be one, we must see that we are able to have a conception of ens that is one, yet pertains to all these different instances.

The second section of the paper will then look at esse commune.

Ens Commune

We will follow Aristotle's example and begin with what is more known to us and then proceed to what is more known by nature.[2] It is important, therefore, to give a preliminary consideration to this concept of ens commune. Literally translated it means common being. Ens does not, however, have any connotation of action. Rather it refers to a being, or better yet, an entity. It should therefore be always taken as a noun. Common, here, can be understood in two ways. As St. Thomas argues, a principle is said to be common either through predication, or as a common cause.[3] It remains to be seen which sense of common should be taken in ens commune.

There are a number of presuppositions that this paper will impose upon its readers, first of which is a presupposition of Aristotle's work in philosophy of nature. I will therefore be pursuing a particular path into metaphysics, which I will not here defend. My reasons for choosing to enter metaphysics through philosophy of nature are two-fold. First, this has been the traditional mode of proceeding for centuries. Second, I only see how to manifest the concept of ens commune by beginning with the philosophy of nature. I acknowledge that there are varying opinions about the necessity of treating physics before metaphysics, but I will not treat of that matter here.

To begin, it is clear that the subject of the philosophy of nature is mobile ens[4] and its principles.[5] It is this sort of ens that we are first and foremost familiar with. This is because we are composite beings and we know through our senses. Mobile ens is material ens, and therefore we know it as sensible ens. What is more, at first ens is equivalent to material ens, since anything more is beyond our experience.

Our idea of ens undergoes a radical change, however, at the conclusion of the philosophy of nature. This occurs when we prove the immortality of the human soul[6] and of the first mover.[7] What is significant about both of these is that they are both immaterial. Ens is now said in an entirely new way, since our studies in the philosophy of nature have compelled us to admit such beings. We consequently must expand our understanding of what it is to be an ens. This is what the concept ens commune attempts to do.

Now that this “new” kind of ens has been discovered, i.e. immaterial ens, it is possible that our desire to have some account of ens which is beyond that of our common experience may likewise be beyond us. This may pose a problem for ever attaining to a science of being qua being. It may be that we will only ever be able to treat of such things as principles and never in themselves. It is easily granted that I can imagine that there are such things as immaterial entia. Moreover, I can try to form some sort of picture in mind of some kind of “ensness” that all entia participate in. However, just because I am able to imagine such things, it does not follow that they correspond to the way things are. The formation of the concept of ens commune must be done very carefully if we are to uphold the rigors required of true philosophical inquiry.

Aristotle describes everything which must be included in the account of ens commune in Book IV of his Metaphysics.

So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these things or of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is non-being.[8]

Therefore in order to have an understanding of ens that is broad enough to include, not just material being, but also immaterial being and all the affections, privations etc. that pertain to these, we must form a concept of ens that is not in any of these things. The emphasis on the “not” follows St. Thomas' division of the sciences in his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate. There St. Thomas makes a distinction between abstraction and separatio.[9] In abstraction we consider one thing without reference to what it is in. As Aristotle says of the geometer,

He strips off all sensible qualities, e.g. weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in three dimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantitative and continuous and does not consider them in any other respect.[10]

Separatio, on the other hand, is judging one thing specifically as not in another. As St. Thomas says,

Thus, therefore, the intellect distinguishes one from another in diverse ways according to diverse operations, since according to the operation as composing and dividing [the second act of the intellect]; it distinguishes one from another through this: that it understands one to not be in another. But, in the operation by which it understands what each thing is, it distinguishes one from another while it understands what this is; understanding nothing concerning the other, neither that it be with that thing, nor that it be separated from that thing. Whence that distinction does not properly have the name of separatio, but only the first [distinction] does.[11]

Thus it is seen that separatio belongs to the second act of the intellect which composes and divides and it is here that we find ens commune which is a conception of ens which is not in matter and motion. It is important to note here, again, the importance of carefully and rigorously forming this concept. The second act of the intellect is where truth and falsity is first found. We do not have the assurance of the inerrant first act of the intellect. The possibility of error is therefore quite real.

It is going beyond the scope of this paper to extensively defend the truth of ens commune. Looking to Aristotle as an example, it seems that to have certainty in making such a judgment we need to reflect long and carefully over our experience. As was mentioned above, the formation of this concept and the feasibility of the science of metaphysics as a whole is in question for Aristotle into the eleventh book of the Metaphysics. Therefore, while we cannot pursue in detail the dialectic required for grasping ens commune we can examine what would pertain to such an idea in order to see how it might be true.

It remains, therefore, to see how what has been said of ens commune illumines the initial claims made by St. Thomas, namely that it is a genus and the subject of metaphysics. It seems clear that ens commune cannot be a genus in any strict sense of the term. Ens can in no way be a genus, since it is said equivocally of various categories. A fortiori, ens commune will not be said univocally. However, in St. Thomas' De Veritate he makes an argument for a broad sense of genus.[12] He justifies his claim with the authority of Scripture, where God and humans are said to be in a genus.[13] A fortiori, we are able to use genus loosely when speaking of ens commune.

To fully justify this particular use of genus, it seems necessary that there be some basis for calling ens commune one. It would be unfitting to place any chance grouping under a genus, even said in a broad sense. If there is no basis in the things, then anything can be a genus. Therefore, it seems clear that there must be a basis in things for calling something a genus. It would seem to follow then, that if there were some way in which something could be understood to be as one, even as it was said of many, that then there would be a basis for calling it a genus.

Aristotle, as has been said, concerns himself with the question of the unity of the subject of metaphysics in book eleven. Aristotle first manifests that, "everything that is may be referred to something single and common."[14] However, at this point it seems that "is" is said in an equivocal manner. Aristotle goes on to argue that the contrarieties also may be referred to the first contrarieties of being. However, every pair of contrarieties is examined by one science. Then, he rules out the other sciences as in sufficient to treat of ens qua ens, all of them being concerned with ens under a particular account. It remains, therefore, to metaphysics to treat of ens qua ens. Having examined the nature of contrarieties, and seen how they are also referred back to something one and common, "since all that is is said to be in virtue of something single and common." It would seem therefore, that what is single and common is substance. For example, all accidents exist and are entia through substance. Therefore, in so far as something is an ens, so it must belong to substance, either as substance, or as an accident, or the contrarieties. Aristotle hints at this in the text above, from Book IV, where we see that all of these things we call being are referred to substance. Therefore, we have found a basis for considering ens commune as one.

This conclusion seems to grant further insight into how we should understand common in ens commune. It seems here that we should understand it as a kind of formal cause, for ens commune is the account given of what makes something to be an ens. This cause, however, should not be understood as external to the thing, but rather as an intrinsic cause. Here we may draw an analogy to the concept of animal. Animal may likewise be seen as an intrinsic formal cause, since it belongs to the account of what it is to be something, but cannot be found as separate from the account of such things either. This would seem to be the case for other genera as well.

From what has been said, there appears to be grounds for considering ens commune as an ens ratione. For the account of why it is common seems to belong more to our conception than to things themselves. However, there is a distinction among entia ratione. There are some which are without a foundation in things and some that do have a foundation in things. Non-being is an example of an ens ratione without a foundation in things. It is, as it were, the exemplar of non-existence. It is a negative concept which we conceive of in the mode of substance, but is not directly based on any experience. Time, on the other hand, is an ens ratione with a foundation in things. Time, according to Aristotle, is "the number of motion according to before and after."[15] Consequently, it is a being of reason since it depends on there being some mind for it to exist. However, it is not without a direct foundation in things, since it is measuring something real viz., motion. Ens commune therefore seems to belong to those entia ratione with a foundation in things; for ens is most of all real, though the account of it common belongs to our conception. This does not mean, in any way, that this concept is made up, or not based in something real. Rather it refers to the limited way of understanding that we possess. Therefore, ens commune is an ens ratione with a foundation in things.

The mode of this section has been largely dialectic in an attempt to manifest the course of thought that is required for the formation of the concept of ens commune. Many of the conclusions, therefore, do not necessarily conclude with complete certainty. It does seem clear from what has been said, that ens commune is an attempt by our mind to find a broad account of ens which is not restricted to matter. Moreover, it seems clear that if such a concept is formed that it can be based on a loose notion of genus. Finally, the account for its unity, though briefly and summarily given, seems to provide sufficient grounds for calling it one. What is left quite uncertain is how ens commune can be the subject of metaphysics. That ens commune is an ens ratione likewise lacks to certainty that one would require before agreeing to such a claim. These two claims are quite involved with one another. If ens commune is an ens ratione, then it seems difficult to see how it is fitting matter for a science. Likewise, the grounds for calling it common and an intrinsic formal cause are left uncertain, since these were used to arrive at ens commune being an ens ratione.


Esse Commune

The concept ens commune, though hard and abstract, nevertheless seems to be relatively well known and common compared to a seemingly closely related concept, esse commune. Now, part of the very difficulty here is that these two ideas may not even be properly distinguished. It is important to recognize that esse commune is distinct from esse as it belongs to any particular ens. Such a distinction seems to be at least implicitly denied by such thinkers as Etienne Gilson and John Wippel, both of whom want to hold that the esse of each thing arises from a judgment of the intellect. In the words of Gilson, “First a knowing subject apprehends what the given object is; next it judges that the object is.” While it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a refutation of such a position, it will be my purpose to manifest a different account of how we are able to form the concept esse. The concept of esse commune arises as a judgment in the second act of the intellect, and presupposes esse in the first act of the intellect. Lest I be accused of making mere counter assertions, I will attempt to indicate ways in which this account seems to be superior to the one provided by Gilson and Wippel.

In order to proceed with more clarity we will first distinguish clearly what is meant by the three central concepts found in this paper, ens, essentia, and esse. I will insist on using the Latin terms throughout, and this is for two reasons: First, the English term “being” being ambiguous can cause more confusion than clarity. Second, the Latin terms are all etymologically related, which aids in better manifesting the relationship between these concepts.

Ens is here taken to mean some thing. Normally we would consider this to be an existing thing, though it is possible for there to be an ens ratione, or a “being of reason,” as seen above. A closely related English word is entity. The problem with entity, however, is that if can often connote substance. Ens, however, has no such limitation and can refer to substance or accidents. As St. Thomas says, following Aristotle, “Ens per se is said in two ways: one way as that which is divided into the ten genera, another way as that which signifies a true proposition.”[16]

St. Thomas, in the same work as quoted above, goes on to define essentia, or essence. He gives six or seven different definitions. We will focus on two of the definitions. The first is what is commonly considered the definition of essence, that is, the whatness or “quiddity” of a thing. The second definition is the definition proper to the metaphysician and is the last definition that St. Thomas gives of essentia. “But essentia is said according as that through which and in which an ens has esse.[17]

This final definition of essentia leads to another important term and one with which this section will be particularly concerned, namely, esse. This concept is difficult in its very simplicity. Literally it is the Latin verb “to be.” However, as is manifest by St. Thomas' use of the term in the definition of essence, it does not need to always be considered as an infinitive verb, but it takes on a more substantive quality and can, accurately enough be translated as existence. To use all of these terms in relation to one another we can say, “An ens has an essentia, through which and in which it has esse.”

As was implied earlier, this section is going to proceed on the basis of an assumption. Stated succinctly, this assumption is that the ens is the object of the first act of the intellect. That is to say, that we know things not just the essences of things or the ideas of things. While I hold that this position is a necessary principle to all thought and can be manifested it has nevertheless been rejected explicitly by Modern philosophers such as Descartes, Locke and Kant in a very a radical way. Thinkers such as Gilson have a more subtle rejection of such a position and they attempt to hold that only essence is present in the first act of the intellect and that esse is a later judgment, as was said above. What is more, Gilson and Wippel argue that this is the thought of St. Thomas.

One of the texts of contention is in St. Thomas' Summa Theologiae. There St. Thomas says “Ens first fall into the conception of the intellect.”[18] It might seem obvious that St. Thomas is explicitly stating the opposite of what Gilson and Wippel contend that he holds. However, Gilson argues that ens is in the first act of the intellect only in an accidental way. That is to say, ens can only be present in the intellect by means of a joining of its parts through a judgment that something exists.

The problems with holding such a position are vast, however, I will at this point only suggest that we take St. Thomas to be speaking a little more straightforwardly, and accept that ens is present in the first act of the intellect as abstracted from some real ens.

It follows, therefore, that if it be the case that ens can be present in the first act of the intellect, we need not make a judgment that a thing is, or is not. Rather, it is immediately evident that the thing we are looking at is an existing thing; that such things are the only things possible for us to look at, so that we are, as it were, compelled to see and know real things.

While I will candidly admit that I am making this assumption, and this makes for an evident weakness in my argument, I nevertheless hold that such an assumption should be more easily held than what is implicitly that of Gilson and Wippel. Both of these thinkers seem to approach their metaphysical inquiry assuming the distinction between essentia and esse. This assumption results in two immediate difficulties. The first is that if one begins with this distinction, then he is unable to appreciate the importance and force of such claims. In order to make such a distinction an argument should be made that would show that an absurdity would arise if we did not posit such a distinction. This is the only sort of argument that can be expected when dealing with things that are so principle to our understanding. At the very least, an argument should be made showing how it is possible to make such a distinction. The second difficulty is that it confuses the order of knowing and the order of being. The distinction between esse and essentia is first in the order of being, but it is among the last distinctions made in the order of knowing.

What is implicit in the assumption of this section is that esse must in some way be present in the first act of the intellect. How it is present can be made clear by considering what an ens is. Let us turn to the definitions of ens that we looked at earlier. “That which is divided into the ten genera” and, “That which signifies a true proposition. St. Thomas goes on to explain the differences between these two definitions.

However, the difference between these two is that, since by the second way everything about which an affirmative proposition can be formed can be called a being, even if it posits nothing in re, by this way privations and negations are called beings; for we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, and that blindness is in the eye. But in the first way, it cannot be said that anything is placed in re. Whence, tin the first way, blindness and such things are not entia.[19]

Therefore, we see that in the first way of using ens we can only talk about existing things, i.e. things that have an act of esse. Therefore, if ens is present in the first act of the intellect, then esse is implied in the concept.

It is important to note, that while esse is present in this first act of the intellect, nevertheless we do not grasp the concept of esse in distinction from the essentia of the thing unless we make a further judgment. That is to say, granted that the concept of cat that I have has come from an existing cat, and that I do not need to conclude to its existence, nevertheless, it is a further operation that allows me to see that there is a distinction between the of the cat and its esse. We see that there are certain things that are possible to either exist or not exist, as in the case of generation and corruption. We see therefore that the essentia of this thing has a certain kind of independence from whether or not the thing exists. I can see that this cat did not exist and will not exist in the future. Further, I can see that no cat had to exist and that no cats could exist in the future. In short, I can see that the existence of cats is wholly dependent upon the causality of another. Therefore, we begin to see the possibility for positing a distinction between the quiddity of the thing and its existence.

The distinction between the concept esse commune and essentia is a fundamental distinction in things, but is by no means first in our order of knowing. It is important here to point out that this distinction does not arise from an abstraction; rather it arises from a separation and this is the proper act of the second act of the intellect. It is a separation precisely because it considers esse as not with the essentia. Abstraction, on the other hand, merely considers one thing without considering another. It seems probable enough that such a judgment is possible to make. It is quite another thing to see that this is a true judgment.

The distinction between esse and essentia has often been touted as St. Thomas' great contribution to metaphysics. This position, however, is challenged by the clear fact that Boethius makes this distinction in disputed question, “How can substances be said to be good insofar as they are since they are not substantial goods?” also known as De Hebdomadibus. In the Regula of the text he lays down that “esse and that which is are different.”[20]

However this historical question resolves, it is clear that St. Thomas made much of this distinction, and made arguments for this distinction; by no means considering it self-evident. Notably he argues for this distinction in his treatise De Ente et Essentia. In context, he is discussing separated substances saying,

Although [separated] substances are forms only, without matter, nevertheless there is not every kind of simplicity in them. Nor are they pure act, but they have an admixture of potency. And this is clear thus: For, whatever is does not concern the understanding of an essentia or quiddity comes from outside and makes a composition with the essentia, because no essentia can be understood without the things which are parts of its essence. However, every essentia or quiddity is able to be understood without this: that something is understood about its existence (esse). For, what a man is or a Phoenix is, is able to be understood and nevertheless it is possible to be ignorant as to whether it has existence (esse) in the natural order. Therefore it is clear that existence (esse) is other than essentia or quiddity.[21]

This is a very important and easily misunderstood passage. The principle claim that I want to defend regarding this passage is that it concludes only with the force of logical necessity, and does not place a real distinction in things. It is essential, therefore, to see that when St. Thomas speaks of a Phoenix, he is not speaking of a mythical bird, but rather a bird that is (or is at least thought to be) real.

As Gyula Klima says in his review of Anthony Kenny's Aquinas on Being notes

However, for Aquinas, the fictitious character of phoenix was by no means a known fact. After all, Isidore of Seville, whom Aquinas frequently cites, discusses the phoenix along with birds known to exist (such as eagles and ostriches).[22] Also, the examples with which Aquinas groups the phoenix-example together are obviously real, natural phenomena (man, eclipse). Therefore, when Aquinas is talking about understanding the essence of the thing without knowing the existence of the thing, he means understanding the real essence of a real thing... but not knowing whether the real thing in question actually, at the moment of our consideration, exists.[23]

The other place where St. Thomas mentions the Phoenix with a natural phenomena is in his commentary on The Sentences where he says, “For there are certain natural things about which the esse is not understood, which is clear from this: that it is able to be understood while being ignorant of whether it exists, just as the Phoenix, or an eclipse or some such things.”[24] Here it is clear that St. Thomas is referring to Phoenix as a natural thing, and clearly not as something made up, but it is only questionable whether it exists now.

Again, St. Thomas uses Phoenix as an example in his commentary on Aristotle's De Caelo. “However, nothing prohibits an individual which is the only one in one species to be generated and corrupted, just as the say about the Phoenix.”[25] Here the force of the example would be lost completely if the Phoenix were not an existing thing.[26]

That he would use the Phoenix in this way (that is, as a real thing, though possibly not existing at this time) is in accord with reason. It would be an error to try to conclude to the distinction between essentia and esse just from the fact that I can make up some creature in my mind since, act precedes potency. As St. Thomas says,

For, since each and every thing is intelligible according as it is in act as is said in Book IX of The Metaphysics, it is necessary that the nature itself or the quiddity of a thing be understood. Either according as it is act itself, as it belongs to forms and simple substances; or according as that which is the act of the thing, as composite substances through their forms; or according as that which is in the place of act, just as prime matter through a certain disposition towards form and a vacuum through the privation of place. And thus it is that, from each and every nature has its account.[27]

This is to say that, we cannot make up an essence and pretend that it is even possible that such a thing would exist. We can only know that it is possible that something exist by seeing that it actually exists. We know the actuality of the thing before we know its potency. For example, I can say the words “greatest prime number.” Each of these words makes sense in themselves and taken as a whole. However, I cannot be sure that such a thing is possible until I have seen or proven it to be the case. In this case, it can be shown that “greatest prime number” is actually an absurdity, and in no way can exist.

Therefore, it would be pointless for St. Thomas to bring up Phoenix if he thought that this was a mythical bird. He must be thinking of it as a bird that may or may not be existing at this time, but the essence of which one is able to know in some way. An example that would be more palatable to our modern ears is the Dodo bird. I know the essence of the Dodo bird in someway, but this is separate from its existence.

At this point, it is important to see that St. Thomas argument only concludes with the force of a logical distinction. Just because I think of the essence of man and Phoenix (Dodo) separate from the existence of these things, does not mean that this is a real distinction in the things. How can I be sure that this is not some limitation that pertains to my human intellect? Why can I not just say that existence is self-determining?

St. Thomas sees that this argument only concludes about a logical distinction, and therefore he goes on saying,

“Unless, perhaps, there is some thing whose whatness is existence itself; and this thing can be only one and first, since it is impossible that there be made a plurification of something except by the addition of some difference, as the nature of the genus is multiplied in the species, or by the is that the form is received in diverse matters, as the nature of a species is multiplied in diverse individuals, or by this that one thing is absolute and another is received in something, just as if there were a separated heat, by its very separation it would be other than heat not separated.”[28]

He then goes on to point out that if such a being were posited which is subsisting esse, this esse would not be able to receive any difference, because then it would no longer be esse alone, but esse with some form. St. Thomas concludes, therefore, that there could be only one such a thing. It is necessary, therefore, that every other thing must have its esse as distinct from its essentia.

Now the argument concludes about things, and we are able to see the necessity for positing this distinction in things. It is only by resolving to one whose essentia and esse are the same, that we see with certainty that these must be distinct in things. This being said, this argument in no way requires that we see that such a being (namely one that is subsistent esse) exists. That requires further argument.

What follows from this judgment wherein we are able to separate essentia and esse is that this concept esse must necessarily be commune, for it is not being considered as the esse of any particular essentia, since its esse has been separated from the essentia. Such a separation, if it is to be properly made, means that the esse must be considered without any of the determinations proper to the essentia. The essentia is what gives the determination of this thing. Therefore without such a determination it is being considered generally, or commune.

We are therefore able to give an account of the text which seems to give most credence to the Gilsonian position, where St. Thomas says that essentia pertains to the first act of the intellect and esse to the second. That is, the first act of the intellect is said to pertain to essentia, because it abstracts the essentia from the thing. Esse pertains to the second act of the intellect, because we are not able to form the concept of esse as distinct from the essentia, until the second act of the intellect.

This brings to a point where we are able to see the superiority of this position over the Gilsonian position. According to Gilson, the second act of the intellect supplies esse to the essentia as cognized. If this were so, however, the esse could only be esse commune, because it is supplied by the second act of the intellect which separates esse from essentia. Thus the Gilsonian position is confronted with two difficulties. It seems they can either hold that there is a common act of esse for all things, or that esse is somehow formally determined by the essentia with which it is joined. The first option seems patently false. The second position is not as immediately able to be seen as wrong, but is clearly rejected by St. Thomas when he says that “Esse is the most formal of all things.”[29] For the essentia would have to determine the esse to be this act of esse.

Therefore we see that the first part of the thesis for this section has been shown, namely, that the concept of esse commune arises from a judgment in the second act of the intellect. The second half, namely that the esse of things must be present in the first act of the intellect has been argued for, if not demonstrated. This part of the thesis was argued by attempting to manifest certain inconsistencies and difficulties that arise when it is denied. The first difficulty that arises is that ens would seem to be in the mind in only an accidental way, and this would give us a precarious hold on reality. Second, the Gilsonian position seems to be assuming the distinction between essentia and esse, which, as was shown, involves a great deal of argumentation to resolve to such a distinction. Finally, we saw that Gilson and Wippel seem to have a challenge before them to explain how exactly the esse of the second act of the intellect, which was shown to be esse commune, is able to be joined to the essentia of a thing.

Conclusion

From the above we are able to discern another, prior principle of unity for the concept of ens commune. We do not have to just resolve to substance and the principle of unity, but we are now able to resolve to that which is the most formal principle of substances, and therefore of all entia: esse.

As St. Thomas says, and as was quoted above, esse is the most formal among all things. The argument for this is based on the idea of act. Form is first seen in relation to matter and is known by that which makes something to be such. This means that it determines matter. Determination, however, pertains to act, since that which is potency would not be in potency if it were already determined. Therefore, we can understand form as act. That, however, which is most act, is esse because it is what makes something to be. It therefore can be said to be most formal.

We are able to resolve to esse precisely because it is this most act. All things have existence through some act of esse and as was seen, when separated from essentia we have the idea of esse commune. Here we are able to think of act without any determination. We know that we can make such a separation, because there is a real distinction between essentia and esse in things. Therefore we are able to see the principle whereby substance is that to which all entia pertain, since esse must be had through or with reference to substance.

We see therefore, that further light is granted to some of the open ended question that were had about ens commune at the conclusion of the first section. We see that, while it seems to true to call ens commune an ens ratione with a foundation in things, nevertheless, its foundation in things is strongly rooted, in that it is based on that principle which is most act, esse. Therefore, it seems that we can have greater confidence in looking towards ens commune as the subject of metaphysics. If such ideas can be obtained with certainty, it is then, and only then, that we are able to begin a true science of metaphysics.


NOTES:

[1] Metaphysics 1059a21

[2] Physics

[3] Super De Trinitate Q. 5 a. 4

[4] The English word “being” is ambiguous in its usage. I will therefore use ens throughout this paper in order to signify an entity.

[5] Ref

[6] De Anima 430a 23

[7] Physics 267b 24-25

[8] Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1003b6-11

[9] Super De Trinitate Q.5 a3

[10] Metaphysics 1061a 30-36

[11] Ibid. emphasis added. Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab altero aliter et aliter secundum diversas operationes; quia secundum operationem, qua componit et dividit, distinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non inesse. In operatione vero qua intelligit, quid est unumquodque, distinguit unum ab alio, dum intelligit, quid est hoc, nihil intelligendo de alio, neque quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab eo separatum. Unde ista distinctio non proprie habet nomen separationis, sed prima tantum.

[12] De Veritate Q.1 a. 4 ad s.c. 8

[13] Acts 17:28 The Vulgate reads thus: ipsius enim et genus sumus.

[14] Metaphysics 1061a10

[15] Physics 219b1-2

[16] Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia. Cap. 1. Ens per se dupliciter dicitur: uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositionum veritatem.

[17] Ibid. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse.

[18] Aquinas, St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I Q.5, a.2, c. Ens primo cadit in conceptione intellectus.

[19] Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, Cap. 1. Horum autem differentia est quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat; per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationes entia dicuntur: dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi, et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re ponit; unde primo modo caecitas et huismodi non sunt entia.

[20] Boethius, De Hebdomadibus. http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/resources/boethius/De_hebdomadibus.txt

[21] Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia Cap. 3. substantiae quamvis sint formae tantum sine materia, non tamen in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actus purus, sed habent permixtionem potentiae. Et hoc sic patet. Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quiditatis, hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his, quae sunt partes essentiae, intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel Phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate.

[22] Cf. Isidore, Etymologies, XII. Also, Clement of Rome, First Epistle to the Corinthians, Ch. 25. There he speaks of Phoenix as a real bird when he says, “Let us consider that wonderful sign [of the resurrection] which takes place in Eastern lands, that is, in Arabia and the countries round about. There is a certain bird which is called a phœnix. This is the only one of its kind, and lives five hundred years. And when the time of its dissolution draws near that it must die, it builds itself a nest of frankincense, and myrrh, and other spices, into which, when the time is fulfilled, it enters and dies. But as the flesh decays a certain kind of worm is produced, which, being nourished by the juices of the dead bird, brings forth feathers. Then, when it has acquired strength, it takes up that nest in which are the bones of its parent, and bearing these it passes from the land of Arabia into Egypt, to the city called Heliopolis. And, in open day, flying in the sight of all men, it places them on the altar of the sun, and having done this, hastens back to its former abode. The priests then inspect the registers of the dates, and find that it has returned exactly as the five hundredth year was completed. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01.toc.html

[23] Kilma, Gyula. On Kenny on Aquinas on Being: A Critical Review of Aquinas on Being by Anthony Kenny. International Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 44, No. 4, Issue 176 (December 2004) p. 579.

[24] Aquinas, Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 3 q. 1 a. 1 c. Quaedam enim natura est de cujus intellectu non est suum esse, quod patet ex hoc quod intelligi potest cum hoc quod ignoretur an sit, sicut Phaenicem, vel eclipsim, vel aliquid huismodi.

[25] Aquinas, In De caelo, lib. 3 l. 8 n. 4. nihil autem prohibet individuum quod est unum tantum in una specie, generari et corrumpi, sicut de Phoenice dicunt.

[26] This is not to say that the argument would fail if it turns out that the phoenix were a bird of legend. Only that the example would.

[27] Aquinas. Super De Trinitate, Q. 5 a. 3 c. Cum enim unaquaeque res sit intelligibilis, secundum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX metaphysicae, oportet quod ipsa natura sive quiditas rei intelligatur: vel secundum quod est actus quidam, sicut accidit de ipsis formis et substantiis simplicibus, vel secundum id quod est actus eius, sicut substantiae compositae per suas formas, vel secundum id quod est ei loco actus, sicut materia prima per habitudinem ad formam et vacuum per privationem locati. Et hoc est illud, ex quo unaquaeque natura suam rationem sortitur.

[28] Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, Cap. 3. Nisi forte sit aliqua res, cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse; et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima, quia impossibile est, ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per additionem alicuius differentiae, sicut multiplicatur natura generis in species, vel per hoc quod forma recipitur in diversis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in diversis individuis, vel per hoc quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor separatus, esset alius a calore non separato ex ipsa sua separatione.

[29] Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputate De Anima, Q. 2, ad 17.