A few random reflections on EN I.

“Nevertheless, even in these circumstances the quality of fineness shines through, when someone bears repeated and great misfortunes calmly, not because he is insensitive to them but because he is a person of nobility and greatness of soul.” - EN, I.10, 1100b30-33

This passage reflects the difference between Stoicism and Aristotelian virtue ethics in a revealing way. The magnanimous man bears great misfortunes calmly not through insensitivity but on account of his excellence. This excellence, as Aristotle has already been discussing in Book I, c.8, consists primarily in those goods of the soul, and these activities bring about happiness. Thus, the excellent or virtuous soul is not insensitive because he is completed by his surroundings. In a way this is necessary and in a way not. It is necessary that a man have surroundings (perhaps the discussion of happiness and death is apropos here). However, the core of happiness is not principled by the “surroundings” of soul. Again, soul is the form of a living body. While it may not matter insofar as determining the virtues is concerned whether hylomorphism or Platonic dualism is right (for the same “ruling” structure will still result---and it is interesting that Cartesian substance dualism results in a different ruling structure and a different account of happiness), is will matter insofar as beatitudo is concerned, for happiness follows what a thing is by nature. So a Platonist can regard the body as a prison, while the Aristotelian must affirm the context and completion of happiness, the complete life, for life here is principled by soul, the form of the naturally organized body.

I don't have time to give a full description of how the talk went, but in short I was very happy with it. Below is the paper, a response from Dr. Robert Miner of Baylor, and my (outline) reply to him-- a reply which deals mostly which his proposed alternative solution to mine as proposed in the paper. One thing which Robert empathized after the Q&A was that his comments were more "pedagogical" in the sense that he was more concerned with helping me see that some aspects of the paper need changing if I were interested in reaching a broader audience. This suggestion is fair, as I am working primary in a Thomistic framework for the paper.

Short PECE 5000 paper ACPA
Rober Miner Commentary

My Miner Response

Below is part 2 of my thesis on double effect reasoning. In the fist part I just provide a basic review of the components of the moral act (of which ya'll are familiar): means, end, circumstance, object, intention, etc. This is a closer look at St. Thomas' understanding of "end," which is more complex than his understanding of some of the other parts of human action. Thanks for reading!

Andrew M. Lang MA Phil Thesis Part 2

Here is the link to the American Catholic Philosophical Association's 2009 conference, with the theme "Reasoning in Context." It looks like some good papers will be given. My paper, “Clarifying two Central Issues in Double Effect Reasoning Debates," which you have seen a version of on this blog, will be given Saturday evening. Thanks for all the input and support fellow blogoi!

Here's the abstract: "The principles whereby the reason operates in ethically complicated situations has been subject to long-standing debates in Catholic Philosophy. A classic text which exemplifies this is Aquinas' consideration of self-defensive killing. In this paper I clarify two central issues in double-effect reasoning debates surrounding this text. Both issues are connected to the seemingly simple but actually complex task of accounting for the 'chosen means' of self-defense. The first issue is whether the 'chosen means' are also able to be considered a 'proximate end,' to which the intention is directed. The second is determining whether the assailant's death is related to the 'chosen means' per se and therefore to the rest of the moral action. Resolving these issues provide grounds for answering the broader question implicit in the situation of self-defensive killing: what is to be done when human actions would inevitably entail that some evil is instrumentally tied to realizing some good?"

We join Catholic bloggers in this joint statement.

November 14, 2008

President-elect Barack Obama,

As American Catholics, we, the undersigned, would like to reiterate the congratulations given to you by Pope Benedict XVI. We will be praying for you as you undertake the office of President of the United States.

Wishing you much good will, we hope we will be able to work with you, your administration, and our fellow citizens to move beyond the gridlock which has often harmed our great nation in recent years. Too often, partisan politics has hampered our response to disaster and misfortune. As a result of this, many Americans have become resentful, blaming others for what happens instead of realizing our own responsibilities. We face serious problems as a people, and if we hope to overcome the crises we face in today’s world, we should make a serious effort to set aside the bitterness in our hearts, to listen to one another, and to work with one another

One of the praiseworthy elements of your campaign has been the call to end such partisanship. You have stated a desire to engage others in dialogue. With you, we believe that real achievement comes not through the defamation of one’s opponents, nor by amassing power and using it merely as a tool for one’s own individual will. We also believe dialogue is essential. We too wish to appeal to the better nature of the nation. We want to encourage people to work together for the common good. Such action can and will engender trust. It may change the hearts of many, and it might alter the path of our nation, shifting to a road leading to a better America. We hope this theme of your campaign is realized in the years ahead.

One of the critical issues which currently divides our nation is abortion. As you have said, no one is for abortion, and you would agree to limit late-term abortions as long as any bill which comes your way allows for exceptions to those limits, such as when the health of the mother is in jeopardy. You have also said you would like to work on those social issues which cause women to feel as if they have a need for an abortion, so as to reduce the actual number of abortions being performed in the United States.

Indeed, you said in your third presidential debate, “But there surely is some common ground when both those who believe in choice and those who are opposed to abortion can come together and say, ‘We should try to prevent unintended pregnancies by providing appropriate education to our youth, communicating that sexuality is sacred and that they should not be engaged in cavalier activity, and providing options for adoption, and helping single mothers if they want to choose to keep the baby.’”

As men and women who oppose abortion and embrace a pro-life ethic, we want to commend your willingness to engage us in dialogue, and we ask that you live up to your promise, and engage us on this issue.

There is much we can do together. There is much that we can do to help women who find themselves in difficult situations so they will not see abortion as their only option. There is much which we can do to help eliminate those unwanted pregnancies which lead to abortion.

One of your campaign promises is of grave concern to many pro-life citizens. On January 22, 2008, the 35th anniversary of Roe v. Wade, when speaking of the current right of women in America to have abortions, you said, “And I will continue to defend this right by passing the Freedom of Choice Act as president.”

The Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA) might well undermine your engagement of pro-life Americans on the question of abortion. It might hamper any effort on your part to work with us to limit late-term abortions. We believe FOCA does more than allow for choice. It may force the choice of a woman upon others, and make them morally complicit in such choice. One concern is that it would force doctors and hospitals which would otherwise choose not to perform abortions to do so, even if it went against their sacred beliefs. Such a law would undermine choice, and might begin the process by which abortion is enforced as a preferred option, instead of being one possible choice for a doctor to practice.

It is because of such concern we write. We urge you to engage us, and to dialogue with us, and to do so before you consider signing this legislation. Let us reason together and search out the implications of FOCA. Let us carefully review it and search for contradictions of those positions which we hold in common.
If FOCA can be postponed for the present, and serious dialogue begun with us, as well as with those who disagree with us, you will demonstrate that your administration will indeed be one that rises above partisanship, and will be one of change. This might well be the first step toward resolving an issue which tears at the fabric of our churches, our political process, our families, our very society, and that causes so much hardship and heartache in pregnant women.

Likewise, you have also recently stated you might over-ride some of President G.W. Bush’s executive orders. This is also a concern to us. We believe doing so without having a dialogue with the American people would undermine the political environment you would like to establish. Among those issues which concern us are those which would use taxpayer money to support actions we find to be morally questionable, such as embryonic stem cell research, or to fund international organizations that would counsel women to have an abortion (this would make abortion to be more than a mere choice, but an encouraged activity).

Consider, sir, your general promise to the American people and set aside particular promises to a part of your constituency. This would indicate that you plan to reject politics as usual. This would indeed be a change we need.

Sincerely,

Deal W. Hudson
Christopher Blosser
Marjorie Campbell
Mark J. Coughlan
Rev. James A. Nowack
Craig D. Baker
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Cross-posted at:
DealWHudson (Theocon)
Inside Catholic
The Hopeful Populist
Catholic Anarchy
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Against the Grain
Defending My Bean Field
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Overheard in the Sacristy
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This Old Church: Behind Enemy Lines
Catholic Mountain
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When considering the dignity of man, or specifically, the dignity of the human person, it is important to understand that such a notion is not a first principle and that this dignity must arise from what it is to be a human person. If this is not done, then the phrase loses all meaning and relevancy, and becomes like an anchorless boat in the harbor, carried on the tide of human emotion and opinion now drifting towards the rocks of error, now towards the open ocean of meaninglessness. Rather, it is important to anchor this concept to a true principle and thereby give it both meaning and relevancy. I propose as that necessary first principle, the definition of a person as manifested by, first Boethius¹ and then St. Thomas Aquinas², namely, “an individual substance of a rational nature.”³ Taking this as my true principle I then propose that the source of the dignity of the human person arises not from our being an individual substance, but from our rational nature.

The very word, dignity, is itself somewhat ambiguous as to its meaning, and it must first be tied down in order to guide this consideration. In light of the thesis of this paper I do not mean to find some very determinate account of dignity, but rather something general that will fit its uses today. The word is derived from the Latin dignitatis, which is translated as worthiness. This is not far beyond what the word means today for it seems that when we speak of the dignity of some one or some thing, we intend to say that it is worthy of some respect and/or honor because of its character or quality. For example, we rebuke a man for having lost his dignity on account of doing something shameful, such as flinging himself at some woman after she has already poorly used him several times before. We say this because we see that he is not acting in a way worthy of a man, but is being compelled by some weakness within himself. The definition of dignity, then, as worthiness of some respect and/or honor, seems to be sufficient.

It is therefore true that dignity must arise from what is most noble in a thing, for we do not respect or honor something because of what is base in it, but because we see what is most excellent in it. For example, we do not give honor to war hero because he has appetites, but rather because he has shown an excellence in virtue, specifically in courage. The dignity of a human person therefore, must arise from what is most noble in the human person. That a man's rational nature is the most dignified part of his person is clear from the following argument: First, as manifested by Aristotle in De Anima, the rational nature of man arises from his intellect, which is immaterial. What is immaterial is more excellent than what is material because it is not parted, it therefore has no principle of corruption, and is therefore incorruptible. The intellect, therefore, is the most noble part of a man. But his intellect is that by which man is said to have a rational nature. His rational nature is therefore most worthy of respect and honor, and is therefore the source of his dignity.

That man's dignity does not arise from his individuality is clear first of all by considering that if this were true in man, then it seems that there is no reason it would not be true universally. Therefore, any individual substance would have dignity. Therefore a man and a stone would both have dignity, based on individuality, but this is manifestly absurd, for no one speaks of the dignity of a stone.

Even if it is objected that the individuality of man might more properly arise from a higher principle, such as God willing and loving the individual, this does not suffice as an account for man's dignity. For, according to natural reason we can understand God's willing and loving the individual in so far as God is the agent cause of being.⁴ Here again we see that there is no essential difference, with reference to being alone, between the man and the stone. If then, we bring in the idea that man is more of an individual than the stone on account of his rational nature, then it must be asked why would one take rationality together with individuality, if rationality is sufficient.

Further, if one holds that God loving and willing the individual man is not as agent cause of being, but rather as redeemer of this individual, then he departs from the realm of philosophy. For, man does not relate to God as redeemer according to the order of nature, but according to the order of grace and inasmuch as he is a child of God. This, then, misses the purpose of the inquiry and fails to give an account of man's dignity from his nature.⁵

Finally, it seems that the most common argument for the dignity of the human person arising from his individuality is as follows: each human person is one of a kind and therefore rare. Things that are rare are valuable, and have worth. Therefore, each person, on account of his individuality and rarity has dignity. This argument, however, fails to consider that just because something is rare does not mean that it is good. There was only one Hitler, and it seems to be good that there is only one and we would not consider it a loss to not have more. Rather, if something rare is to be valuable, it must also have something good and excellent that arises from its nature that makes that thing desirable. This is not to deny that rarity is a principle of value, but it must presume that the rare thing is good.

It is therefore clear that man's dignity arises from his rational nature and that individuality in no way causes his dignity.

____________________
1. De Persona et Duabus Naturis Contra Eutychen et Nestorium , 4
2. I, Q.29, a.1,2
3. It is not my intent to defend this principle here, but rather take it as my starting point. The two great minds above have sufficiently shown this definition to be true.
4. For, insofar as God wills something he brings it into act. To will any other being is to cause its being and since being and good are the same in re, it follows that being as being is lovable.
5. This is not to say that an argument from theological principles cannot be made. Only, it is not my purpose here to make such an argument.

...from common ways of speaking about forgiveness immediately suggest themselves:

1. Forgiveness is the remission of a due punishment. For example, if someone intentionally breaks his neighbor’s window, we might say that the neighbor fogives the window-breaker if he doesn’t seek to punish him.


2. Forgiveness is the remission of not only due punishment, but also due satisfaction. In the example, the neighbor doesn’t seek to punish the window-breaker, nor does he even require that he pay for a new window.


3. Forgiveness is not taking into account the offense in all future dealings with the offender. This case includes 1 and 2. For example, the window-breaker suffers no consequences from the neighbor: no punishment, no restitution, no being reminded of the incident when the neighbor needs a favor (like being forgiven himself), etc. In short, all the interactions between neighbors happen as if the incident never happened.


4. Forgiveness is forgetting of the offense. But if the forgetting is unwilling, we wouldn’t say that the neighbor has forgiven the offender, just that he has a bad memory. And one can’t forget willingly, unless perhaps he willingly acquired 3) as a habit with the intention of forgetting the incident. But, in that case, the forgiving would just be 3) and the forgetting would be accidental. So it is more likely that “to forgive and forget” refers to not considering the offense.

All of the above formulations focus on the forgiver’s disposition toward the forgiven. There are a few other possibilities that focus on the effect of the forgiven:

5. Forgiveness is the removal of a guilty feeling in the offender.


6. Forgiveness is the restoration of proper charity in the offender toward the offended, which lack caused the offense.

So, it seems a big question is whether forgiveness is said more of the forgiver or of the forgiven.
____________________

It’s been a recurring problem that I don’t have a precise concept of forgiveness. First, I’ll try to lay out a few ground rules about the method for finding a definition.

I will attempt to understand a precise definition using the three sources of philosophy¹:

1. common conceptions, manifested by the way we speak. These will not only be a pre-philosophical source of the precise conception sought, but also the measure of whatever conclusion is reached.
   


2. reason, which can first of all abstract the common conceptions, then can proceed from them, which are more known to us, to a precise conception, which is more knowable by nature.
   


3. prior thinkers, who have taught us not only by their true insights, but even more so by their mistakes.
   

To these three, I’ll throw in another element: Revelation, as guarded by the Magisterium, and explained by the Doctors of the Church. Although this will, hopefully, be a philosophical inquiry, not theological, I think knowledge of God’s forgiveness is rather limited to the philosopher. Revelation, therefore, will provide a welcome check against the universality of the definition, especially considering the impact such a definition will have on the interpretation of Scripture.

Following Aristotle's requirements for a definition, I will seek a universal definition of forgiveness, i.e. one that applies per se to every species of forgiveness, because it contains the middle term, or cause of a demonstrative conclusion. In this way, the definition can explain all the effects and consequences of forgiveness (or at least "facilitate even a conjecture about them"²).
____________________
1. Taken from Charles De Koninck, Three Sources of Philosophy, 1964 Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
2. De Anima, Bk. I, Ch. 1