For anyone interested in philosophy of science, here's a paper on how to classify Galileo's science of local motion according to the principles of St. Thomas laid out in his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate.

Discovering why St. Luke spends so much time describing the Nativity, when according to St. Thomas his main purpose is extolling the priesthood of Christ, involves looking at the details of the Evangelist's account:

1. St. Luke begins by noting the occasion of Mary and Joseph's journey to Bethlehem: a world-wide census. Why record this detail? The Tradition tells us that the enrollment is a figure of Christ enrolling the whole company of the elect in the Book of Life at the Last Judgment.

   GREGORY: But the registering of the whole world when our Lord was about to be born was mystical; for He appeared in the flesh Who should write down the names of His own elect in eternity.

   AMBROSE: There is described a secular registration, implied a spiritual, to be laid before the King not of earth but of Heaven; a registering of faith: a census of souls. For the old census of the Synagogue was abolished, a new census of the Church was preparing. And to decide that the census was not of Augustus, but of Christ, the whole world is ordered to be registered. For who could demand the registration of the whole world but He who had dominion over it, for the earth is not of Augustus, but the earth is the Lord's?

   ORIGEN: To those who attentively consider it, there seems to be expressed a kind of sacrament, in its being necessary that Christ should be put down in the registration of the whole world; in order that His name being written with all, He might sanctify all, and being placed in the census with the whole world, He might impart to the world the communion of Himself.

   AMBROSE: This was then the first public enrollment of souls to the Lord, to Whom all enroll themselves not at the voice of the crier, but of the Prophet, who says, O clap your hands, all you people.

   ...to cite a few authorities. It is fitting that St. Luke should include this detail , as it is pre-eminently the role of Christ the High Priest to offer redemption to the world and salvation to the elect.


2. Our Lord is conceived in Nazareth, but St. Luke notes that he is born in Bethlehem. This name, which means "House of Bread," has a mystical significance:

   THEOPHYLUS: He condescended to become incarnate at that time, that after His birth He might be enrolled in Caesar's taxing, and in order to bring liberty to us might Himself become subject to slavery. It was well also that our Lord was born at Bethlehem, not only as a mark of the royal crown, but on account of the sacrament of the name.

   GREGORY: Bethlehem is by interpretation the house of bread. For it is the Lord Himself who says, I am the bread of life which came down from heaven. The place therefore where the Lord was born was before called the house of bread, because it was there that He was to appear in His fleshly nature who should refresh the souls of the elect with spiritual fullness.

   Christ's birth in the House of Bread can be taken as a foreshadowing of the Blessed Sacrament, or as a figure of the redemptive nourishment Christ provides to his elect. Either way, this detail is intimately connected with his priesthood.


3. St. Luke goes on to describe Christ's birth, noting his rest in a manger. The detail also has a priestly significance:

   THEOPHYLUS: He is confined in the narrow space of a rude manger, whose seat is the heavens, that He may give us ample room in the joys of His heavenly kingdom. He Who is the bread of Angels is laid down in a manger, that He might feast us, as it were the sacred animals, with the bread of His flesh.

   CYRIL: He finds man in his corrupt affections become like the beasts that perish, and therefore He is laid in the manger, in the place of food, that we changing the life of beasts, might be brought to the knowledge that befits man, partaking not of hay, but of the heavenly bread, the life-giving body.

   Once again, Luke's description of our Lord's birth is ordered toward demonstrating his role as High Priest and Redeemer.


4. Next, we have the angel's message to the shepherds: "Fear not; for, behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy that shall be to all the people: For, this day is born to you a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord, in the city of David." Compare this announcement of Christ's birth, in which he is referred to as "Saviour" with that of the Magi, who declare him "King."


5. Finally, the heavenly army's Gloria testifies to the saving power of Christ's Priesthood. For they not only praise God, singing, "Glory to God in the highest," but also add, "and on earth peace to men of good will." Why should the angels include the peace of men in their song of joy at Christ's birth? Once again, the Fathers interpret:

   GREGORY: At the same time they also give praises because their voices of gladness accord well with our redemption, and while they behold our acceptance, they rejoice also that their number is completed.

   THEOPHYLUS: They wish also peace to men, as they add, On earth peace to men, because those whom they had before despised as weak and abject, now that our Lord has come in the flesh they esteem as friends.

   CYRIL: This peace has been made through Christ, for He has reconciled us by Himself to God and our Father, having taken away our guilt, which was the ground of offense also. He has united two nations in one man, and has joined the heavenly and the earthly in one flock.

   THEOPHYLUS: For whom they ask peace is explained in the words, Of good will. For them, namely, who receive the new born Christ. For there is no peace to the ungodly, but much peace to them that love the name of God.

   ORIGEN: But the attentive reader will ask, How then does the Savior say, I came not to send peace on the earth, whereas now the Angels' song of His birth is, On earth peace to men? It is answered, that peace is said to be to men of goodwill. For the peace which the Lord does not give on the earth is not the peace of good will.

   AUGUSTINE: For righteousness belongs to good will.

   CHRYSOSTOM: Behold the wonderful fill working of God. He first brings Angels down to men, and then brings men up to heaven. The heaven became earth, when it was about to receive earthly things.

   ORIGEN: But in a mystery, the Angels saw that they could not accomplish the work committed to them without Him Who was truly able to save, and that their healing fell short of what the care of men required. And so it was as if there should come one who had great knowledge in medicine, and those who before were unable to heal, acknowledging now the hand of a master, grudge not to see the corruptions of wounds ceasing, but break forth into the praises of the Physician, and of that God who sent to them and to the sick a man of such knowledge; the multitudes of the Angels praised God for the coming of Christ.

The Church Fathers¹ have given me at least plausible answers to my question: it's time to move on with the commentary.
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1. via the Catena Aurea

The account of the Magi in the Gospel according to Matthew is given as a manifestation of the Incarnation, not only as a figure of the universal redemption of Christ the High Priest.¹

In fact, of the senses of Scripture, the interpretation of the Magi as manifestation of the Incarnation seems to be the more literal one. Therefore, since the literal sense is the foundation of all other senses and is the primary intention of the human author, it makes sense for St. Matthew, focusing on the Incarnation, to discuss the Magi at length.

But why does St. Luke, primarily interested in Christ as Priest, detail the Nativity? To be continued...
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1. At least, according to St. Thomas' interpretation.

Another comparison of the Gospels according to Matthew and Luke makes one question St. Thomas' distinction between the two. For, as has been said, St. Thomas claims that, "Matthew takes up describing the carnal generation of Christ...Luke, however, chiefly intends to commend in Christ the priestly character."¹ Why, then, does St. Luke present a more detailed exposition of the Nativity of Christ, while St. Matthew emphasizes more the Adoration of the Magi? It would seem that the Evangelist wanting to describe the Incarnation would spend more time talking about the Nativity, and the one focusing on Christ the High Priest - who reconciled the world to God² - would highlight the gentile kings coming from afar to worship the Infant King.

To be continued...
(meaning: I don't have an answer yet)
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1. Super Evangelium Matthaei, Ch. 1, lect.2
2. ST, III, Q.22, a.1, c.

The Institution of the Eucharist - Joos van Wassenhove (active c.1460-80)

Sequence for the Octave of Corpus Christi

Lauda Sion Salvatorem; lauda ducem et pastorem in hymnis et canticis Quantum potes, tantum aude quia major omni laude, nec laudare sufficis. Laudis thema specialis Panis vivus et vitalis, hodie proponitur. Quem in sacrae mensa cenae turbae fratrum duodenae, datum non ambigitur. Sit laus plena, sit sonora, sit jucunda, sit decora, mentis jubilatio Dies enim solemnis agitur, in qua mensae prima recolitur hujus institutio. In hac mensa novi Regis, novum Pascha, novae legis, phase vetus terminat. Vetustatem novitas umbram fugat veritas, noctem lux eliminat. Quod in cena Christus gessit, faciendum hoc expressit in sui memoriam. Docti sacris institutis, panem vinum in salutis, consecramus hostiam. Dogma datur Christianis, quod in carnem transit panis et vinum in sanguinem. Quod non capis, quod non vides animosa firmat fides, praeter rerum ordinem. Sub diversis speciebus signis tantum et non rebus latent res eximiae Caro cibus, sanguis potus manet tamen Christus totus Sub utraque specie. Asumente non concisus, non confractus, non divisus: integer accipitur Sumit unus, sumunt mile: quantum isti, tantum ille: nec sumptus consumitur Sumunt boni, sumunt mali: sorte tamen inequali, vitae vel interitus. Mors est malis, vita bonis: vide panis sumptionis quam sit dispar exitus. Fracto demum sacramento, ne vaciles, sed memento, tantum esse sub fragmento, quantum toto tegitur. Nulla rei fit scissura: signi tantum fit fractura, qua nec status, nec statura signati minuitur. Ecce panis Angelorum, factus cibus viatorum: vere panis filiorum, non mittendum canibus. In figuris praesignatur cum Isaac immolatur: Agnus Paschae deputatur: datur manna patribus. Bone pastor, panis vere, Jesu, nostri miserere: Tu nos pasce, nos tuere: tu nos bona fac videre in terra viventium. Tu qui cuncta scis et vales: qui nos pascis hic mortales: tuos ibi commensales, coheredes et sodales, fac sanctorum civium. Amen. Alleluia.

Praise thou, Sion, praise thy Saviour! Praise thy Prince with all thy fervour! Anthems to thy Shepherd sing. All thou canst, do thou endeavour, Yet thy praise can equal never Such as merits thy great King. Duty this today thou'rt owing, Bread the living, life-bestowing, Full to honour with Thy praise. Same the bread that Christ in leaving To the twelve, each one receiving, Gave, no one doubt can raise. Let thy praise be loud and swelling, Be it joyous, loud and welling From a full, exulting heart. Mem'ry of that feast we render, Keeping rites in solemn splendour, When Christ did first Himself impart. This new Feast, the old repeating, Newer King and Pasch revealing, Usher in a newer rite. What is new to age succeedeth: Place to Truth the shadow cedeth; Radiance puts the gloom to flight. What He did, that eve reclining, Done anew He willed, assigning This a token of His love By His sacred precepts guided, Make we bread and wine provided, A saving victim from above. Christian truth uncontroverted Is that bread and wine converted Sacred flesh and blood become. Mind and eye whilst unperceiving What's beyond their own conceiving Strenuous faith to them brings home. Hidden under varied species, Signs, not things, the untold riches, Choice and rare beyond conceit. Flesh and Blood our life sustaining, Christ intact in both remaining, 'Neath each sign we greet. Christ, to whomsoever given, By Him is neither rent nor riven Each unparted Christ receives. Come there one, come there many, Each partakes as much as any, Nor the less for other leaves. Good and bad this banquet sharing Are an unlike lot preparing, Life or death to either falls. Life to those, to these perdition, Though to both the same fruition, How unlike the fate that calls. When the host in pieces breakest, If thou waver, thou mistakest, For each fragment thou partkest Holds no less than does the whole Of the substance no division, Signs alone admit partition, Whence unlessened the condition Of the symboled Body and Soul. Lo ! angelic bread reviving Pilgrims worn to heaven striving, Children from it strength deriving, Sacred bread to dogs denied. This the ancient types saluted, Isaac victim constituted, And the lamb for pasch deputed, Manna to our sins supplied. Jesu, bread of life, protect us! Shepherd kind, do not reject us! In Thy happy fold collect us, And partakers of the bliss elect us Which shall never see an end. Thou the wisest and the mightiest, Who us here with food delightest, Seat us at Thy banquet brightest, With the blessed Thou invitest, An eternal feast to spend. Amen. Alleluia.

If St. Matthew is principally concerned with describing Christ's generation according to the flesh (as has been said), why does he record our Lord's genealogy through Joseph and not through Mary?

First, it is important to realize that Christ's carnal descent (at least insofar as he is of David's line, thus fulfilling the prophecies¹) can be inferred even from Joseph's ancestry. This is because it was a custom among the Jews to marry into the same tribe and family.² That Mary, as well as Joseph, was of the house of David, can be seen from the fact that they both return to the city of David when ordered to return to their own cities for enrollment.³ Therefore, giving Joseph's genealogy is sufficient to show that Jesus was biologically of the House of David.

But why not just give Mary's genealogy? Here, St. Matthew demonstrates in a more subtle way how God "humbled himself to share in our humanity."⁴ For it was a custom among the Jews, in fact, a custom among most cultures, to trace genealogies through the father. The Holy Spirit inspired St. Matthew to follow this custom in order to show Christ's assumption of the whole human condition. Given that our Lord's carnal generation through Mary and her Davidic line could also be shown at the same time, by respecting the human custom of patriarchal genealogy the condescension of the Incarnation is all the more emphasized.
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1. See, for example, II Kings 7:12, 1 Chr. 17:11, Ps. 131:11, Jer. 23:5
2. c.f. Num 36:6-10
3. Luke 2:1-5
4. Roman Mass, Offertory Prayer

There is no shortage of non-believers who blaspheme Holy Scripture by citing its numerous "errors and contradictions". A common complaint concerns the supposed contradictions in the genealogies of Christ presented in the Gospels according the Matthew and Luke.¹
Worse than the incredibly bad logic of atheists, however, is the attempt of some nominally Catholic scholars to impute error to Holy Writ.² This is, of course, against the Church's teachings, who holds the inerrancy of Scripture³ and the historicity of the Gospels⁴.

St. Thomas, in his Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, points out differences in the genealogies much more clearly than the heretics. Such discrepancies are not only not troubling to the Catholic scholar, they are helpful in understanding the texts. He groups the differences into five categories:

1. 1) Difference in Position: St. Matthew starts out his Gospel with our Lord's genealogy, but St. Luke waits until Ch. 3, after the baptism in the Jordon. As St. Augustine says, this difference is due to the different intentions of the Evangelists. The whole of the Gospel according to Matthew is principally concerned with describing the generation of Christ according to the flesh. Hence it is entitled "the book of the generation of Jesus Christ". Therefore it is fitting that it begins with the genealogy. The Gospel according to Luke, however, is principally concerned with the priestly character of Christ, that is, with Christ's expiation of sins. Therefore, it begins with Zachary performing his priestly functions in the temple. It is fitting, then, that St. Luke place the genealogy after our Lord's baptism, which is the means by which sins are removed.


2. 2) Difference in Order: St. Matthew begins with Abraham and descends down through the generations to Christ. St. Luke, on the other hand, begins with Christ and ascends through Adam to God. This is due to the different purposes of the aforementioned offices of Christ, Son of Man and High Priest. "He who was the Son of God became the Son of man, that man, having been taken into the Word, and receiving the adoption, might become the son of God."⁵ St. Matthew emphasizes the former part of that process, St. Luke the latter. Therefore, it is fitting that St. Matthew proceeds by descent, St. Luke by ascent.


3. 3) Difference in Manner: St. Matthew connects adjoining generations with the verb "begot", while St. Luke uses the phrase "was of". Because the descending generations recorded by Matthew are begotten, Matthew has recorded the physical, carnal ancestors of Christ. The ascending ancestors of Christ recorded by St. Luke, on the other hand, simply belong to subsequent generations. This formulation allows Luke to record legal parents, according to either of two Jewish customs: the brother of a widow without children must marry the widow⁶, so that the legal father (the deceased) may not be the biological father; the parents of a woman without male siblings would sometimes adopt her husband⁷, so that his legal ancestors (the wife's biological ancestors) may not be his biological ancestors.


4. 4) Difference in End: Matthew begins with Abraham and descends down to Christ. Luke starts with Christ and ascends, not only to Abraham, but all the way to Adam and to God. This has to do with their respective audiences: St. Matthew is writing to Hebrews, to whom Abraham is more known than Christ; but St. Luke writes to Greeks, who only know of Abraham by hearing of Christ. And so Matthew introduces Christ to the Hebrews through Abraham, while Luke introduces Abraham and Abraham's God to the Greeks through the man Christ.


5. 5) Difference in Persons Enumerated: St. Thomas has already explained the simple difference in names by distinguishing between legal and biological parents. Here, he points out that Matthew includes women in the genealogy, but Luke does not. Particularly, the women St. Matthew includes are all known sinners: Thamar was a fornicator⁸, Ruth was a idolater (because she was a Gentile)⁹, and Bathseeba was an adulteress¹⁰. This could be to show that Christ descended through sinful man, in the form of a sinner (although without sin), to redeem sinners.

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1. c.f. Forgery in Christianity (about 3/4 of the way down the page), and Bible Perspectives and Christian Contradictions to cite a couple. -WARNING: these sites present blasphemous and ridiculously incorrect readings of Scripture.-
2. For example, Fr. Raymond E. Brown, The Birth of the Messiah (pp. 93-94). -WARNING: Fr. Brown was not an orthodox scripture scholar.-
3. Pope Leo XIII, Providentissimus Deus, 21
4. Vatican Council II, Dei Verbum, 19
5. St. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, Bk III, Ch 19:1
6. Deut 25:5-6
7. c.f. 1 Chron 2:34
8. Gen. 38:24
9. c.f. Ruth 1
10. II Kings 11

I've started working on St. Thomas' Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. You can check out the outline based on his commentary here, even while it is a work in progress. (The outline will be in Latin until I complete it, then I will translate it.)
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I've posted an outline of the Scriptures based on St. Thomas' Principium Biblicum. I have been unable to find an english translation of the work, so maybe I will post my own soon. Certainly I will begin to comment on the outline.

UPDATE: I've posted my translation of the work.
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From St. Thomas’ treatment of God’s goodness, we know:

1. that the account of goodness from created things belongs also to God;
2. that the account of goodness is not said in the same way of created and uncreated things; and
3. that the way in which God is good exceeds the way in which anything we can experience directly is good.¹

Far from destroying the mystery of God, this knowledge intensifies it by pointing out that God’s goodness exceeds any goodness we can directly know in created things. Thus the believer’s possible objection against pursuing formal theology because it infringes upon the ineffability of God is proven blasphemous. For if this opposition were true, God must be such that we are capable of comprehending Him and His attributes. Theology, on the contrary, proves this impious notion false by demonstrating that the attributes of creatures bear an analogous similarity to the attributes of God, which cannot by fully understood by our intellects. The security of God’s transcendence is not a question of the amount of knowledge possible, as if more knowledge would encroach His mystery; the limitation of theology, rather, comes from the kind of knowledge that is possible of God in this life. Therefore, we should never fear that theology, however formal, precise and thorough, will lead to a smug satisfaction in having comprehended God. Instead, we should strive to know as much as we can about the Highest Subject and stand in awe at the mystery uncovered.

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1. c.f. S.T., 1, q.XII, a.12

These three aspects of knowledge by analogy are present in St. Thomas’ treatment of God’s goodness. St. Thomas prefaces the discussion with a treatment of goodness in general.¹ The notion of goodness as being insofar as it is appetible must be abstracted from creatures. This treatment is necessary to clarify the meaning of goodness before St. Thomas asks whether goodness belongs to God. That he does clarify goodness from the standpoint of knowledge from creatures, moreover, shows that goodness attributed to God falls under the same general notion of appetible being. This account of goodness is as suitably applied to God as to creatures. Therefore, if we show that God is good, this is not a meaningless phrase, nor a pure equivocation, but actually provides some positive knowledge of God, because both uses of “good” stem from a common principle: being as desired.

St. Thomas proves that goodness belongs to God by comparing effects to their cause. Every thing desires its own perfection. But the perfection of an effect is participation in its cause, since agents make things like themselves. Therefore, the perfection of every agent is desirable by the effect. But God was shown to be the agent cause of all beings.² Therefore, God is appetible, and goodness, as understood in the general account, belongs to Him.

If the same notion of goodness is applied to God as to creatures, how can we understand that this analogy is not identity, that is, that created goodness is not the same as uncreated goodness? The answer lies in the formulation of goodness, desirable being. For since God is not in a genus with any creature,³ being is said equivocally of uncreated and created being. Therefore, although the formulation of goodness is the same in either case, it is applied equivocally to God and creatures. “Good,” however, like “healthy,” is not used purely equivocally, for there is a common principle for using the same word of God and creatures, namely the formulation of goodness explained in Question 5.

Since there is a common principle of using “good,” we can have positive knowledge that God is good. Yet, since this principle is based on a likeness of cause and effect, not an identity, St. Thomas is justified in saying that, “we are not able to consider about God how He is, but rather how He is not.”⁴ For after explaining that the account of goodness we know from created things applies to God in Article I, St. Thomas spends the rest of Question VI explaining that God’s goodness exceeds any creature’s goodness. First, St. Thomas sets the goodness of God apart from all other goods by declaring that God is the highest good.⁵ God was proven to be good by being an agent cause, which necessarily has the perfections of its effects. But God is also not in a genus with created things. Therefore, God is an equivocal cause, so that He has the desirable perfections of His creation in a more excellent way than created things have them. Although the same account of goodness applies to God as to creatures, whatever way a creature is good by having a desirable perfection, God is good in a higher sense by having the same perfection in a more excellent way. Furthermore, St. Thomas goes on to point out that only God has goodness by His essence.⁶ Since His essence is incomprehensible to finite intellects, certainly His goodness is likewise unable to be grasped in itself. He then shows that created goodness emanates from God but is not simply a formal sharing in the one goodness of God,⁷ further clarifying that likeness is not identity. Although God’s goodness is not an entirely empty notion to us because of the similarity to created goodness, the entire treatment has done more to show how created goodness and God’s goodness differ than how they are similar.

The order among analogous uses of a word helps explain the compatibility of knowledge and mystery. St. Thomas has demonstrated that God is good through the similarity of cause and effect. Therefore, since goodness is in God as in a cause, “good” is said primarily of God and secondarily of creatures. But since we came to the general account of goodness through creatures, goodness of creatures is more known to us. In fact, since we have no direct experience of the creator, God’s goodness is not known directly at all. There is no phantasm of God, so the intellect has no object from which to abstract a direct concept of Him. We can know the existence of prime matter through analogy without being able to comprehend it; similarly, we can know some attributes of God without being able to comprehend their full meaning. In both cases there is true knowledge. It is only denied that we can have essential knowledge: not of prime matter because it lacks intelligibility, and not of God because His intelligibility exceeds our way of knowing.

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1. c.f. S.T., 1, q.V
2. c.f. S.T., 1, q.II, a.3
3. c.f. S.T., 1, q.III, a.5
4. S.T., 1, q.III, praemium
5. c.f. S.T., 1, q.VI, a.2
6. ibid., a.3
7. ibid., a.4

There are three things to note about knowledge by analogy in general before discussing knowledge of God by analogy to creatures. First, an analogy is a means to real knowledge of a thing. In every analogy something is known by comparison to something else to which it has a similarity. Since they have a real similarity, what is being said about them is not a pure equivocation. Unlike “bark of a tree” and “bark of a dog,” which are merely the same sounds used to signify different ideas, terms used analogously can be reduced to one principle. For example, we say “healthy” of a fit man, a nourishing steak, and a robust complexion. This is not simply the use of the same sound to signify completely different ideas - there is one reason for using “healthy” in all cases, that it signifies some relation to well-being. Therefore, calling a piece of dead meat healthy is actually informative in light of the already known healthiness of a man.

Second, an analogy is not identity. However real the similarity may be between significations, they still are not the same significations. The “healthy” said of man is not the same as the one said of steak or of color. Although there is one principle of all uses of the word, the relation to well-being, each case employs a different relation. The man is healthy, because he has health formally in him; the steak is healthy because it has the power to be a material and agent cause of well-being in something else; complexion is healthy because it is an effect of well-being. Thus, the analogous uses of a word are neither purely equivocal nor purely univocal.

Third, there may be an order among analogous senses of a word. Since formal well-being is the final cause toward which healthy agents and matter are ordered, and since a healthy complexion is an accidental consequence of a healthy man, “healthy” is primarily applied to a man. Nevertheless, a derivative use may be more known to us than a more primary use. For example, we use a healthy complexion as a sign of a healthy man because it is more obvious to us. This order of intelligibility, according to nature or according to us, is especially clear in those cases in which we can know fully one use of a word but not another. For example, we know prime matter by an analogy with the matter of an artifact:

The underlying nature, however, is understandable according to analogy. For as bronze is to statue or as timber is to bed or as matter and the formless before it takes on form is to whatever else has form, so is this underlying nature to substance and “this something” and a being.¹

We know that matter which underlies substantial change exists because we know matter which similarly underlies accidental change. Still, we can have no direct experience of prime matter, since in itself it is entirely without form and lacks intelligibility. Therefore, when we use “matter” to signify prime matter, we do not have comprehension of what that signification means. We only know that prime matter has to substantial form, which is known, a similar relationship as that of secondary matter to accidental form, which are also known. Therefore, it is manifest that the use of “matter” to signify prime matter is less known to us than other uses. It is also true in this case that prime matter is less knowable by nature, because it lacks act, which is what gives things intelligibility.

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1. Physics, 191a 10-12 (Bk. 1, Part 7)

Faith in a mysterious, incomprehensible God seems to imply a contradiction. Faith demands that we declare Him certainly to exist, even to exist in a certain way. Mystery seems to silence any talk about Him at all. To know things about God, the believer may object, is to predicate things about Him; therefore, our ideas, abstracted from created things, must be applicable to God. Consequently, there is a likeness between God and creatures, which seems abhorrent to the utter transcendence of God. Rather, he would argue, we must believe in certain things about God, without knowing them. For, “we walk by faith, and not by sight.”¹ If knowledge of God is repugnant to the believer, however, utter ignorance of God seems to devoid faith of any content. One could say along with Cleanthes:

But if our ideas, so far as they go, be not just and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature, I know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance?²

Pious belief in a God beyond the grasp of any finite intellect and desire to preach meaningful truths about Him seem to be at an impasse. To unravel this paradox, to justify the testimony of faith and the science of theology, it is necessary to understand more deeply the character of our knowledge of God. Rather than destroying God’s inscrutability, formal theology deepens His mystery by directing the mind toward what is beyond its comprehension.³

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1. 2 Cor. 5:7
2. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part IV, 158
3. Although I will use only Questions 1-12 of the Summa Theologica (S.T.), which concern knowledge of God that can be grasped by unaided human reason, the thesis still applies to knowledge of God had by faith through Revelation. For, even revealed truths are understood through words, whose concepts are abstracted from created things. Therefore, even knowledge by Revelation does not attain to the essence of God and does not oppose His mystery.

...from common ways of speaking about forgiveness immediately suggest themselves:

1. Forgiveness is the remission of a due punishment. For example, if someone intentionally breaks his neighbor’s window, we might say that the neighbor fogives the window-breaker if he doesn’t seek to punish him.


2. Forgiveness is the remission of not only due punishment, but also due satisfaction. In the example, the neighbor doesn’t seek to punish the window-breaker, nor does he even require that he pay for a new window.


3. Forgiveness is not taking into account the offense in all future dealings with the offender. This case includes 1 and 2. For example, the window-breaker suffers no consequences from the neighbor: no punishment, no restitution, no being reminded of the incident when the neighbor needs a favor (like being forgiven himself), etc. In short, all the interactions between neighbors happen as if the incident never happened.


4. Forgiveness is forgetting of the offense. But if the forgetting is unwilling, we wouldn’t say that the neighbor has forgiven the offender, just that he has a bad memory. And one can’t forget willingly, unless perhaps he willingly acquired 3) as a habit with the intention of forgetting the incident. But, in that case, the forgiving would just be 3) and the forgetting would be accidental. So it is more likely that “to forgive and forget” refers to not considering the offense.

All of the above formulations focus on the forgiver’s disposition toward the forgiven. There are a few other possibilities that focus on the effect of the forgiven:

5. Forgiveness is the removal of a guilty feeling in the offender.


6. Forgiveness is the restoration of proper charity in the offender toward the offended, which lack caused the offense.

So, it seems a big question is whether forgiveness is said more of the forgiver or of the forgiven.
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It’s been a recurring problem that I don’t have a precise concept of forgiveness. First, I’ll try to lay out a few ground rules about the method for finding a definition.

I will attempt to understand a precise definition using the three sources of philosophy¹:

1. common conceptions, manifested by the way we speak. These will not only be a pre-philosophical source of the precise conception sought, but also the measure of whatever conclusion is reached.
   


2. reason, which can first of all abstract the common conceptions, then can proceed from them, which are more known to us, to a precise conception, which is more knowable by nature.
   


3. prior thinkers, who have taught us not only by their true insights, but even more so by their mistakes.
   

To these three, I’ll throw in another element: Revelation, as guarded by the Magisterium, and explained by the Doctors of the Church. Although this will, hopefully, be a philosophical inquiry, not theological, I think knowledge of God’s forgiveness is rather limited to the philosopher. Revelation, therefore, will provide a welcome check against the universality of the definition, especially considering the impact such a definition will have on the interpretation of Scripture.

Following Aristotle's requirements for a definition, I will seek a universal definition of forgiveness, i.e. one that applies per se to every species of forgiveness, because it contains the middle term, or cause of a demonstrative conclusion. In this way, the definition can explain all the effects and consequences of forgiveness (or at least "facilitate even a conjecture about them"²).
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1. Taken from Charles De Koninck, Three Sources of Philosophy, 1964 Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
2. De Anima, Bk. I, Ch. 1