Here are some images and prayers to the holy angels:

Prayers to Our Guardian Angel

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From the Office for the feast of Guardian Angels (Oct. 2). This feast was first authorized by Pope Paul V in 1608.

Sancti Angeli, custodes nostri, defendite nos in proelio, ut not pereamus in tremendo iudicio. V. In conspectu Angelorum psallam tibi, Deus meus. R. Adorabo ad templum sanctum tuum et confitebor nomini tuo. Deus, qui ineffabili providentia sanctos Angelos tuos ad nostram custodiam mittere digneris, largire supplicibus tuis, et eorum semper protectione defendi, et aeterna sociate gaudere. Per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum.

O ye holy Angels, our guardians, defend us in battle that we may not perish in the awful judgement. V. In the sight of the Angels I will sing to Thee, O God. R. I will worship facing Thy holy temple and confess Thy name. O God, who in Thine ineffable providence hast deigned to send Thy holy Angels to watch over us, grant to us, Thy supplicants, to be always defended by their protectino and in eternity to share their joy. Through our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.

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From an 11th century prayer book belonging to Abbot Aelfwine.

Credo quod sis angelus sanctus, a Deo omnipotente ad custodiam mei deputatus. Propterea peto, et per illum qui te ad hoc ordinavit, humiliter imploro, ut me miseram fragilem atque indignam semper et ubique in hac vita custodias, protegas a malis omnibus atque defendas, et cum Deus hinc animam meam migrare iusserit, nullam in eam potestatem daemonibus habere permittas, sed tu eam leniter a corpore suscipias, et in sinu Habrae suaviter usque perducas iubente ac iuvante creatore ac salvatore Deo nostro, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

I believe that thou art the holy angel appointed by almighty God to watch over me. On this account, I beg and humbly implore thee, through Him who has ordained thee to this task, that in this life thou wouldst always and everywhere guard me, wretched, weak, and unworthy that I am. Protect and defend me from all evil, and when God has bid my soul to leave this world, permit not the devil to have any power over it. Rather that thou wouldst gently take it from my body and lead it sweetly unto the bosom of Abraham with the bidding and assistance of God our Creator and Savior, who is blessed for ever. Amen.

Prayers to St. Michael

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From the Office for the feast of St. Michael the Archangel (Sept. 29 Calendar of the Extraordinary Use). The collect at the end appears in manuscripts of the 8th century.

Princeps gloriosissime, Michael Archangele, esto memor nostri: hic et ubique semper precare pro nobis Filium Dei, alleluia, alleluia. V. In conspectu Angelorum psallam tibi, Deus meus. R. Adorabo ad templum sanctum tuum et confitebor nomini tuo. Deus, qui miro ordine, Angelorum ministeria hominumque dispensas: concede propitius ut, a quibus tibi ministrantibus in caelo assistitur, ab his in terra vita nostra muniatur. Per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum. Amen.

O most glorious Prince, Michael the Archangel, be mindful of us, here and everywhere: pray always unto the Son of God for us, Alleluia, Alleluia. V. In the sight of the Angels I will sing to Thee, O God. R. I will worship facing Thy holy temple and confess Thy name. O God, who in a marvelous order hast established the ministries of angels and men, mercifully grant that as Thy holy Angels ever do Thee service in heaven, so at all times they may succor us here upon earth. Through our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.

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This prayer was composed by Pope Leo XIII after he experienced a vision. On October 13, 1884, while consulting with his cardinals after Mass, Leo XIII paused at the foot of the altar and lapsed into what looked like a coma. After a little while the Pope recovered himself and related the terrifying vision he had of the battle between the Church and Satan. Afterwards, Pope Leo went to his office and composed this now famous prayer to St. Michael the Archangel and assigned it to be recited after Low Mass.

Sancte Michael Archangele, defende nos in proelio, contra nequitiam et insidias diaboli esto praesidium. Imperet illi Deus, supplices deprecamur: tuque, Princeps militiae caelestis, Satanam aliosque spiritus malignos, qui ad perditionem animarum pervagantur in mundo, divina virtute, in infernum detrude. Amen.	Saint Michael the Archangel, defend us in battle; be our defense against the wickedness and snares of the devil. May God rebuke him we humbly pray. And do thou, O prince of the heavenly host, by the power of God thrust into hell Satan and all the evil spirits who prowl about the world for the ruin of souls. Amen.

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Traditional prayer.

O princeps caelestis militiae, sancte Michael, qui superbum Luciferum cum omnibus suis asseclis ub tartarum deiecisti, o defensor et protector Ecclesiae, o animarum ex hoc saeculo migrantium praeses: succore populo Dei, defende Ecclesiam tibi commendatam contra omnes insidias satanae; adiuva animam meam contra eundem hostem constitutam, quam tibi nunc commendo. Praesertim me in hora mortis meae protege, ut ad paradisi gaudia admittar, ubi cum omnibus Angelis Deum aeternis laudibus depraedicem. Amen.

O Prince of the heavenly host, Saint Michael, thou who cast into hell proud Lucifer with all his followers, thou who art defender and protector of the Church, thou who art protector of souls departing from this world, come to the aid of the People of God and defend the Church committed unto thee against all the snares of Satan. Help my soul which I now commend to thee against this same enemy. Protect me especially at the hour of my death, so that I may be admitted to the joys of paradise where I, with all the Angels, may praise God eternally. Amen.

Prayers to St. Gabriel


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From the Office for the feast of St. Gabriel the Archangel (March 24 - Calendar of the Extraordinary Use).

Princeps gloriosissime, Gabriel Archangele, esto memor nostri: his et ubique semper precare pro nobis Filium Dei, alleluia, alleluia. V. Stetit Angelus iuxta aram templi. R. Habens turibulum aureum in manu sua. DEUS, qui inter ceteros Angelos, ad annuntiandum incarnationis tuae mysterium, Gabrielem Archangelum elegisti; concede propitius, ut qui festum eius celebramus in terris, ipsius patrocinium sentiamus in caelis: qui vivis et regnas in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

O MOST glorious Prince, Gabriel the Archangel, be mindful of us, here and everywhere: pray always unto the Son of God for us, Alleluia, Alleluia. V. An Angel stood near the altar of the temple. R. Holding a golden censer in his hand. O God, who amongst all the Angels didst choose the Archangel Gabriel to announce the mystery of Thine Incarnation; mercifully grant, that we who solemnly keep his feast on earth may feel the benefit of his patronage in heaven: who livest and reignest for ever and ever. Amen.

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Traditional prayer.

O FORTITUDO Dei, sancte Gabriel, qui virgini Mariae incarnationem unigeniti Filii Dei annuntiasti, laudo et veneror te, o electe Spiritus, et supplex oro, ut meus apud Iesum Christum, Salvatorem nostrum, et eius benedictam matrem advocatus esse, atque in omnibus angustiis me solari et corroborare velis, ne ullis unquam tentationibus superatus, Deum meum peccato offendam. Amen.

O STRENGTH of God, Saint Gabriel, thou who announcedst to the Virgin Mary the incarnation of the only-begotten Son of God, I praise thee and honor thee, O elect spirit. I humbly beg thee, with Jesus Christ our Savior and with His Blessed Mother, to be my advocate. I also pray that thou wouldst comfort me and strengthen me in all my difficulties, lest at any time I may be overcome by temptation and I might offend God by sinning. Amen.

Prayers to St. Raphael

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From the Office for the feast of St. Raphael the Archangel (Oct. 24 - Calendar of the Extraordinary Use).

PRINCEPS gloriosissime, Raphael Archangele, esto memor nostri: hic et ubique semper precare pro nobis Filium Dei, alleluia, alleluia. V. Stetit Angelus iuxta aram templi. R. Habens turibulum aureum in manu sua. DEUS, qui beatum Raphaelem Archangelum Tobiae famulo tuo comitem dedisti in via: concede nobis famulis tuis; ut eiusdem semper protegamur custodia et muniamur auxilio. Per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum. Amen.

O MOST glorious Prince, Raphael the Archangel, be mindful of us, here and everywhere: pray always unto the Son of God for us, Alleluia, Alleluia. V. An Angel stood near the altar of the temple. R. Holding a golden censer in his hand. O God, who didst give blessed Raphael the Archangel to Tobias Thy servant as a companion for his journey, grant that we, who are also Thy servants, may likewise be safeguarded by his watchfulness and fortified by his help. Through our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.

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Traditional prayer.

O CAELESTIS medice et comes fidelissime, sancte Raphael, qui Tobiae seniori visum restituisti, iuniorem per omnes suscepti itineris vias deduxisti et incolumem conservasti: esto corporis et animae meae medicus, pelle ignorantiae tenebras, mihique in periculosa huius vitae peregrinatione constanter assiste, donec me ad caelestem patriam perducas. Amen.	O HEAVENLY doctor and most faithful companion, saint Raphael, thou who didst restore sight to the elder Tobit, and didst escort the younger Tobias throughout his appointed journey and kept him safe and sound, be the doctor of my body and soul. Dispel the darkness of my ignorance, and assist me in the dangerous journey of this life always, until thou leadeth me to my heavenly homeland. Amen.

A doctor, when considered under the ratio merely of "man," is said accidentally to be the cause of health. Similarly, this blog, an accidental relation to its contributers, is accidentally made noteworthy when its members are promoted. And such is the case due to the happy coverage of a recent baptism by the prominent (at least in the Catholic blogosphere) priest Fr. Z in his blog "What Does the Prayer Really Say?"

Of course, it is equally true to say that the promotion of the blog by this means is wholly accidental and therefore irrelevant. For we do not seek men for medical advice, quite to the contrary, we see doctors. This could be seen again in the case of this blog by the fact that "promotion" is wholly outside of the intention of this blog. Therefore, this post is sophistry, and rubbish. Except for four things:

- The conveyance of the glad fact that the beautiful sacrament shared by members of this modest blog has been noted by a prominent member of the greater Catholic community.
- The equally worthy conveyance of good will by a number of commenters on that blog post.
- The amusingly false observation by one of the commenters that Frater A. is on a cell phone during the ceremony! Surely there have been few more absurd things attributed to him.
- The opportunity to offer my own congratulations and well-wishing to the new and beautiful family. Cheers!

An area of both classical and contemporary dispute in interpreting Aristotle’s theory of perception is with regard to how perception involves the sense-organ taking on the sensible form of the perceived object without its matter.[1] In this paper I will consider St. Thomas’ interpretation of Aristotle on this matter with regard particularly to the sense of sight.


It is a noteworthy fact that Aristotle did not see the study of the soul as strictly speaking an independent science.[2] Aquinas was certainly cognizant of this.[3] The study of the nature of the soul is allocated to natural philosophy (phusikoς), which provides the account for the natural principles of the living.[4] Aquinas takes the methods given when natural philosophy is accounted for in principle and applies them to the study of the soul.

Natural philosophy’s common method of beginning from the confused universal and moving to the particular universal is that which explains both the order of Aristotle’s general exposition of sensation, and specifically the sense of sight.[5] It is through Aquinas’ particularly astute exposition of this procedure that we arrive at an account of how the case of sight involves the sense-organ taking on the sensible form of the perceived object without its matter.

Most generally, the powers of the soul are defined by their activities, and these are likewise defined by their objects. Thus objects are the first things which ought to be considered in the study of the soul.[6] So also Aquinas recognizes Aristotle to begin with the sense-objects when explaining the senses because “objects are prior to faculties.”[7]

The sense objects which are most important for Aquinas’s exposition are the special sense objects: “The very essence and definition of each sense consists in its being naturally fitted to be affected by some such object.”[8] These are the objects which are directly and properly perceived (proprie per se sensibilia). Related to this, Aquinas notes that although we cannot but use these terms, the senses are not properly said to be ‘acted on’ by these objects, but are acted on secundum modum of a sensible. Hence the faculty becomes like the object in sensing, but only sensitively and not substantially.[9] This is a key point Aquinas applies to all the senses. At the same time, Aquinas asserts the sense faculties are the acts of bodily organs and, following the principle “whatever is received is received in the mode of the receiver,” the sense faculties receive a similitude of the thing sensed in a bodily and material way.[10] Reconciling these seemingly incongruous principles, namely that the senses sense in a material and bodily way, and also that they are not acted on in the strict sense of the way body acts on body is at the heart of Aquinas’s interpretation of how the sense organ taking on the sensible form of the perceived object without its matter. Showing how Aquinas proposes to resolve this incongruity for all of sensation is outside the purpose of this paper. But I will next examine Aquinas’ subtle exposition of Aristotle which resolves this incongruity in the sense of sight. This exposition, it seems to me, provides the key to explaining how sight involves the eye taking on the sensible form of the perceived object without its matter.

Aquinas, following Aristotle,[11] notes first that “the proper sense-object being that which each sense perceives of itself exclusively, the sense object of which the special recipient is sight is the visible.”[12] The ‘visible’ is simply a broad term used to include both colour and the translucent visible object without a name for things such as glow-worms and certain fungi. This is straightforward enough.

The difficulty is how the visible object (most importantly colour) [13] acts on the sense of sight. Aquinas sees Aristotle’s foundation for the answer to this particular problem in his first showing what colour has to do with visibility, and secondly in settling what is required for colour to be seen.[14] With regard to the first, Aquinas notes along with Aristotle that the object of sight, namely colour, as such is essentially visible.[15] However, colour is essentially visible not in the sense that it is always visible, but insofar that it possesses the intrinsic qualities to be visible. This is clear from the fact that colour manifest itself only in the right conditions. These right conditions are what Aristotle calls the “transparent” and light.[16] Aquinas’ explanation of these conditions settles the second task of explaining what is required for colour to be seen.

The “transparent” are any substances under the ratio of possessing the quality of being receptive to colour, such as air, water, and solids such as glass. These substances are receptive of colour “from without” such that they render themselves visible vis-à-vis the concomitant colour, and hence are not visible per se. Because the presence of light renders this quality actual, light is defined as the act of the transparent as such; that is, it is light which makes this quality of transparency to be in these things.[17] For example, air is a medium between some coloured thing and my eyes, and when light is present in the air, I can see the coloured thing.[18] From this it is clear that the nature of light must be centrally related to how the eye in seeing takes on the colour of the perceived object without its matter. Appropriately Aquinas next carefully examines the nature of light.

Aquinas thus states that it is clear enough that light cannot be a body, because it would follow that the body of light would coexist in the body of the transparent-- an impossibility.[19] Aquinas points out that on the other hand, “it is impossible that any spiritual nature should fall within the apprehension of the senses, whose power, being embodied, cannot acquire knowledge of any but bodily things.”[20] In other words, the light which is perceived by sense is not spiritual [21](natura spiritualis).[22] This seems to open Aquinas to an obvious difficulty: If light is neither a body nor spiritual, then what is it? His reply runs as follows. Though strictly speaking light is not spiritual (in the sense it does not need matter), it is the spiritual or formal quality of light which brings the transparent into act and consequently is the cause of seeing. Seeing is the reception of the form of colour through light; to bring the transparency into act is the formal quality of light.[23] This is to say that it is primarily light as a form which disposes the act of colour to be visible through transparency.[24] But just as light is a formal quality, there must be some matter in which the light exists, albeit the most subtle form of matter, the “most spiritual.”[25] This matter acts on the eye, but not precisely so as to make the eye to see, but merely to act on the matter of the eye which is seeing due to another principle. What is this matter? It is nothing other than the “transparent body.”[26]

This is amendable with modern physiology and optometry which has explained how light waves act on the eye. Light-waves can be understood as the transparent formed by light, i.e. the matter simultaneous with but nevertheless different than the formal of aspect seeing which is the reception of colour through the transparent.[27] This two-fold way the sense is acted upon can be made clearer by taking the easier parallel case of touch. In the act of touching, the object touched makes an indentation on the skin. This indentation is precisely how the sensible matter is materially affected when sensing, but the indentation as such made by the object is clearly not the sensation.[28]

Admittedly, Aquinas seems a bit hesitant in his interpretation here. On the one hand he calls sight the “most spiritual” and “maximum spiritually,” which implies a comparative order with the other senses, such that sight has the same material/formal aspects as the lower senses.[29] On the other hand, he also states in the same place that light is “only a spiritual change,” implying sight is sui generis apart from the other senses.[30] However, in light of Aquinas’ universal statements made about sensation being bodily and his direct arguments against light being strictly speaking spiritual, it seems more reasonable to take him to be formally restating the point that the proper ratio when considering the cause of sight is the formal quality of colour through light and not its material aspect of the transparency.[31] Light acts on transparency, thus enabling the colour to be such that of itself it has its power to impress its likeness on the medium, and also then on the eye. This principled explanation seems best to answer how the sense organ of sight takes on the sensible form of the perceived object without its matter: the matter the eye is affect by is the transparency, which is accidental to sight. It is the colour which is able to impress its formal quality on the eye through the transparency in act, and this is vision.

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[1] Considered by Aristotle in De Anima (hereafter DA) 416b32-418a6. Aristotle, De Anima, Transl. H.G. Apostle (Iowa: The Peripatetic Press 1981).

[2] As Amelie Oksenberg Rorty points out in “De Anima: Its Agenda and Recent Interpreters.” Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, eds. M. Nussbaum and A.O. Rorty (USA: Oxford University Press 1995).

[3] The order of the sciences is the first thing he mentions at the beginning of his commentary on the DA.

[4] I.e. the physical study is concerned with the principles of the living (arche ton zion), c.f. DA 412a7, 403a27-28. If there are any powers of the soul which are able to exist outside the provenance of natural philosophy they then are the concern of the metaphysician, c.f. DA 403b15.

[5] C.f. Physics 184a10-15. Aristotle, Physics, Transl. H.G. Apostle (Iowa: The Peripatetic Press 1980).

[6] DA 415a14-416b31.

[7] Book II Lectio XIII, para. 383. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima (hereafter CDA), Transl. By K. Foster and S. Humphries (Indiana: Dumb Ox Books 1994).

[8] Ibid. Book II Lectio XIII, para 387. Thus I am putting aside Aquinas’ explanation of the sensus communis sense objects which are part of sense but not in the same essential way.

[9] Ibid. Book II Lectio XIII, para 381. Aquinas notes that because the pre-Socratics failed to see this distinction they thought the sense-faculties were composed of the same elements as their objects.

[10] CDA Book II Lectio XII, para. 377.

[11] DA 418127-29.

[12] CDA Book II Lectio XI, para. 399.

[13] Aquinas claims the unnamed glowing object of sight is only mentioned by Aristotle incidentally, and that such creature are the way they are due to a certain weakness of not being able to actualize their proper colors seen during the day. The basic point seems fair enough, namely that the glowing object of sight is a certain exception, and thus I will set aside a consideration of it here. At any rate, it turns out that it is in virtue of the normative relationship of colour to seeing that this exception is explained. See CDA Book II Lectio XV, para. 430.

[14] In DA 418a29-418b4 and DA 418b4-9 respectively; c.f. CDA Book II Lectio XIV, para. 400.

[15] DA 418a31 and CDA Book II Lectio XIV, para. 400.

[16] DA 418b1-3.

[17] Again, “it is evident that neither air…nor anything of the sort is actually transparent unless it is luminous.” CDA Book II Lectio XIV, para. 405.

[18] Conversely the transparent in potency is darkness.

[19] DA 418b17. Aristotle gives further arguments for this position in DA 418b20-26, but the force of the above argument is strong enough to prove his point.

[20] CDA Book II Lectio XIV, para. 415-416. This further point is interestingly left unstated in Aristotle, but seems indirectly affirmed in DA 419a25-31.

[21] Ibid. Book II Lectio XIV, para. 416.

[22] Ibid. Book II Lectio XIV, para. 424.

[23] Thus Aquinas places light in the third species of quality, affective quality. C.f. Book II Lectio XIV, para. 420.

[24] This can conversely be said the way Aristotle states it: “to be a color is to be that which causes motion in that which is transparent when in activity.” DA 419a10-11.

[25] “Sed in immutatione visus est sola immutatio spiritualis: unde patet, quod visus inter omnes sensus est spiritualior, et post hunc auditus.” Ibid. Book II Lectio XIV, para. 418.

[26] Ibid. Book II Lectio XIV, para. 421.

[27] This is clearly Aristotle’s conclusion in DA 419a7-15.

[28] As drawn out by Aquinas in Ibid. Book II Lectio XIV, para. 418.

[29] See footnote 80; Ibid. Book II Lectio XIV, para. 418.

[30] Certain contemporary philosophers have focused too much on this apparent hesitancy in Aquinas and have gone on to argue that for Aquinas sensation must be wholly spiritual and in no way material. See for example, Burnyeat, Myles, “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?,” Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, eds. M. Nussbaum and A.O. Rorty (USA: Oxford University Press 1995). According to Burnyeat, Aristotle thinks the sense-organ taking on a sensible form is nothing more or less than the awareness of that form. He asserts that there is “no physiological process which stands to a perceiver’s awareness of colour or smell as matter to form.” (pg. 15) Because this is open to obvious refutation by modern biology, Burnyeat ultimately proposes to “junk” Aristotle. (pg. 26)

[31] Likewise one would read Aristotle’s arguments against Empedocles: light as a vulgar material body would indeed be “extravagantly postulated” to move instantly across the horizon. Rather, with light’s more formal nature it would seem to move very, very quickly: 186,282.397 miles per second, to be exact.

“She reaches mightily from one end of the earth to the other, and she orders all things well.” (Wis 8:1)

Since it belongs to wisdom to order and judge, and since we all, as is testified by the title we bear in this blog, are seekers of wisdom, it seemed to Vincentius and I that our labels needed some trimming and revision in order to dispose ourselves more readily to wisdom. Our thought is that a list of labels that consists of many particulars and vague names does little to nothing to aid one in describing and discerning what an article is about. Especially now as the blog is bursting with new growth, and we are anticipating many new articles, we want to get a handle on the labels before things get out of hand.
In light of this, we have compiled the list below as our recommended labels for this blog. Our basic division is threefold: the object quo, the object of the article; the object quod, the subject; and the modus, the mode of presentation of the article. (See Vincentius' latest post for a clear account of object quo and quod.) We are aware that we may not have included all necessary labels and ask you to please e-mail us with any suggestions. I have already gone through all the previous posts and edited the labels. Please take some time to review your previous articles to make sure they have been labeled correctly and adequately. We are also aware that not all may use the labels under the precise headings which are listed in this article, but by all means do not be concerned. Vincentius and I have merely found this a helpful way to categorize and order the types of articles in the blog. This will hopefully facilitate participation and comments.

Object Quo
Sacred Doctrine
Scripture
Spirituality
Metaphysics
Physics
Mathematics
Logic
Middle Sciences
Ethics
Aesthetics

Object Quod
God
Christ
Mary
St. Thomas Aquinas
Augustine
Angels
Saints
Fathers
Liturgy
Aristotle
Plato

Modus
Commentary
Translation
Outline
Essay
Point of Interest
Feast Day

This article will attempt to determine the formal object of Sacred Theology and to unify and order the seemingly disparate accounts of the same given by St. Thomas: the formal object is the light of divine revelation (ST Ia,q.1, a.3), God (ST Ia, q.1, a.7), and things that are immaterial in such a way as to never exist in matter (In Boetium De Trinitate, q.5, a.4).

In q.1, a.3 of the Summa Theologiae, the Angelic Doctor teaches that the unity of a habit (science, in this case) comes from the formal account of its object:

Est enim unitas potentiae et habitus consideranda secundum obiectum, non quidem materialiter, sed secundum rationem formalem obiecti, puta homo, asinus et lapis conveniunt in una formali ratione colorati, quod est obiectum visus.

He goes on to specify that the unity of sacred theology comes from the one formal object of things able to be revealed:

Quia igitur sacra Scriptura considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata, secundum quod dictum est, omnia quaecumque sunt divinitus revelabilia, communicant in una ratione formali obiecti huius scientiae.

So far, so good. When discussing the subject of the science, however, although he uses the same language of formal object (in fact, he uses the very same example from sight), he names God, not revealable things, as the formal object:

Sic enim se habet subiectum ad scientiam, sicut obiectum ad potentiam vel habitum. Proprie autem illud assignatur obiectum alicuius potentiae vel habitus, sub cuius ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam vel habitum, sicut homo et lapis referuntur ad visum inquantum sunt colorata, unde coloratum est proprium obiectum visus. Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione dei, vel quia sunt ipse deus; vel quia habent ordinem ad deum, ut ad principium et finem. Unde sequitur quod deus vere sit subiectum huius scientiae.

Finally, in his commentary on Boetius' De Trinitate, (in which St. Thomas uses the formal object as a principle of division), he distinguishes the science of Theology generically from Physics and Mathematics by its remotion from matter and motion:

Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt, quae non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt, sive numquam sint in materia, sicut deus et Angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa et huiusmodi. De quibus omnibus est theologia, id est scientia divina…

He later distinguishes Sacred Theology from Metaphysics by further specifying the kinds of immateriality involved in each:

Sic ergo theologia sive scientia divina est duplex. Una, in qua considerantur res divinae non tamquam subiectum scientiae, sed tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia, quam philosophi prosequuntur, quae alio nomine metaphysica dicitur. Alia vero, quae ipsas res divinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientiae et haec est theologia, quae in sacra Scriptura traditur. Utraque autem est de his quae sunt separata a materia et motu secundum esse, sed diversimode, secundum quod dupliciter potest esse aliquid a materia et motu separatum secundum esse. Uno modo sic, quod de ratione ipsius rei, quae separata dicitur, sit quod nullo modo in materia et motu esse possit, sicut deus et Angeli dicuntur a materia et motu separati. Alio modo sic, quod non sit de ratione eius quod sit in materia et motu, sed possit esse sine materia et motu, quamvis quandoque inveniatur in materia et motu. Et sic ens et substantia et potentia et actus sunt separata a materia et motu, quia secundum esse a materia et motu non dependent, sicut mathematica dependebant, quae numquam nisi in materia esse possunt, quamvis sine materia sensibili possint intelligi. Theologia ergo philosophica determinat de separatis secundo modo sicut de subiectis, de separatis autem primo modo sicut de principiis subiecti. Theologia vero sacrae Scripturae tractat de separatis primo modo sicut de subiectis, quamvis in ea tractentur aliqua quae sunt in materia et motu, secundum quod requirit rerum divinarum manifestatio.

Note, however, that the account of the specific object of Sacred Theology in this text is not the light of divine revelation as it was in the Summa; instead, it is immateriality of the sort that cannot exist in matter. Notice, also, that in this text St. Thomas determines the subject of each species of theology: Sacred Theology studies the first principle in itself and principally, while Metaphysics studies the first principle only in relation to created being.

First, concerning the distinction of the subject and object of Sacred Theology presented in the Summa, it should be noted that the object of any habit can be said materially or formally. St. Thomas makes this distinction explicit in the quote from Ia q.1, a.3 given above. The material object is considered under an account that only accidentally relates the thing to the power. In the example given by St. Thomas, it is only accidental that what is seen is a man or a rock. The formal object, on the other hand, is exactly the reason why it is grasped by a certain power, as things are seen precisely because they are colored.

Given this distinction between formal and material objects, however, it still remains to see why St. Thomas gives different accounts of the "object" and "subject" of Sacred Theology, since both accounts seem to be aiming at the formal object. It must be said, then, that the formal object of a habit itself is two-fold. For one could say that things are visible because they are colored; but it is also true to say that they are visible because they are illuminated. The color is what we see, the terminus of our action of seeing; but the light is that in which we see, not accidentally. The habit of sight is only fully specified by saying that its formal object is illuminated color. Color is an example of what is called by the scholastic tradition the formale obiectum quod, while light exemplifies the formale obiectum quo, or sub quo.¹

By extension, the formal object of sciences will also be two-fold. The formal object quo of a science is the light, so to speak, in which the science views its object quod. The light proper to science is immateriality, which is why St. Thomas divides the sciences in his commentary on Boetius' De Trinitate according to different degrees of remotion from matter and motion. This light determines a principle subject, or object quod, about which the science treats, and to which all other things treated by the science are referred, whether it be mobile being in Physics, for example, or quantity in Mathematics. For, given a certain mode of understanding, there will be a corresponding grade of being whose mode of existence is properly the cause of why the intellect can consider things under that light.

Therefore, when St. Thomas gives the principle of unity of Sacred Theology in Ia q.1, a.3, he is giving the obiectum quo. For Sacred Theology studies everything in the light of Divine Revelation: this is the mode in which all its truths are seen. In article 7, however, he is giving the obiectum quod. For what is principally revealable is God Himself, and all other things treated in the science are related to Him. God is what terminates and is attained by the habit of this science.

But what about the apparent discrepancy between the accounts of the object quo in the Summa and In Boetium De Trinitate? It should be noted that in the Division and Method, St. Thomas is working from the "top down". That is, he is making a general division of sciences, starting with the highest genera. On the contrary, in the Summa, he is asking whether the science is one, that is, whether it is indivisible, or an infima species of science. Therefore, there is no necessity that the formal object quo given in one work match the account given in the other work. In fact, the account given in the Division and Method, that is, under the light of immateriality of the sort that never exists in matter, seems to be applicable to Sacred Theology as held by us, by the blessed, and even (allowing analogy of the word "science") by God Himself. The light of revelation, however, is only applicable to Sacred Theology as held by us, making it an infima species and absolutely one science. Note especially that the subject, that is, the object quod of Sacred Theology is the same for the genus of Sacred Theology, or for the species of Sacred Theology as held by us: namely, God, or the first principle of things considered in Himself. This is further evidence that the most proper principle of dividing the sciences is by the object quo, as is done in the Division and Method.
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1. See, for instance, Billuart in his Summa Sancti Thomae: "Nota: objectum, seu ut loquitur S. Thomas, subjectum, considerationis scilicet et non inhaesionis, duplex distinguitur in omni potentia vel habitu, nimirum materiale et formale. Objectum materiale est id quod a potentia vel habitu attingitur quidem, non tamen ratione sui sed ratione alterius. Objectum formale est id quod a potentia vel habitu attingitur ratione sui et ratione cujus caetera attinguntur. In objecto formale duplex ratio debet distingui: ratio quae, et est ipsa res quae attingitur, et dicitur objectum formale quod: et ratio qua seu sub qua, et est id quo mediante ratio quae attingitur: et dicitur objectum formale quo seu sub quo; ita ut ex hac duplici ratione quae et qua integretur objectum formale, quod est specificativum potentiae vel habitus. Sit exemplum in potentia visiva; objectum ejus materiale est corpus; formale quod, color; formale quo, lux; formale specificativum coloratum lucidum."

See also Cajetan in his commentary on the Summa: "III. Ad evidentiam huius rationis, nota duplicem esse rationem formalem objecti in scientia: alteram obiecti ut res, alteram obiecti ut obiectum; vel alteram ut quae alteram ut sub qua. Ratia formalis obiecti ut res, seu quae, est ratio rei obiectae quae primo terminat actum illius habitus, et ex qua fluunt passiones illius subiecti, et quae est medium in prima demonstratione; ut entitas in metiphysica, quantitas in mathematica, et mobilitas in naturali. Ratio autem formalis obiecti ut obiectum, vel sub qua, est immaterialitas talis, seu talis modus abstrahendi et definiendi: puta sine omni materia in metaphysica, cum materia intelligibili tantum in mathematica, et cum materia sensibili, non tamen hac, in naturali."

When we study the preambles of faith in St. Thomas’ Summa Theologiae, we do not hold that such truths are simply inaccessible by human reason. Indeed, there can and should be a science of human reason dedicated to questions about the nature and principle(s) of being. Theology, then, has every right to presuppose the existence of such sciences and even use them when reflecting on revealed truths. Yet St. Thomas does not treat these preambles as one might imagine he would have. Euclid at the start of his science, which is often used as the model of scientific structure and order, opens with a series of definitions, postulates and common notions which will be used in the science, all of which either come to us as per se notum, or are proved in another science. Why would St. Thomas choose not to do this? Why indeed would he spend so many questions going over truths already established in the lower sciences?

Fides quarens intellectum:

“I prayed and understanding was given me; I called upon God, and the spirit of wisdom came to me. I preferred her to scepters and thrones, and I accounted wealth as nothing in comparison with her. Neither did I liken to her any priceless gem, because all gold is but a little sand in her sight, I loved her more than health and beauty, and I chose to have her rather than light, because her radiance never ceases. All good things come to me along with her, and in her hands uncounted wealth. I rejoiced in them all, because wisdom leads them; but I did not know that she was their mother. I learned without guile and I impart without grudging. I do not hide her wealth, for it is an unfailing treasure for men; those who get it obtain friendship with God, commended for the gifts that come from instruction.” Book of Wisdom from ch. 7

When we study the preambles of faith in St. Thomas’ Summa Theologiae, we do not hold that such truths are simply inaccessible by human reason. Indeed, there can and should be a science of human reason dedicated to questions about the nature and principle(s) of being. Theology, then, has every right to presuppose the existence of such sciences and even use them when reflecting on revealed truths. Yet St. Thomas does not treat these preambles as one might imagine he would have. Euclid at the start of his science, which is often used as the model of scientific structure and order, opens with a series of definitions, postulates and common notions which will be used in the science, all of which either come to us as per se notum, or are proved in another science. Why would St. Thomas choose not to do this? Why indeed would he spend so many questions going over truths already established in the lower sciences? Could he not rightly presuppose that anyone with the audacity to begin the study of God in Himself, would have carefully considered those things which philosophy could offer: not only the metaphysical preambles, but also those questions about man which seem to so readily be known from the natural philosophy of the soul? He then could say that everything treated of from here on out is based on principles inaccessible to simple reason, but that we can use these philosophical beginnings, not for the sake of proving the articles of faith directly studied herein, but for the sake of enhancing our understanding of them. In so doing he would clearly demarcate where human reason stopped, have the truths brought by the “ancilliae sapientiae” readily available, and not have to waste time reproving things that his students should already know.

Instead, since St. Thomas describes theological inquiry as proceeding from principles held by faith, doesn’t the very inclusion of the metaphysical considerations as articles in a book of theology lend credence to the claims of the Modernists that all such things are beyond the bounds of human reason? Can we say that St. Thomas has already done what Kant championed so many years later, abolishing knowledge to make room for faith? Or rather, has he misled us the opposite way, beginning with things knowable by reason, he proceeds seamlessly through his consideration of God as if each new article builds on the one before, making all of theology a mere development of rational thought? Lest we fall into either error, are we not better contenting ourselves being like little children who enter the kingdom of heaven, memorizing the pious anecdotes from the Baltimore Catechism? For those who wish to be truly holy, they could pursue the hermetic lifestyle, passing all hours of the day striving to reach God through faith and charity, mortifiying their flesh, perpetually and mystically reciting the Sacred name of Jesus. In either case however, ought we all to leave St. Thomas’ convoluted metaphysical studying to the casuistic Jesuits and arrogant theologians, who have abandoned faith for human knowledge?

I do not really expect any serious Catholic, (or even historian) to take seriously the claim that St. Thomas was some closet Kantian who despaired of reason’s efficacy and leaped into a sort of Tertullian like fideism. It’s also true that for most of us we will not be content with either the Baltimore catechism option or the hermit approach. This is not because we should disparage either approach across the board; certain souls reduced by their physical disabilities may indeed be far more a conduit for grace and holiness in their simple adherence to their catechism then I will reach in the midst of all my studies. And as for those souls called to the divine life of the hermit, their life is by far superior to any life of study I may undertake. But in the end most of us do not fall into either camp, but are instead driven by the longings of our soul to reason about the basic precepts of Sacred Doctrine which all believers must hold. They will either do this in a vague confused way, or with a penetrating clarity like that of St. Thomas.

For the sake of these, the Mystical Body of Christ needs faithful to devote their lives to perfecting in themselves the virtue of Sacred Doctrine, through study, for the sake of guiding the rest of the faithful in their reflections on the faith and for combating heresies that may arise due to the poor thinking done on such matters. The Church offers us 33 doctors of the Church, all of whom are said to share by a special grace, in the teaching ministry of Christ Himself. Of these, the Church offers us St. Thomas, as the first and best introductory teacher of the Sacred Doctrine whose purity she safeguards.

Whence, as we try to understand St. Thomas’ consideration of truths known by reason within the book both he and the teaching Church recommend for those beginning the study of Sacred Doctrine, we need to begin with the presumption that he really knew what he was doing, and that the effect is very conducive to our salvation. While apologetic purposes would be a good defense, it seems inappropriate to use that defense for a book which has the purpose not of teaching apologetics, but of leading beginning Christian students to a more perfect habit of Sacred Doctrine.

The first good, then, of St. Thomas’ inclusion of the Metaphysical considerations as questions discussed in the Summa, seems to be the magisterial task of keeping his students from error. And this is done in two ways. One could argue that adopting the Euclidean model of presenting previously proven truths would too strongly suggest to the student that the articles of faith rested on the lower sciences as if upon principles. The second way is that St. Thomas has a chance to catch any philosophical errors up front, since a little error in the beginning could lead to major heresies in the end. So while not strictly proper to the science, the philosophical considerations let the teacher make sure all of his students are the on the same page before reflecting on the central truth of all reality, namely the Trinity.

The second good, is that St. Thomas can model the way in which Sacred Doctrine orders and judges and is in harmony with the other sciences. Since it is obvious from natural reason the way in which metaphysics orders and judges the natural sciences before it, then if one can exemplify how Sacred Doctrine uses metaphysics, the student can then extend this to all knowledge. So when St. Thomas uses a theological authority in a sed contra about a philosophical question, he is modeling how Sacred Doctrine judges the lower truths. In understanding Biblical passages and the teachings of the Church Fathers in accord with certain philosophical truths, St. Thomas stresses to the student that truth is one, and admits of no contradictions within itself between the different sciences. Indeed, since God is the author of creation and revelation, these truths must be in harmony, and if not, there was an error in reasoning or interpreting somewhere along the way.

When he describes certain philosophical truths as preambles to the articles of faith, he teaches us how to order all sciences to Wisdom. He makes clear what it means to be a preamble through the sed contra’s which end each one of the early sections of the Summa, namely: In Question 1, Art. 10, after teaching us how Sacred Doctrine can be a science, St. Thomas reminds us that the words of Scripture transcend all science and are ordered to placing us deeper in the mystery, while the sed contra that concludes the section on our knowledge of God in Q. 12 Art. 13 again instructs the student that we are moving toward a knowledge that no philosopher of this world can know. So at the end of both of these sections the student is called to look to a mystery that transcends human knowing and see that as point of arrival for these preambles. The point of arrival is specified at the end of the other two sections In Question 11 Article 4, “Whether God is the Most One,” we are ending the treatment of the last attribute of God’s substance that St. Thomas treats, so in a sense this article is seen as the culmination of the previous chain of reasoning. (This is not because the article is dependent on the entire chain of articles proceeding; that order could have been supplied by philosophy, this instead is an order that St. Thomas chose as one option out of several possible.) In the sed contra, St. Thomas quotes St. Bernard who tells the student, “Among all things which are called one, the unity of the Holy Trinity is most supreme.” Thus the point of arrival in this series of considerations is the Trinity, our knowledge of God’s unity is no good to our salvation unless we are looking toward His Trinity. And again in concluding the question on Divine Names, St. Thomas reminds us the point of discussing these names: we can truly say and believe that God is three-in-one. What is the great mystery the other sections were looking toward? What is this house to which Wisdom has asked her handmaids to guide us, but to which she alone can open the door? It is none other than the Sacred Mystery of all Reality, the Holy Trinity, and through his ordering and teaching St. Thomas reminds us of this central truth. And the truth and goodness of this ordering is something that is more powerfully compelling to the mind when shown to be present during the course of study than if it only were to be stated as a fact at the beginning.

The third good is accidental to the instruction, but it seems to me that it is still there none the less. While it may be true that human reason can reach the truth of the preambles, it is also true that God’s grace does not simply wrap the human person with faith like a cloak but rather quickens a smoldering wick and strengthens that which is weak. In this case the smoldering weakling is the human intellect darkened by sin. If these natural truths taught by St. Thomas are studied in the context of Wisdom, the student is already inclined to see that even his ability to come to these natural truths is a divine gift. “There is for all mankind one entrance into life and a common departure (Wis. 7:6).” All our existence is marked by original sin, from the pangs of childbirth that bring us forth to the death that ushers us out. So we, in this common sinful state of the human race, respond with Solomon and say, “Therefore I prayed, and understanding was given me; I called upon God, and the spirit of wisdom came to me (Wis. 7: 7.).” It is God who grants us “thoughts worthy of what we have received, for He is the guide even of wisdom, and the corrector of the wise. For both we and our words are in His hand, as [too] our understanding (Wis. 7:15-16).” Even of natural things: knowledge of what exists, the structure of the world, natures, powers and reasonings of men, all things both the manifest by nature, and the secret revealed mysteries alike, have been taught to us by Wisdom, the fashioner of all things (see Wis. 7:17-22). This is not to say that the student’s reason by its nature, even in its darkened state could not come to these natural truths. It is to say, however, knowing his intellect to be damaged by sin, the student should give thanks to God for having strengthened and healed him through the grace that enables him to approach the sacred mysteries with a nature renewed both in power and in knowledge.

The last benefit, I believe is the most fitting and noble reason for St. Thomas to teach us the natural truths he does, whether in the section on preambles, the section of creation, or the section on moral action. We should not read St. Thomas to be writing simply another commentary on the De Anima, the Metaphysics, or the Ethics. St. Thomas believes this to be a theological work, and as such, the tone is different. Our studying these truths in theology is in many ways analogous to Milton’s Eve in Paradise Lost. Now Milton is not one that should normally be quoted either as an authority in theology or in marriage, but in this context the beauty of the subject exceeds the error of the author’s intention. Eve excuses herself as Adam is talking to Raphael and the following justification is given:

“Not as not with such discourse delighted, or not capable her ear of what was high: such pleasures she reserved, Adam relating, she sole auditress; her husband the relater she preferred... and of him to ask chose rather; he she knew would intermix grateful digressions, and solve high dispute, with conjugal caresses, from his lip not words alone pleased her. O when meet now such pairs, in love and mutual honor joined.”

Eve does not leave the study because she is incapable or insufficient to the task, but instead she wishes to learn the truth from her bridegroom’s lips. When taught she will receive it and come to understand it through her reason, and with her intelligence know it through its cause. This does not prevent her, out of charity for her beloved of desiring to hear it first from him. And so it seems that St. Thomas wants us in the Church to wish to learn these truths first from our Bridegroom. We will receive them, and know them through our reason. We do not need our Bridegroom to reveal such things to us, we can indeed come to know them, and even when He does reveal them, our intellect will come to see them in the light of reason. But how we long that He may kiss us with the kisses of His mouth, and how our hearts yearn to be joined to Him in love. So let us first hear that God is from His own mouth (Ego sum qui sum), and hear from Him He does not change (Ego Deus non mutor). Let us learn these natural truths first from our Beloved’s lips that we may enter into Wisdom’s house and dwell therein. For we have loved Him, and desired Him from our youth, and desired Him to take us for His bride, and feed us with the honey from His mouth.

Apology

The other parts of this tract are argued so truly, so brilliantly and so splendidly, and are also of so much worth and instinct with so fragrant a perfume of devout and holy feeling, that in no way should they be rejected because of those things at the beginning (rightly intuited, but less surely argued out). Rather the latter should be demonstrated more firmly and so everything received with very great respect and praise.

I would suggest to you, my patient readers, that the above claims should be evident. I merely exhort all who read this to give great consideration and patience to any of the great thinkers that have gone before, and most especially if they bear the great title of Doctor of the Church as St. Anselm, Doctor Magnificens.



In the St. Anselm's Proslogion, he makes his famous and controversial argument for the existence of God. Whether or not one agrees or disagrees with this argument, in the end all can agree that it is hard to wrap one's mind about the argument, and in particular, to find the middle term of the argument. Below I will argue that the reason this difficulty arises is that the argument is to be taken as per se notum, that this is the best way to take the argument, and that the arguments St. Anselm does provide are merely manifestations of the truth is he is trying to show, not actually proofs or demonstrations of that conclusion. I will quote St. Anselm's argument below, and then begin my discussion.

And surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind alone, this same that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is that-than-which-a-greater-can-be-thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists both in the mind and in reality.

Now, “Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota quod praedictum uncluditur in ratione subiecti.” (ST1,Q2,a1 respondeo). Therefore, in order to show that St. Anselm's proposition is per se notum, we must discover the predicate in the account of subject. It is important to note here St. Thomas's distinction, i.e. “Aliquid dicitur per se notum dupliciter: uno modo, secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secudum se et quoad nos.” Now, the subject of the proposition in question is That-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought; the predicate is existence. That this is per se notum is clear from this, that the very argument for the truth of the proposition is the subject itself. The very reason, that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, exists is that it is that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, which is to say, that the predicate is contained in the subject. This is shown in other per se notum propositions as well.
They way St. Anselm gives the argument, it seems as though there is actually a movement of the mind. However, it is merely a manifestation of the truth through the the subject of the proposition, not an actual demonstration. Let us take, for example another per se notum proposition,the whole is greater than the part. If the whole is less than the part, then it would a part, but it is the whole, which is absurd, therefore the whole is greater than the part. Thus, we see that one can give the appearance of an some sort of demonstration for per se notum propositions, but they will always bear the traits of being a reduxio and of turning to the subject, or definition of the subject for the “reason”.
St. Anselm never seems to be formally attentive to this idea in his work, though his argument seems to tend this way even from the beginning when he his discussing how it came to him, "So it was that one day when I was quite worn out with resisting its importunacy, there came to me, in the very conflict of my thoughts, what I had despaired of finding, so that I eagerly grasped the notion which in my distraction I had been rejecting." Upon examination of his arguments one sees the same pattern throughout. I will leave this to you to prove to yourself, gentle reader. What I am chiefly concerned with here, is the nature of his main argument as we have given it above. I will therefore turn to my final concern and show this is the best way to take the argument.
The argument for why this is the best way to take the argument is simple: it is the only way the argument can be seen to be true. Remember above when we made the distinction between per se notum propositions. St. Anselm's proposition is a case of a proposition that is per se notum in itself, but not to us. For if one could grasp fully what it was to be God, that is, if one could see the divine essence or comprehend it, that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists, would be a self evident proposition. Furthermore, St. Thomas treats the argument in Question 2, article 1, as a self evident proposition. Therefore it seems clear that this is the best way to take the argument.

I know that I failed to provide an examination of the various arguments from Anselm's text, but I thought it better to avoid the tediom of such an exercise. Moreover, what is important here is to see the nature of Anselm's first argument as well as to see that this is the best way to take the argument, and this has been shown.