Aristotle gives the proper order of investigation in 415a 15-23: object, operation, power, soul. But in considering the intellect, he first considers the power (429a 10 – 430a 26), then its operation (430a 27 – 431a 4). Again, in considering the possible intellect, he first considers the power of the possible intellect (429a 10 – 429b 9), then its object (429b 10-23). Any thoughts?
Labels: Aristotle, physics, quodlibetal question
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My first thought on this matter is that perhaps, having treated of all of the sense powers, Aristotle moves directly to the power of the intellect because it can only be come to through an analogy with the senses. The intellect is unlike any other power of the soul. It is the knowing power, but is itself not very knowable to. Therefore, it might be necessary that Aristotle move to its treatment directly. The senses, while more knowable to us are less knowable in themselves. They can only be spoken of distinctly by first treating of their objects. The intellect, I suppose, is realized by the fact that we know something, but the object is present in this initial consideration only indistinctly. It is only be seeing what kind of power the intellect is, through analogy to the sense powers, that we are able to determine its object more precisely.
There, at least, is some food for thought. Feel free to cut out the fat, or bring in your own dish.